Pavin Chachavalpongpun

In 2019, Thailand may finally hold the elections its military government has continually punted further down the road since the 2014 coup. But given the new military-backed constitution, do the polls even matter? The established political order – centered on the trifecta of the monarchy, the military, and the bureaucracy – has a lot riding on the outcome, and may not be willing to leave the results in the hands of Thailand’s people.

So what does the future look like for Thai democracy? Pavin Chachavalpongpun, associate professor at Kyoto University's Center for Southeast Asian Studies, provides some much needed context for Thai political developments in this interview with The Diplomat.

The current political transition Thailand is undergoing, which dates back to the time of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra back in the 2000s, has often been framed as growing popular challenges to the established political order anchored around the monarchy, military, and bureaucracy. As we enter 2019, what does that bigger picture look like?

The power struggle, erupting in the 2000s, has continued to shape the Thai political landscape, which suggests the persistent nature of the conflict. Throughout the past two decades, the political fault line has partly been drawn on the role of the monarchy, considered the most revered institution. Thaksin, in self-exile overseas, has remained hugely popular among his supporters in far-flung regions. Now in 2019, even as Thaksin is unable to return home, he still casts a long shadow over Thai politics, particularly during this crucial period leading up to the election.

This will also be the first election under the new reign of King Vajiralongkorn, and therefore the political stakes are high for both the old establishment camp and the Thaksin faction. The old established political order has lost its spell since the death of King Bhumibol Adulyadej in 2016. The decline of the established political order coincided with the domination of politics of Thaksin made possible by his populist policies. Thaksin’s successful populist policies directly challenged the old power. This prompted agents of the establishment, including the military and the judges, to intervene in politics in order to maintain the status quo. The 2019 election is inevitably a contest of the two divided factions over the defense of what are meant to be the interests of the old establishment versus those of the people.

One of the key changes we have seen within that broader context is a much-anticipated royal succession and the consolidation of power of the new King Maha Vajiralongkorn, amid broader questions about the role of the monarchy in Thailand. How do you expect the role of the monarchy to evolve into 2019 and beyond?

Many analysts misinterpreted that the new reign would bring about a rather weak king simply because of the fact that Vajiralongkorn has lacked moral authority enjoyed by his father, Bhumibol. Hence, he would lack legitimacy among his supporters.

But since the death of Bhumibol, time has proven them wrong. Vajiralongkorn, in fact, had commenced the consolidation of his power much earlier than anticipated, even while Bhumibol was at his hospital bed. Vajiralongkorn reorganized the power structure within the walls of the palace, replacing those close to his father with his own confidants. He intervened in the constitutional writing, ordering the junta to amend certain provisions that would augment his political power, including his right to remain overseas without appointing a regent. He also took possession of the wealthy Crown Property Bureau, officially making him the richest monarch in the world. In politics, he handpicked the new army chief, General Apirat Kongsompong, to serve as a crucial instrument in supporting the position of the monarchy, and at the same time deepening the ties that the monarchy has with the army.

This trend of promoting an active monarch has continued into 2019. Alongside, Vajiralongkorn has striven to silence his critics, only this time not by lese-majeste law, but by the Computer Crime Act. Vajiralongkorn is consolidating his power while creating a climate of fear to prevent challenges to the throne.

After multiple delays, the military-led government has said that elections are scheduled for sometime in 2019. Looking ahead to polls, there continue to be questions about the actual significance of the election, given that we have already seen some tinkering with the rules of the game to produce political outcomes more favorable to the interests of certain parties. How would you assess the significance of any election held in 2019, if it actually occurs?

The elections have been repeatedly postponed and there are sensitivities tied to the coronation ceremony, which will start in May. Putting that aside, the elections, while stirring up excitement among Thais, may have little impact on changing the political situation. The junta sponsored the rewriting of the current constitution, which is designed to preserve the power position of the traditional elites. For example, it empowers the Senate over the Lower House, it gives more power to independent organizations in monitoring the government, and it also encourages independent members of parliament so as to break up the domination of power of big parties, like that of Thaksin.

In other words, although the military regime may come to an end after the elections, the political power of the military will remain. The constitution also allows the future prime minister not to be elected. Hence, General Prayut Chan-o-cha, the current prime minister and the leader of the coup, could return to the premiership after elections. The political climate in the post-elections period might be less repressive, but it is surely not democratic. But many Thais still prefer to see the elections going ahead so that some forms of political movements would be allowed instead of them being totally banned under the present military regime.

