South Korea’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Dilemma

On his visit to Seoul in November 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump suggested to President Moon Jae-in that South Korea participate in the “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy, of which the ROK-U.S. alliance could be an integral part. Trump’s suggestion caught the Moon government off guard. Initially, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the suggestion, noting that a “free and open Indo-Pacific” was consistent with South Korea’s diplomatic strategy to diversify foreign relations. But the Blue House was unenthusiastic. Moon’s chief economic advisor flatly rejected the idea, claiming that FOIP is a Japanese initiative to link Japan with the United States, Australia, and India. Thus, South Korea stands to see little benefit from participating. A Blue House official confirmed that South Korea did not agree to join FOIP during the Trump-Moon summit. The explanation noted that it was “President Trump” who “highlighted that the United States-Republic of Korea alliance remains a linchpin for security, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific,” not both Trump and Moon.

Unlike Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who went all-in on bilateral relations with the United States, Moon wants to split the difference between the U.S. and China. The Moon government understands that the ROK-U.S. alliance is the centerpiece of South Korea’s security and diplomacy. It also understands that, in order for the alliance partnership to be valid, South Korea needs to make a sizable contribution to the U.S. strategy toward Asia. But, at the same time, the Moon government believes that FOIP is designed to contain China. FOIP poses a foreign policy challenge to a Moon government that has been treading on a tightrope between the United States and China.

Factors in South Korea’s FOIP Decision

South Korea’s decision whether to participate in FOIP will be largely dependent upon how the concept evolves. First, South Korea will be more inclined to join FOIP if the initiative comes from the United States rather than Japan. As of now, it seems that the Moon government perceives FOIP as mainly a Japanese initiative to contain China militarily. Since Seoul presumes that Japan has no qualms about containing China, Japan’s leading role is a nonstarter for Korean participation. If Japan is seen as taking the lead, the South Korean government will be hard-pressed to mobilize public support at home. But if FOIP evolves into an official U.S. strategy toward Asia, South Korea would assess the issue of participation more seriously.

Second, if the nature of FOIP as the U.S. Asian strategy grows to be more multidimensional in terms of issues and inclusive in terms of membership, South Korea will be more willing to join. Obama’s Asian rebalancing strategy was multidimensional in that it contained not only military but also economic, diplomatic, and cultural components. If FOIP is hijacked by the Quad (the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India) to reinforce the “security diamond” to contain China, South Korea will face a difficult decision.

So far, the security dialogue between the Quad countries has been the only tangible outcome from FOIP. If FOIP exacerbates great power rivalry, South Korea, along with other countries in the region, will be hesitant to join. FOIP as a strategy will not succeed if it makes countries uncomfortable by presenting tough choices between the United States and China. Many Asian countries prefer not to be forced to pick a side between Washington and Beijing.

In order to mobilize support from countries in the region, FOIP has to address economic and nontraditional security issues. In terms of membership, FOIP has to be more than the Quad, because support from other countries in the region will prove to be critical to the initiative’s success. Furthermore, to mobilize support from other countries, FOIP should be compatible with existing multilateral cooperation mechanisms in the region.

Third, the United States, when it takes on the leadership role, should develop FOIP into a norm-based multilateralism and stay committed to it. Trump went to great lengths to drive home the point that FOIP is meant to protect the norm-based order in the region. During the APEC summit in November 2017, Trump presented a vision of FOIP as “a place where sovereign and independent nations, with diverse cultures and many different dreams, can all prosper side-by-side, and thrive in freedom and in peace.” However, if FOIP becomes a venue for the United States to advance Trump’s “America First” agenda, South Korea and other countries in the region will be less willing to join. Given Washington’s lackluster commitments to the region’s multilateralism and flip-flopping on Asian strategy as administrations come and go, South Korea remains deeply skeptical as to whether FOIP will evolve into a coherent, long-term American strategy toward the region or turn out to be simply short-term political shenanigans.

Fourth, the ideological predilection of the incumbent South Korean government will affect the decision to join FOIP. Historically, South Korea’s vision for Asian regionalism has oscillated between broader multilateralism with inclusive membership to a narrower version with limited membership. Conservative governments have tended to support the former, whereas progressive governments have tended to support the latter. Before the administration of progressive President Kim Dae-jung, the conservative South Korean government’s vision of regionalism had been quite broad, embracing inclusive multilateralism that incorporated countries beyond the traditional East Asian countries. Unlike his predecessors, Kim envisioned a narrower version of regionalism in that he supported Asian multilateralism, not Asia-Pacific multilateralism. Kim’s penchant for Asian multilateralism reflected his political view that Asia needed an independent strategic space from the United States. Kim’s view elicited significant support from China and ASEAN countries, but understandably not from the United States. South Korea’s vision for multilateralism became even narrower as another progressive politician, Roh Moo-hyun, succeeded Kim Dae-jung. Kim was drawn to an idea of multilateralism for East Asia, but the scope of Roh’s idea of regionalism and South Korea’s diplomatic role stayed in Northeast Asia. Roh envisioned South Korea as playing the role of “balancer” in Northeast Asia’s security affairs and emerging as a “hub” in the region’s economy.

President Moon’s election campaign proposed a “Northeast Asia Plus Community of Responsibility (NAPCOR)” as its strategy of multilateralism for the region. The Moon government claims that NAPCOR is meant to continue and expand on the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) of the previous Park Geun-hye government, not to replace it. There are three components to NAPCOR: NAPCI, New Nord-Politik, and New Sud-Politik. The New Nord-Politik is to provide an avenue for inter-Korean reconciliation and to create synergy with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The New Sud-Politik is to expand South Korea’s diplomatic horizon to ASEAN countries and to India. Nevertheless, most of the NAPCOR initiatives are in limbo at this stage.

