What China Thinks of the Indo-Pacific Strategy

Although the Chinese government has not openly discussed the United States’ “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy – usually referred to simply as the Indo-Pacific strategy in China – the Chinese academic community has had a heated debate about the nature of the concept, the possible impact on China and the region, and the future of U.S.-China relations. These ongoing debates among China’s internal voices shed some light on an important concept in U.S.-China relations and regional affairs in Asia.

China’s Definition

According to some Chinese scholars, the Indo-Pacific strategy is a preliminary idea for the United States to connect the Indian Ocean and the Pacific region, to constrain China's rise from a geopolitical perspective, and to safeguard its own leadership and interests in the region.

Many Chinese scholars believe that the concept has not matured. For example, Lin Minwang, a researcher at Fudan University, believes that the Indo-Pacific strategy is still a concept that needs to be constructed and the quadrilateral security dialogue – the Quad formed of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia –  is only the beginning of the construction of the Indo-Pacific security region.

Moreover, many scholars believe that the Indo-Pacific strategy is simply the descendant of and an expansion on the Obama administration’s “rebalance” strategy. For example, Wang Xiaowen, a scholar at Beijing Language and Culture University, wrote that the Indo-Pacific strategy is essentially an extension and deepening of the “rebalance,” with the aim of strategically linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Zheng Yongnian, a well-known scholar from Singapore, noted that “the rise of the ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ is related to the fact that the world order and the core of power competition are undergoing a major shift.”

The development of the concept is closely related to changes in Asia’s geopolitical situation, and its definition of the Indo-Pacific aims to reshape the regional order. Some scholars believe that the core of the Indo-Pacific strategy is the group of four countries known as the Quad. Jin Canrong, a distinguished Chinese scholar from Renmin University, claims that “the U.S.-Japan-India-Australia alliance is based on democratic values, while Japan-India-Australia-Vietnam alliance, which the United States acquiesces to and Japan plays a leading role in, is a geopolitical concept.”

At present, the United States, India, Japan, and Australia seem to have different assessments and considerations regarding the Indo-Pacific strategy. Due to the decline of the United States’ power and internal divisions in the alliance system, and the differences in capabilities among countries, there are differences in how each member mobilizes strategic resources. In that sense, many Chinese scholars believe that the Indo-Pacific strategy put forward by the Trump administration is limited and faces many uncertainties in the coming years.

Background of the Indo-Pacific Strategy

In recent years, the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad concept have been raised and advocated by various countries at various points in time. On the one hand, Chinese scholars believe that the geopolitical changes brought about by China's rise are the main reason Washington is devoting efforts to boost Indo-Pacific alliances, and the Indo-Pacific strategy is intended to hedge against China’s future behavior.

Wei Zongyou, a scholar at Fudan University, suggested a few years ago that the Indo-Pacific region is becoming the next geostrategic center of the world. With the rapid rise of China, India and other emerging economies in the Indo-Pacific region have shifted their strategic focuses eastward. The focus of international politics has also shifted to the Indian and Pacific regions. For example, Professor Zhu Feng of Nanjing University believes that Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy reflects the fact that since the end of the Cold War, the Asian regional balance of power and geostrategic situation have shifted. Chen Bangyu, a scholar at Central China Normal University, points out that balancing China is a fundamental motivation for the United States, Australia, and India to promote the Indo-Pacific strategy concept. Xia Liping of Tongji University believes that the American strategy is actually an attempt to regulate the rise of China and India within the framework of the international structure and international rules, which are dominated by the United States. Chinese scholars, in large part, have a similar understanding of the directionality of the Indo-Pacific strategy in that its intention is to suppress China’s rise.

On the other hand, many scholars also recognize that Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy is a revision and update of Obama's “rebalance.” Xue Li, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, believes that the new strategy is needed because of the strategic culture and the need for balance of power in the United States. Hu Xin, a scholar at the National University of Defense Science and Technology, also pointed out that one of the reasons for Trump’s choice of the Indo-Pacific strategy was that the “rebalance” strategy did not succeed and China’s peripheral diplomacy offset whatever early effectiveness the “rebalance” strategy yielded, forcing the United States to find a new “focal point.” In addition, Lin Minwang of Fudan University, who focuses on the study of Sino-Indian relations, believes that promotion of relations among the four Quad countries, and the development of a mechanism for dialogue among the four, is the intrinsic motive force and the basis for sustained development of the security dialogue mechanism.

As such, changes in the geopolitical environment in the Asia-Pacific region are the fundamental causes motivating the creation of the Indo-Pacific strategy. Against the backdrop of the relative weakening of the United States’ dominant position and the increasing shift of geopolitical and economic gravity to the Indo-Pacific, the aim is to reshape alliances and partnerships to respond to China’s rise.

How Does the Strategy Work?

