Abe’s Choice After the LDP Presidential Election

On September 20, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was re-elected for his third term as the president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). His re-election made it certain that, unless he decides to step down before his term ends, Abe will serve as Japanese prime minister until the fall of 2021. Combined with the period from 2006-2007, when he served as prime minister for the first time following the tenure of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Abe will become the longest-serving Japanese prime minister since the Meiji Restoration. 

This brings the inevitable question: What will Abe want to accomplish in his final three years as prime minister? His aspirations are clear. In the policy brochure from his election campaign committee that was released at the end of August, Abe identified five items of focus: economic growth, social security reform, revitalization of the economy, robust global diplomacy, and constitutional revision. In particular, Abe seems determined to move forward with constitutional revision. In the press conference that he held with his challenger for the LDP presidency, former defense minister and former LDP Secretary-General Shigeru Ishiba, on September 10, Abe reiterated his willingness to introduce a revised constitutional draft to the upcoming Extraordinary Session of the Diet to be convened later in the fall.

To be sure, this clearly reflects Abe’s personal aspiration. Moreover, based on the sentiment that the current Japanese constitution was ultimately the product of American occupation in the immediate years following World War II, one of the key organizing principles of the LDP is the enactment of a constitution that has been indigenously drafted, debated, put to the vote at the Diet, and approved by national referendum. If Abe is successful in pushing the constitutional revision through the Diet and if the majority of the public votes in a national referendum to support it, it will no doubt become the watershed moment for postwar Japanese politics.   

Ironically, though, as much enthusiasm as Abe has consistently demonstrated toward constitutional revision, this issue may not be the most fitting place for him to invest his political capital. There are several reasons for this. First and foremost, despite Abe’s enthusiasm, constitutional revision is not the agenda that the public wants their leader to focus on. A poll released by the Nihon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) on September 18 shows that, when asked whether Abe needs to submit a constitutional revision draft to the Diet this fall, only 18 percent replied he does, while 32 percent said there was no need and 40 percent remain ambivalent. Other polls, such as one conducted by the Sankei Shimbun, show that the number of Japanese who support prioritizing constitutional revision is stuck at approximately 27 percent, even among LDP supporters.

More importantly, while Abe has overwhelming support among LDP supporters, as shown by his easy victory in the party’s presidential election, such solid support for Abe does not seems to be shared outside the party. For instance, a poll released by the Yomiuri Shimbun on August 27 indicates that Ishiba attracted far more support among nonaffiliated voters, which account for 40 percent of Japanese voters. Indeed, support for Abe among the Japanese public is extremely soft. The aforementioned NHK poll shows that the public is almost evenly split between those who approve of Abe’s performance (42 percent) and those who do not (39 percent). Even among those who approve of Abe’s performance as prime minister, the primary reason for their support is the lack of better alternatives. This strongly suggests that, should Abe try to push constitutional revision immediately after his re-election, the public may see him as a prime minister who is not interested in the issues that they care about and grow critical of him very quickly.

Furthermore, Abe’s image as an extremely conservative politician, who has often been suspected to have a “revisionist” view of Japanese prewar history, makes any effort by him to bring constitutional revision into the national debate excessively political. Many have jumped to the conclusion that Abe, by revising the Article 9 of the constitution, intends to transform Japan into a country that will fight foreign wars. Considering the level of emotions on display during the debate in the Diet as Abe’s government tried to pass the Peace and Security Legislation — a package of laws that aimed at a modest modernization of Japan’s defense establishment — any debate on constitutional revision that Abe may try to introduce to the Diet will most certainly be even more politically charged. Pursuing this goal, then, will leave Abe with no more political capital to invest in any other important issues that he will need to tackle.

Given such circumstances, Abe might be wise to prioritize other issues in his final years as prime minister. The good news for Abe is that he can expect his final term to be politically stable, even if that’s largely because of the lack of credible alternatives. By leveraging this stability, there are some issues, both foreign and domestic, where Abe can navigate Japan through the current gridlock.

In the area of foreign policy, North Korea is one such issue. Japan can only re-engage in the ongoing multinational diplomacy to determine the roadmap for North Korea’s denuclearization and the long-term future of the Korean Peninsula if Tokyo can break the current impasse vis-à-vis North Korea on abduction issues. Thanks to his stellar credentials as a champion of the abductees and their families, only Abe can forge a path for Japan to proactively participate in the developments surrounding North Korea, even if that could mean modifying Tokyo’s current stance on the abduction issue.

With Russia, as well, Abe’s established image as a conservative politician can help him to move the Japan-Russia relationship forward. Japan-Russia relations have been long constrained by Japan’s position that the sovereignty issue of the Northern Territories needs to be addressed.  Even though Abe’s attempts to leverage his personal relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin have not borne fruit yet, only Abe can afford to explore a new approach for Japan-Russia relations.   

On domestic issues, as well, Abe can leverage his government’s political stability to tackle some unpopular agenda items. Such issues include raising the consumption tax (already slated to take effect in October 2019), social security reform (which may include reorganizing the benefits seniors can receive depending on their income bracket), and more drastic efforts to support working families. As politically difficult as some of the measures may be, they are critical for preparing Japan as its population continues shrinking and rapidly aging.

None of these issues can move forward if Abe decides to prioritize constitutional revision. As Abe enters his finals years as Japan’s prime minister, he will have to decide whether he wants to stick to his personal aspirations or put his country’s interest first.