The Post-PyeongChang Prospects for a North-South Summit

The PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games witnessed history when North and South Korea joined together as one (hockey) team to show the world that a peaceful solution of the Korean question may be achieved.

After a series of dialogues that led to North Korea’s participation in the Olympics, as well as warmer relations with the South, North Korea even suggested inviting South Korean President Moon Jae-in to Pyongyang. The invitation was delivered by Kim Yo-jong, Kim Jong-un’s younger sister and close aide, during a meeting at the Blue House on February 10.

Although a hopeful development for the international community, South Korea’s politicians are divided over whether the North’s recent approach is of good faith, or is merely driven by an ideological motive that seeks to undermine South Korea’s integrity.

Choo Mi-ae, head of the ruling liberal Minjoo Party of Korea, welcomed North Korea’s invitation on February 12, saying that “a North-South summit will be recorded as the greatest achievement of the PyeongChang Olympics.” According to Choo, “the summit will serve as a meaningful opportunity for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

Lee Jeong-mi, head of the liberal Justice Party, said on the same day that “the third North-South summit will prove to the world that the Korean Peninsula has chosen peace over war,” adding that “the government should embark on substantial preparation for the summit by sending a special envoy to North Korea.”

On the other hand, Jang Jae-won, spokesperson for the conservative Liberty Korea Party, has criticized the North’s invitation, saying that “a summit not based on the premise of denuclearization is madness that flatters North Korea and shuns the United States.”

Jeong Tae-ok, spokesperson for the same party, also pointed out that “North Korea came to the Olympics and asked for a summit thanks to South Korea’s combined military exercises, deployment of strategic assets from the U.S., and international pressure for denuclearization.”

“[A] summit will drive away not just the exercises or strategic assets, but also tear down international cooperation,” Jeong warned.

Yoo Seung-min, head of the conservative Bareun Party, agreed, saying “a summit that cannot solve the nuclear problem, undermines sanctions, and brings down U.S.-ROK alliance is worth not having it at all.”

According to the conservatives, South Korea must maintain heavy sanctions on North Korea until they begin to take substantial effect and hold U.S.-ROK combined military exercises as soon as the Olympics are over to convince North Korea not to resort to military options, including limited strikes on South Korea and the United States.

The liberals also do not seem all too eager for rapid moves toward a North-South summit. While still welcoming the North’s gesture, they have mentioned the need to first set the right conditions to convince the international community, particularly the United States, before taking on the idea of holding talks.

Choo, of the Minjoo Party, has in fact said that South Korea should “convince the United States and other allied nations to garner international support, based on which North and South heads of states can meet.” She stood by Moon’s response to the invitation: “avoiding giving an immediate answer, but shaping the right environment.”

If an inter-Korean summit takes place, it will be the third of its kind. The first was held in June 2000, and the second was held 11 years ago, in October 2007.

Since the first and second summits occurred during a time when North Korea’s nuclear development was an “allegation,” they focused on recovering the trust between North and South Korea via closer exchanges and alleviating military tension in the Korean Peninsula.

Now, however, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are less a matter of “if” and more a matter of “how much.” Reportedly, Pyongyang may have the capability to reach targets as far away as the United States. In the meantime, there is no alternative to dialogue except heavy sanctions on North Korea, not to mention the Trump administration’s military option.

Therefore, experts argue that it will be imperative for the South Korean government to handle the denuclearization issue as a main topic of discussion for the summit. Hong Min, director of North Korean Studies at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said that the summit “will only face criticism if it fails to deliver a certain amount of success in the denuclearization problem.”

Experts argue that the most reasonable outcome of the summit would be for North Korea to declare a moratorium on conducting additional nuclear tests, as was done in 1999 when the “Perry Process” led North Korea to halt its missile tests, at least temporarily.

Some believe that this may be an option that even the United States can consider as a starting point for a U.S.-North Korean dialogue. Throughout the process, however, South Korea should “maintain its role as a facilitator to achieve dialogue, even if the United States continues to add pressure on North Korea,” Hong mentioned.

North Korea’s shift into a “peace player” since it announced a willingness to improve relations with South Korea, as stated in Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s address, is a source of concern for many in South Korea, who have dubbed the outreach “peace offense.” The summit invitation does not help in that respect.

Yet, sending Kim’s younger sister as a special envoy to South Korea, as well as disclosing the returned envoy’s report and follow-up measures to the media are quite unprecedented in Korean history. Some experts are hopeful that North Korea may come up with yet another surprise if a summit is to take place.