China’s Two Sessions: Implications for the World

The 2018 annual session of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) will be long remembered for its momentous shake up of the status quo. In an unusually long session – running from March 5 to 20 – the NPC not only passed constitutional amendments but pushed through a massive reorganization of the State Council and its ministries, created a new, powerful anti-corruption body, and appointed the leaders who will govern China’s state apparatus for the next five years.

While the most immediate consequences for all these moves are domestic, the world should take notice as well. The trends and developments that solidified into actual policy with the NPC’s rubber-stamp approval will have important implications for how China interacts with the world – and vice versa.

Xi as “President for Life”

Ahead of the NPC session, the biggest news was a constitutional amendment plan that (among many other changes) struck down the two-term limit on the presidency and vice presidency. There were no similar restrictions on the other two offices that make up China’s power triangle: the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the chair of the Central Military Commission. With presidential term limits now a thing of the past, Xi Jinping can legally hold on to all three roles for a third term, and possibly much longer. One academic quoted in a Global Times article justified the term limit change by arguing China needs “stable, strong and consistent leadership” – through 2035.

Whether or not Xi stays that long (it’s not impossible; he would turn 82 in 2035), he is going to be leading China well into the 2020s – and that means there’s no 10-year expiration date on his muscular diplomatic strategy.

It’s a bit misleading to say that China’s recent assertive turn is entirely due to Xi; even under former President Hu Jintao, China was making moves in the South China Sea, investing in port and rail infrastructure across Asia and Africa, and pushing for more representation in global bodies like the IMF. However, there’s no denying that Xi has taken China’s global role to a new level. That’s a major part of what defines Xi’s self-termed “new era” for China – more global influence, which is seen in Beijing as simply a necessary measure of respect for a global power.

As long as Xi and his “new era” continue to define China, we can expect to see the country increasingly engaged in global issues. Whether that’s a negative or positive largely depends on your perspective – but either way, governments around the world should be preparing themselves to respond.

Wang Qishan Is Back

Xi is not the only familiar face bucking retirement conventions. Wang Qishan, the former anti-corruption czar, would have typically retired after hitting the unofficial age limit and being replaced on the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee during last fall’s 19th Party Congress. However, earlier this year his name resurfaced as a delegate to the NPC, a clear signal that he was going to rejoin Xi – only this time working under the state, rather than the Party, apparatus.

As expected, on March 17 Wang was elected as vice president, typically either a figurehead position or a useful apprenticeship for a successor-in-training. Wang is neither a figurehead nor an apprentice, and thus he will give the role more substance than it has held in the past. Given his close relationship with Xi, expect Wang to be more empowered than previous Vice President Li Yuanchao, particularly in any negotiations with foreign countries.

Washington should take particular note of that, as Wang is expected to be tasked specifically with overseeing U.S.-China relations. He has deep experience talking with U.S. counterparts, as he previously co-chaired the U.S.-China economic dialogues from 2009 to 2012, during his stint as vice premier. That experience will come in handy for China as trade frictions heat up again under the Trump administration.

China’s Diplomats Get Promoted

Last fall, then-State Councilor Yang Jiechi was elected to the Politburo, making him the first foreign policy specialist to make it onto the CCP’s second-highest body in 20 years. That trend of empowering diplomats continued at this year’s NPC session, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi taking over Yang’s spot on the State Council. Wang is thus the first official to hold both the foreign minister and state councilor titles since Qian Qichen in the 1990s. The unofficial title of “China’s top diplomat” belongs to the state councilor in charge of the diplomatic portfolio, previously Yang. Now that Wang Yi can claim that title as well, he will be newly empowered in his second term as foreign minister.

Chinese foreign policy analysts have long bemoaned the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is largely an afterthought when it comes to actual policymaking. That may be changing now, with Wang and Yang both receiving effective promotions in quick succession. Along with reports that Wang Qishan will be taking on a foreign policy-heavy role, the message is clear: diplomacy is of increasing importance for China’s leaders, and the bureaucracy is being bolstered accordingly.

The real question is whether this means a corresponding drop in the influence of China’s military leaders over foreign policy decisions – and, if so, whether we will see a softer side of China’s rise over the next five years.

China’s Soft Power Push Continues

On a related note, other announcements signal that China will redouble its efforts to polish its image abroad. First, China will seek to expand its soft power through the newly created Ministry of Culture and Tourism, which combines the functions of the previous Ministry of Culture and National Tourism Administration. Soft power is something of an obsession for Xi, as it’s arguably the area where China’s international clout lags the farthest behind that of the United States. According to a preview of the new ministry published in the South China Morning Post, the aim is “to create a super cultural ministry to expand the scope of China’s ideological influence.” Xi has made no secret of his ambition to promote a “China model” abroad, and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism will be the government body most responsible for carrying out this work.

China also overhauled and streamlined its foreign aid apparatus by creating a dedicated organization – the new State International Development Cooperation Agency – to handle that portfolio. Previously, foreign aid programs had been split between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce; the new agency suggests China is serious about ramping up its foreign donations, with the goal of cementing its image overseas as a responsible, peaceful major power.

According to the official explanation by Vice Premier Wang Yong, China’s foreign aid will have a particular focus on “Belt and Road” countries. Expect such donations to be used as a political reward for countries who sign on to Xi’s signature project, and as a way to counter criticisms that the BRI is taking advantage of participant countries.

In addition to foreign aid, China’s government is poised to ramp up efforts to convince the Chinese diaspora – whether students getting their degrees abroad or ethnic Chinese whose ancestors emigrated generations ago – to support Beijing’s initiatives.

One of the less remarked upon constitutional amendments puts the category of all people who “endeavor to revitalize the Chinese nation” under the umbrella of the “broad patriotic united front” under CCP leadership. As Matt Schrader notes in an analysis for the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief, “This revision refers to the duty of overseas Chinese communities, among them Chinese students studying in foreign universities, to ensure their work contributes to Xi’s restoration of Chinese greatness.”

That means propaganda work to convince the Chinese diaspora of their “duty” will only increase from here, as will corresponding debates in their host or home countries about how to best deal with CCP influence operations abroad.

From Xi’s dominating leadership to CCP influence abroad, none of these issues is new. But the developments at the NPC provide insight into how China conceives of its role abroad, and the world should that seriously.

To give a famous quote from American poet Maya Angelou a foreign policy paraphrase: “When a country shows you who they are, believe them the first time.”