What Is China Actually Doing for North Korea?

In January, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited Beijing for meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping. It was Kim’s fourth visit to China in the past year – almost as though he is making up for lost time, given that Kim’s first six years in power passed without him setting foot on Chinese soil (or, indeed, visiting any foreign country).

Yet the flurry of visits by Kim to China – and a rumored upcoming visit by Xi to Pyongyang, not yet confirmed by the Chinese government – is somewhat deceiving. While the frequent exchanges between North Korea and China give the impression that Beijing is playing an active role in the current round of diplomacy, in actuality China has taken a remarkably low-key stance.

The undisputed leaders of the current diplomatic trend are Kim and South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in. It was Kim’s overture in his 2018 New Year’s address, and Moon’s willing acceptance of the same, that set the stage for North Korean participation in the PyeongChang Olympics in February 2018; that snowballed into substantial diplomacy between the Koreas. Moon and Kim have held three summits to date: two in Panmunjom just on the South Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and one in Pyongyang. A fourth Kim-Moon summit is supposed to be held in Seoul, which would be a historic first.

The United States has a critical role to play as well – it is South Korea’s major ally, the leader of the UN forces still on the Korean Peninsula, and the driving force behind the global sanctions regime against the North. Simply put, North Korea cannot receive any of its desired rewards for denuclearization – a formal peace treaty to end the Korean War and relief from sanctions – without U.S. support. Thus the June 2018 summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim captured headlines around the world. The preparations for that meeting resuscitated previously inert U.S.-North Korea diplomacy, even if the aftermath has proven disappointing. Now a second Kim-Trump summit is in the works.

Notably, the inter-Korea summits and the Kim-Trump meeting all produced more tangible outcomes, in terms of signed documents and roadmaps for the future, than any of the China-North Korea dialogues so far. True, many of the pronouncements, especially the commitments on denuclearization, were vague, but other promises have led to real-world progress. For example, both Koreas are actively engaged in confidence-building measures along the DMZ, including dismantling guard posts, and are exploring inter-Korea economic cooperation such as railways (although final implementation will depend on the removal of UN sanctions). Even some of the more vague measures – such as Trump and Kim’s agreement to “join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula” – were historic in their ambition, despite a lack of concrete follow-up as yet.

In this context, it’s notable that China and North Korea’s meetings have not resulted in any major deliverables or new promises. Take, for example, the lengthy readout of Kim’s January 2019 visit, as published by China’s state news agency Xinhua and reposted by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The biggest commitment was a vague agreement by both sides “to make joint efforts to push for continuous new development of China-DPRK relations in the new era [and] constantly advance the political settlement process of the Korean Peninsula issue.”

Of course there was plenty of praise for the state of the relationship. Xi claimed that China-North Korea relations “opened a new historic chapter in 2018” while Kim trumpeted that “DPRK-China relations last year were elevated to a new height.” But noticeably absent from the readout was any tangible or specific commitment. No new Chinese investments in North Korea, for example, were rolled out. Even more tellingly, there were no specific promises made by Beijing to assist in the diplomatic process, other than a vague offer of “support” for North Korea’s position.

At each of the Kim-Xi meetings, the only real commitments have been to increase exchanges, including high-level government meetings, party-to-party exchanges, and people-to-people exchanges. If, as many analysts hold, Kim is meeting with Xi so frequently to signal that North Korea has options for development, so far the “China card” remains largely a bluff – both unplayed and uncalled. Despite four trips by Kim to China, Xi has not made any new commitments to aid North Korea either economically or diplomatically.

Of course, this is not to say that China doesn’t have a role to play on the Korean Peninsula. It absolutely does, and Kim’s frequent trips – always close before or after a major bilateral meeting with either South Korea or the United States – attest to that. Doubtless Pyongyang and Beijing are engaged in behind-the-scenes coordination and collaboration at these summits. And if and when Xi does make his inaugural visit to Pyongyang, we could expect some more concrete deliverables, especially in terms of economic aid or investment, then.

Still, it’s undeniable that China’s actual role in the current round of diplomacy has been surprisingly low-key. Other than offering support for North Korea’s positions – and only verbal support, at that – and expressing a general preference for sanctions relief, China isn’t doing much on the Korean Peninsula.

What could China be doing? For one thing, given Kim’s current focus on economic development, Beijing could be promising new investments in North Korea, especially its special economic zones, which have been stalled for years. China could also offer to help fund some of the more ambitious inter-Korean cooperation projects, such as a trans-Korean railway, easily done under China’s “Belt and Road” rubric. There are some reports indicating that China has eased off on sanctions enforcement, effectively increasing trade volumes with North Korea, but that speaks more of a return to an old status quo than a new breakthrough.

Diplomatically, Chinese leaders could be speaking much more vocally about the importance of sanctions relief and/or a final peace deal on the Korean Peninsula. But while China has made its preference for both those objectives clear, it has not shown much inclination to push for either to become reality. Even at an October 2018 meeting among the deputy foreign ministers of China, Russia, and North Korea – three countries all firmly opposed to the U.S.-led sanctions effort – Beijing’s statement was far from bold. “It is time to start considering the adjustment of the UN Security Council’s sanction regime” against North Korea, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement issued after those talks. That is the farthest China seems prepared to go at the moment. Here again, Beijing is punching well below its weight.

It’s possible that, given China’s difficult diplomatic situation at the moment – especially on the U.S.-China relations front – Korean affairs simply aren’t high on Beijing’s priority list. Plus, inserting itself more forcefully into the Korean Peninsula situation risks complicating the fraught U.S.-China relationship even further, with little benefit for Beijing. And, optics aside, there are legitimate questions as to just how far the rapprochement with North Korea has progressed, given the bad blood between the two sides for most of Kim’s reign. Whatever the reason, as long as the situation on the peninsula remains stable, and trending in a positive direction, China seems content to largely keep an eye on developments, without taking an active role.

China has not been “sidelined” on the Korean Peninsula, as many speculated might happen in the lead-up to the Trump-Kim summit. But Beijing does seem to have voluntarily taken a seat on the bench – for now.