Will 2019 Be a Year of Chaos for China?

In China, there is a widespread superstition: Whenever a year ends with the number 9, it will be a year of chaos.

Other than Chinese people’s traditional awe for the number itself, the superstition is also based on China’s history. In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated the Kuomintang and founded a “new China,” the People’s Republic of China. In 1959, the Tibetan uprising erupted in Lhasa while the Chinese mainland suffered the Great Famine. In 1969, a military conflict broke out along the border between China and the Soviet Union. In 1979, China fought a brief war with Vietnam, and at the same time, established diplomatic relations with the United States. In 1989, Beijing brutally cracked down on the Tiananmen Square protests. In 1999, the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade triggered a series of anti-American protests across the country. In 2009, violent riots broke out in Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Thus, many Chinese people believe (though they may not publicly say it) that 2019 could be extremely precarious, particularly considering that this year marks a series of either significant or sensitive anniversaries.

Such a belief has been intensified by many Chinese people’s growing discontent with the rule of Chinese President Xi Jinping.

When Xi became president in 2012, many Chinese liberals placed high hopes on him. They expected that Xi, as the son of Xi Zhongxun (who once served as the deputy prime minister of China and supported Deng Xiaoping’s economic “reform and opening” from the very start), could lead China toward genuine political reform, just like Taiwan’s Chiang Ching-kuo did in the 1980s. Even when Xi started to centralize his power in the following years, many optimistic people still defended him, arguing that Xi had to amass enough power and conquer bitter rivals ahead of launching meaningful reforms.

Such optimism was shattered in 2018, when China’s legislature amended the national constitution and removed the two-term limit for the presidency and the vice presidency, allowing Xi to remain in office as long as he wants.

This fundamental move forced people at home and abroad to face the facts: In terms of human rights, democracy, rule of law, and civil society, China has been going significantly backward under Xi’s rule.

In its World Report 2019, Human Rights Watch said that the severity of human rights repression in China was now “the worst since the violent suppression of the Tiananmen Square democracy movement of 1989.”

The greater the pressure, the greater the counter-reaction will be. More and more people – including China’s top authorities – are worried that a national crisis could take place this year. In his speech marking the 40th anniversary of China’s reform and opening up last last year, Xi himself sent an alarming message to the whole country, saying that “we will face all kinds of risks and challenges in the future and we may even encounter unimaginable, terrifying tidal waves and horrifying storms.”

However, even though he was fully aware of the potential for “unimaginable, terrifying” storms, Xi still vowed that China should stay on the “current path” – or to be more specific, the path he himself has decided upon.

“No one is in a position to dictate to the Chinese people what should or should not be done,” Xi said. “We must resolutely reform what should and can be changed; we must resolutely not reform what shouldn’t and can’t be changed.”

Xi further reiterated the Communist Party’s complete control over the country. “Whether it’s the Party, the government, the army, ordinary people, or students; the east, the west, the south, the north, or the middle, the Party leads everything,” he said.

Xi’s firm stance on China holding to its current path finally provoked Chinese intellectuals to push back.

Soon after Xi’s speech was made, an article titled “100 Chinese public intellectuals issue reflections on the 40th anniversary of reform and opening up” was posted on Chinese social media. In this article, more than 100 Chinese academics, scholars, professors, lawyers, artists, independent commentators, and other professionals contributed their candid views. In one to two sentences, these intellectuals either expressed strong concern for the future or called for genuine reform involving freedom of speech, economic liberalization, the rule of law, genuine elections, and human rights.

For example, Chen Baochen, a media worker in Shandong province, said: “If there is no freedom of speech or thought, the reforms and opening up would have little meaning.”

Jiang Ping, a top Chinese legal scholar, former president of China University of Political Science and Law, and well known for his constant advocacy for rule of law in China, said: “The rule of law is not only a means of reform, but also a goal of reform.”

Cai Shenkun, a political commentator based in Beijing, exclaimed: “Reform is not only about ensuring the people do not go hungry; people also have to dare to speak, and not be afraid to speak out!”

Zhang Qianfan, a constitutional law professor at Beijing University, stated: “Every problem in Chinese society, particularly the erosion of human rights and rule of law in recent years, is fundamentally a result of the lack of real elections.”

Zhang Sizhi, an active rights lawyer who is known as “the lawyers’ conscience” in China, warned: “Friends, we can’t wait until the ‘red sun’ rise above the horizon.”

All these remarks – either harsh criticism against China’s top authority or straightforward demands for freedom of speech – are very rare in today’s China. These public intellectuals knew well that they ran the risk of fierce retribution from the government after publicly expressing such opinions.

Unsurprisingly, the article was quickly removed by China’s censors.

Days later, Zheng Yefu, a sociology professor from China’s prestigious Peking University, published a long article, titled “Why political reform is difficult to achieve” on Chinese social media. In this article, he bravely called for the end of China’s one-party rule.

“In its 70-year history of ruling, the CCP has brought too many disasters to the Chinese people,” Zheng wrote. “Now the only thing both the Chinese people and the ruling party could benefit from is that the CCP should peacefully fade from history, using nonviolent means and with minimal disruption to society.”

“This is the best way forward for the Chinese people, for the Party, and for the leaders of the Party,” Zheng added. “There is no better way.”

Zheng also urged all Chinese intellectuals to speak out for the country. He said: “If … all [intellectuals] stayed true to their conscience, and courageously spoke their minds, then China would not be like this today.”

Notably, even some of China’s liberal-minded political “princelings” have chosen to stand along with these public intellectuals now.

Hu Deping is one of those “princelings.” He is the eldest son of Hu Yaobang, whose death in 1989 ultimately led to the Tiananmen Square crackdown. It had been widely reported earlier that Hu remained close friends with Xi because of their family connection from the previous generation.

On January 16, Hu delivered a public speech to a seminar in Beijing hosted by the Hongfan Institute of Legal and Economic Studies. Hu warned China’s top authority to avoid deadly Soviet errors such as centralizing power and adopting a rigidly planned economy, according to a report by The South China Morning Post.

Apparently, both China’s top authorities and Chinese intellectuals agree that China is at a crossroads now and a potential big crisis is waiting ahead. But the measures each side offers to avoid the crisis are completely opposite.

According to China’s current laws, Zheng Yefu could end up in prison simply for advocating an end to one-party rule, but it seems that such fear can no longer keep China’s intellectuals quiet.