What’s Behind Japan-China Rapprochement?

Japan-China rapprochement seems to be underway. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe hosted South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang for the Seventh Trilateral Summit in Tokyo on May 9; Li then stayed in Japan following the conclusion of the trilateral meeting for a three-day official visit. During his stay, Li had robust engagements in addition to his bilateral meeting with Abe, such as attending the Japan-China Governor’s Forum, visiting Toyota’s electronic vehicle facilities, and meeting with a selected number of Japanese legislators, including the speakers of both the Lower and Upper Houses of the Japanese Diet. Li also had a courtesy call with Emperor Akihito, which is significant as the emperor is set to step down and hand the throne over to his son, Crown Prince Naruhito, in March 2019.

Even more noteworthy was the forward-leaning attitude on rebuilding Beijing’s ties with Tokyo that Li demonstrated during his visit. Appearing in the joint press conference with Abe following their bilateral meeting, Li acknowledged that Japan-China relations have not yet returned to a normal state, but said that his visit was meant to provide the impetus to that end. Li also invited Abe to make an official visit to China, which is likely to happen before the end of this calendar year. It now also looks likely that Chinese President Xi Jinping will visit Japan within the next couple of years.

One can trace the beginning of the rapprochement back to September 2017, when Abe attended the National Day reception at the Chinese embassy in Tokyo. But ironically, the real momentum for the improvement of the China-Japan relationship came when the Trump administration in the United States began to implement its approach to trade policy.

Obviously, China and Japan stand at very different places in their security relationships with the United States — Japan is a staunch U.S. ally, while China has been identified as one of the United States’ main strategic competitors. But oddly enough, the two countries find themselves in a similar place when it comes to trade relations with the United States, with both being subject to hefty tariffs levied by the Trump administration. Although China has so far been more successful than Japan at fending off punitive measures by the United States, the two countries now share the experience of being the target of the Trump administration’s “America First” trade policy, which places a heavy focus on U.S. bilateral trade relations around the world.

In addition, the two countries also share uneasiness about U.S. diplomatic engagement with North Korea. Both Tokyo and Beijing feel that they have not been adequately consulted, even though their engagement will be critical in implementing whatever agreement may emerge after the Trump-Kim summit. Despite the increasing fluidity of developments in U.S.-North Korea relations, including the fluctuating probability of the planned summit meeting between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Japan and China continue to face the reality that neither of them may be able to proactively influence the ultimate fate of the Korean Peninsula.

The current circumstances, if played well, may present an important opportunity for Abe to rebuild Japan’s relationship with China in an entirely new way.

The current rapprochement between Japan and China is unique in the sense that neither side has demonstrated a willingness to compromise their respective core national interests, including the disagreement on sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. Rather, the rapprochement has been possible because Japan and China have finally agreed to focus more on their common interests. Far from compromising on the question of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, Abe’s policy has been to stand firm on exerting Japan’s will to enforce its claim over this area by utilizing the Japan Coast Guard and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in the maritime domain and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force in airspace. By doing so, Abe seems to have been successful in communicating to Beijing that, while Japan is quite willing to revitalize its relationship with China, it will not come at the cost of compromising on its sovereignty claims. In other words, if Beijing wants a better relationship with Tokyo, such a relationship is possible only when Beijing agrees to focus on the areas of potential cooperation while, in essence, agreeing to disagree with Japan over the Senkaku Islands.

Indeed, a Japan-China relationship that will allow them to agree to disagree on some issues while cooperating in others points to the possibility that Japan and China have entered the maturation period of their bilateral relationship, which was long overdue. Should Abe be able to navigate Japan through its bilateral relationship with China and come out having accomplished a noticeable warming of Tokyo’s relationship with Beijing without making a significant compromise on Japan’s sovereignty claims, he would set an important precedent for his successors in the way to handle Japan-China relations: that it is possible to establish a constructive diplomatic relationship with China without making undue compromise on the issues where Tokyo disagrees with Beijing.

And with Tokyo’s relationship with Washington looking more uncertain than ever thanks to the Trump administration’s unpredictable Japan policy, including its willingness to coordinate its policy toward North Korea, setting Japan on the path toward rebuilding relations with China without begging for such rapprochement is an important, though unexpected, diplomatic achievement for Abe.