On the surface, NAPCOR appears to be an inclusive concept, but the U.S. role appears relatively insignificant in the Moon government’s regional strategy. The Moon government seems to agree that the nation’s security alliance with the United States is the cornerstone of South Korea’s security interests, thereby exerting good-faith efforts to reinforce the relationship with the Trump administration. Nonetheless, the Moon government fiddles with the idea of “balanced” foreign relations, which is seen as posing a threat to the country’s security alliance with Washington. The United States and conservatives in South Korea are allergic to the idea of “balanced” foreign relations, because it reminds them of the Roh government’s conception of South Korea as a balancer in Northeast Asia.

Since taking office, Moon has taken great pains to mend fences with Beijing and delayed the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), a U.S. missile defense system. The escalation of North Korean nuclear and missile threats forced the Moon government to complete the deployment of one battery of THAAD in September 2017. But to improve relations with China the Moon government went so far as to make three public promises to Beijing in October 2017: South Korea would not deploy another battery of THAAD, would not participate in the American missile defense system, and would refuse a trilateral security alliance between South Korea, the United States, and Japan. It should not come as a big surprise that the Moon government’s regional strategy mirrors that of the Roh government.

How South Korea Can Capitalize on FOIP

There are compelling reasons for South Korea to be more open-minded and proactive about FOIP.

First, FOIP will present an opportunity for South Korea to broaden its diplomatic horizons, which hitherto have been limited to Northeast Asia. The Moon government should understand that FOIP is not just the Quad’s security strategy, but an emerging regional concept across Asia. The concept of “region” in Asia is in flux. FOIP as an emerging concept echoes the growing importance of maritime cooperation and security in Asia. To that extent, FOIP has the potential to replace existing concepts in Asia. In the era of maritime Asia, South Korea will have to expand its strategic vision and capitalize on the opportunities of FOIP. Japan has long made the decision to expand its strategic vision to FOIP, whereas South Korea’s vision has been confined to Northeast Asia.

South Korea has taken great pains to present itself as a responsible middle power country that contributes to global public goods, but with limited success. The previous Lee Myung-bak government’s diplomatic slogan was “global Korea” to move beyond bilateral diplomacy in Northeast Asia. Former President Park Geun-hye attempted to expand diplomatic efforts beyond Northeast Asia and to lead Asian multilateralism by introducing NAPCI and the Eurasia Initiative. But both the Lee and Park governments were forced to spend most of their foreign policy capital in dealing with the North Korean nuclear and missile problems, and thus failed to diversify diplomatic portfolios beyond Northeast Asia.

Second, FOIP and the Moon government’s New Sud-Politik initiative are mutually reinforcing. The Moon government’s New Sud-politik aims to expand South Korea’s diplomatic efforts to Southeast Asia and India. South Korea’s economy is heavily dependent on China for trade and investment, but China’s “new normal” economy means that South Korea should turn elsewhere for new markets. China’s economic retaliation after the deployment of THAAD was a somber wake-up call that South Korea urgently needs to diversify diplomatic efforts and economic partners. In this context, the importance of Southeast Asia and India looms large as alternative diplomatic and economic partners.

So far, South Korea has put in good-faith efforts to reach out to Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and Vietnam, but not India. The Moon government has not been active in reaching out to India for fear of estranging relations with China. In addition, the New Sud-Politik has been mainly about expanding economic ties southward. But just as FOIP will have to embrace economic and nontraditional security issues to become more appealing, the New Sud-Politik will have to broaden its scope and contribute to the region’s discussion on security and peace to become more viable.

Lastly, if FOIP evolves into a multilateral venue to contribute to the region’s public goods, it can dovetail nicely with the ROK-U.S. alliance, which is morphing into a norm-based global partnership.

FOIP: Beyond ‘Balancing’

The Moon government should understand that participation in FOIP does not necessarily mean that it is up to the task of containing China. The New Nord-Politik initiative of the Moon government is to connect the economy of South Korea to China by way of North Korea and further beyond to Eurasia. In this sense, the New Nord-Politik is compatible with and complementary to China’s BRI. If the New Nord-Politik progresses in tune with the BRI, China will have a difficult time arguing that joining FOIP as an extension of the New Sud-Politik is a ploy to contain Beijing.

In reality, to South Korea, FOIP is more than a matter of choosing between the United States and China. Therefore, the Moon government should not approach FOIP as a matter of “balanced” diplomatic relations between the two great powers. Indo-Pacific is a regional concept that is on the rise and has the potential to become the dominant concept of region in Asia. South Korea will gain substantially by becoming an active member and architect at an earlier stage.

South Korea should not just sit back and wait because of Sinophobia. Rather than sitting on the sidelines, South Korea should get involved at this incipient stage to make significant inputs so that FOIP can develop into a multidimensional and inclusive regional concept and strategy. South Korea should exert good-faith efforts to steer FOIP into embracing the region’s concerns about open sea-lanes, free and fair trade practices, and development cooperation, and so on. Good-faith efforts notwithstanding, it is quite possible for South Korea to face tough choices in the future.

If the “moment-of-truth” choice between the maritime Asia that abides by liberal norms and the continental Asia that is China-centric and illiberal ever arrives, it is in South Korea’s best interests to choose the former over the latter. But one condition has to be met. FOIP will have to develop into a coherent American strategy toward the region that is multidimensional in terms of issues and inclusive in terms of membership, which seems less likely to happen under the Trump administration.