While the focus is often on more established actors, whether it be the elite or parties linked to former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, there has also been some emphasis on newer voices such as the Future Forward Party. You have been outspoken about the role of such parties in the current environment. Looking ahead into 2019 and beyond, what is your sense of the significance of newer political parties in Thailand? 

For years, while Thaksin and his many political parties have remained vastly popular, and while the electoral process has become a significant tool of Thais, the situation does not necessarily lead Thailand out of the crisis. Thaksin’s supporters feel that they had no other alternatives in politics. The lack of alternative political parties has become an entrapment for many red-shirts, known crudely as supporters of Thaksin, in the need to maintain their loyalty to Thaksin. But in return, Thaksin can take, and indeed has often taken, them for granted.

Recently, new political parties have emerged into the Thai political scene. One of the most prominent parties has been the Future Forward Party led by the young billionaire Thanathorn Jungrungruangkit, with an attractive political platform. The Future Forward Party has pledged to take the military out of politics under the slogan, “restoring the lost decade.” Some of Thaksin’s supporters have realized that they do not need to depend on his party anymore.

But the Future Forward Party is not without flaws. One of the most serious flaws has been the decision not to put forward an agenda on the reform of the lese-majeste law, even when one of the founders, former law professor Piyabutr Saengkanokul, once led a nationwide campaign to amend the draconian law.

Amid the focus on Thai domestic politics in 2019, Thailand’s chairing of ASEAN in 2019 will cast a spotlight on the country's foreign policy as well. The junta’s time in power has seen some notable changes in Thailand’s relationships with neighboring states as well as with some major powers, including the United States and China. What are some key things you will be looking closely at in Thai foreign policy heading into 2019?

Since the coup of 2014, it is fair to say that Thailand has had no foreign policy. Thai diplomacy has been operated under an autopilot mode, and bending with the wind seems to be the common strategy of Thailand in its diplomacy, not unlike some times in its past.

To be succinct, the coup put Thailand in an awkward position vis-à-vis its allies in the West. As a result, international sanctions have been imposed against Thailand. This situation forced Thailand to lean over more to China in order to earn political legitimacy, as much as support in other fronts, inducing the economic. Sino-Thai relations have been strengthened in the past few decades. The growing ties between the two nations have begun to worry the American leadership as the latter sees its declining influence in the kingdom. Because of the domestic situation in Thailand, the country has no choice but to befriend China at the expense of its ties with the West.

The elections may not drastically shift this tendency. Under democracy or authoritarianism, Thailand will have to depend on the rising China. The geographical proximity and the economic role of China in Thailand have dictated the way Thailand has conducted its diplomacy with Beijing. Meanwhile, China has proven to the Thai leadership that it would not interfere in the Thai conflict. The fact that China still allows Thaksin to use its territories as launching pads against the junta attests that China is playing both sides in regard to the power struggle in Thailand. In this game, the U.S. seems to lag behind the Chinese strategic position in this Southeast Asian nation.

Thailand’s foreign policy in 2019 will be advanced at a time when there is an increasing focus on the Indo-Pacific concept. While Thailand is no stranger to calibrating its relationships with major powers during periods of contestation, there have been concerns about how its internal political challenges, when combined with external challenges such as rising U.S.-China tensions and growing strains on multilateralism, could present a tough environment for Bangkok. How do you see Thailand's role within this wider Indo-Pacific concept in 2019 and beyond?

I see little role for Thailand in the Indo-Pacific concept. As I emphasized earlier, Thailand has had no foreign policy. Indeed, since Thaksin was overthrown in the coup in 2006, the great era in foreign policy in Thailand has come to an end. Under Thaksin, Thailand had ambitious foreign policies, such as establishing Asia-wide cooperation through ACD (Asia Cooperation Dialogue), and the ACMECS (Ayeyawaddy-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy). Thailand led the region with new regional visions.

But that period of ambitious foreign policy has long gone. Thailand has become too preoccupied with its own domestic politics, and foreign policy has been abandoned in many cases. For example, Thailand has failed to determine its position in the South China Sea conflict, preferring to sit on the fence mainly to avoid upsetting China. The role of Thailand in ASEAN has also been disparaged simply because of the existence of the military regime in Thailand, which continues to embarrass both the ASEAN goal to build a democratic region and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission of Human Rights. The world can expect little from Thailand, especially because the political turmoil at home is likely to keep Bangkok busy in years ahead.