At present, many Chinese strategists have pointed out that since Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy is still in its infancy, its policy direction is uncertain. However, it is not difficult to predict that the United States will launch a campaign of strategic repression against China in many ways.

In the view of many Chinese scholars, the future prospects of the Indo Pacific strategy are vague. Chen Jimin, an associate professor at China's Central Party School, believes that it will face several restrictions: Trump’s “America First” stance erodes the internal motivation for the Indo-Pacific strategy; the current Trump administration team is not robust; and the countries inside the region are “placing two bets” (or hedging) to avoid being overly reliant on an undependable United States. Huang Jing, who was a visiting professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, believes that the mere existence of the Indo-Pacific strategy does not mean that it can be effectively implemented, and whether it can be implemented depends to a large extent on how China responds. Jin Canrong of Renmin University has pointed out more directly that “the idea of the ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ is like a bubble; as soon as the sun shines, the foam disappears.” This point of view directly questions the feasibility and future prospects of the Quad and the wider Indo-Pacific concept.

From this point of view, although Chinese scholars believe that the starting aim of the Indo-Pacific strategy, to a certain extent, is to contain China and hinder the reconstruction of the regional order through strategies such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the Indo-Pacific strategy may face resource problems, and/or be derailed by further changes in the regional situation and the inability of all parties to participate fully.

Chinese scholars thus doubt whether the Indo-Pacific strategy can achieve its goals. However, some scholars have also analyzed specific policy trends of the United States and how they reflect upon the strategy. Zhu of Nanjing University believes that the United States will continue to use its military alliances to counterbalance China, expand the Western alliance network in Asia, and deter and contain China on the South China Sea issue. According to an analysis by Wu Minwen of the National University of Defense Science and Technology, as the United States implements the Indo-Pacific strategy in the region, it would adopt comprehensive measures on several levels from the political (pushing democratic values) to the diplomatic (drawing in like-minded partner states) and military (military exercises and arms sales) to further the mission of containing the rise of China. In this, the United States would also aim to weaken China’s influence in order to maintain, ensure, and consolidate Washington’s hegemonic position.

For Chinese scholars, the Indo-Pacific strategy faces many uncertainties. Although its core aim is clear, the possibility of containing China in the Asian region with the Indo-Pacific strategy remains to be seen.

Impact on China-U.S. Relations

Whether it is the Obama administration’s “rebalance” or Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy, the adjustment of the United States’ Asia-Pacific strategy takes Sino-U.S. relations as the key consideration.

The impact of the Indo-Pacific strategy on China and China-U.S. relations is a common concern for many Chinese scholars. On the one hand, due to the fact that the Indo-Pacific strategy is in its infancy, Chinese scholars believe that the damage to China and Sino-U.S. relations is limited so far.

Professor Zhao Kejin of Tsinghua University is more optimistic. He believes that in Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy, China has not been completely positioned as a strategic rival by the United States, and there is still plenty of space for negotiation. Jia Wenshan, a researcher at the National Academy of Development and Strategy at Renmin University, also pointed out that China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo-Pacific strategy are not necessarily in conflict. He noted that “some Western media have considered the Indo-Pacific strategy, which was planned by the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, as a competitor of the Belt and Road Initiative.” But as long as the implementation of the Quad strictly adheres to the three principles of consultation, co-construction, and sharing proposed by China, the Indo-Pacific strategy could actually be regarded as an integral part of China's Belt and Road Initiative.

On the other hand, the competitive and confrontational facets of the Indo-Pacific strategy have made some Chinese scholars pessimistic and concerned about the future of Sino-U.S. relations. For example, Wei Zongyou and other scholars believe that the Indo-Pacific strategy will have a negative impact on China's surrounding strategic environment at least in the short term. Ding Dong, a senior researcher at the International Institute of Peace and Development, a center jointly set up by the Carter Center in the U.S. and Xi’an Transportation University, believes that the transformation of U.S. policy toward China has had an obvious negative impact. He argues that the Indo-Pacific strategy is an enhanced version of Obama's “rebalance.” As a result, Sino-U.S. relations may move toward a “new Cold War” era in the coming years. Moreover, some Chinese scholars believe that the Indo-Pacific strategy may manifest as a competitor to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. With inherent economic and military security facets, the Indo-Pacific strategy could be viewed as competition for the Belt and Road. Such competition would undoubtedly cause harm to Sino-U.S. relations.

All in all, although there are diverse opinions within China when it comes to the newly proposed Indo-Pacific strategy concept, the majority of Chinese scholars tend to view it as a confrontational strategy adopted by the United States in hopes of containing or repressing China’s ultimate rise. However, Chinese scholars are not sure about the future effectiveness of the Indo-Pacific strategy as the coordination problem among the United States, Japan, India and Australia would be tremendous. Thus, most Chinese scholars are adopting a “wait and see” approach and postponing deeper assessments until more evidence is available.