South Korean Conservatives: What Now?

The conservatives ruled in South Korea from 2008-2017. And then the bottom fell out.

Both presidents during this near decade – Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye – are currently in jail on various corruption charges. Before being handed a 24-year prison sentence, Park was impeached, the first time that had ever happened in South Korea’s political history. Suffice to say, the conservatives are not popular today. What happened to Korea’s conservatives and how might they fix the mess they find themselves in?

At the beginning of 2016, things weren’t so bad. The approval rating for the main conservative party – then Saenuri – sat at 40 percent, according to Gallup Korea. This is not notably high, but it isn’t surprisingly low either (the current ruling party of Moon Jae-in, the Minjoo or Democratic Party, had an identical approval rating as of the second week of February, according to Gallup). However, by the end of 2016 Saenuri’s approval would slip more than 20 percentage points to 15 percent before dropping even further as the party imploded.

The collapse of conservative rule began in December 2016 when the ruling Saenuri Party, fractured by the impeachment of then-President Park Geun-hye, split. Those belonging to the “anti-Park” faction and most supportive of impeachment would go on to form the Bareun Party (literally the “Righteous Party”), a center-right party led by Yoo Seung-min. Many of those who stayed on would still support Park’s impeachment, but the factionalism that had been kept bottled up spilled out into the open. Saenuri then rebranded itself (not an uncommon practice for South Korean political parties) as Liberty Party Korea.

The impeachment and removal of Park Geun-hye, coupled with the split of the Saenuri Party, delegitimized conservatism as a viable political identification for many. Little recovery was made under Hong Joon-pyo, who ran as the main conservative presidential candidate in the 2017 special election. Describing himself as “Hong Trump,” Hong fashioned himself as a no-nonsense strongman politician, not dissimilar to former dictator Park Chung-hee (Park Geun-hye’s father). Hong’s campaign was meant to mobilize the conservative base and promoted the idea that Moon Jae-in was a “pro-North” communist sympathizer; it was a platform taken from a Cold War-era playbook. Moon resoundingly defeated Hong by 17 percentage points (41-24 percent). It was the largest margin of victory in the democratic era. It’s easy to imagine an even more lopsided victory without two centrist candidates taking 28 percent of the total vote (Yoo Seung-min for the splinter, center-right party secured 6.7 percent and Ahn Cheol-soo of the center-left People’s Party took 21.4 percent).

What Does It Mean to Be Conservative?

It is clear that conservatives have lost favor with many voters in South Korea, but who, exactly, are the conservatives? The problem with using words like “conservative” and “progressive” – especially for an Anglo-centric audience – is that it invokes a traditional left-right political spectrum that has defined politics of the modern, industrial West. Conservatives are associated with pro-market policies and defense of traditional values and norms, whereas progressives/liberals tend toward greater redistribution and, especially recently, greater social inclusion.

While there are some shared characteristics, it isn’t entirely appropriate to categorize South Korean political identities or parties in the same way. There are issues that divide the population between left and right, but they are different than the commonly understood social cleavages. Conservatives identify with a set of values based on anti-communism (read: anti-North Korea) and the legacy of political and economic development associated Park Chung-hee’s rule (1963-1979). Relatedly, there is a strong geographic association with conservatism. Favored throughout South Korea’s development period (the 1960s-80s), the eastern provinces of Yeongnam (North and South Gyeongsang, including the city of Daegu Metropolitan City) lean conservative. Honam in the west (North and South Jeolla, plus Gwangju), was not allocated the same resources and opportunities as the east; it was also the center of authoritarian opposition. It leans strongly progressive.

Notably, Hong Joon-pyo won a plurality of votes in North and South Gyeongsang, despite the collapse of the Saenuri Party and the general unpopularity of conservatism at the time. South Gyeongsang was a close call (less than a full percentage point difference), but given that Moon Jae-in is from Geoje (South Gyeongsang) it is remarkable that Hong still took a plurality of the votes. Hong also enjoyed the highest level of support among older age cohorts. A plurality of those between 50-59 years-old voted for Hong and a majority of those 70+ voted for the otherwise unpopular conservative candidate.

The 2017 special election is instructive in that it shows the lasting effect of regionalism and notable cohort effects, but exceptional elections like the one in 2017 are just that – exceptional. Do previous elections show similar patterns?

Determinants of Conservative Support

To explore the determinants of voting conservative, I looked at East Asia Institute survey data from 2005, 2010, and 2015. The questionnaires asked respondents who they voted for in the previous presidential elections. Together, they include elections in 2002, 2007, and 2012, which saw one victory for a progressive candidate, Roh Moo-hyun (2002), and two conservative victories, Lee Myung-bak (2007) and Park Geun-hye (2012).

I regressed “voted for conservative candidate” as a dichotomous outcome variable against relevant explanatory variables, plus some controls. The explanatory variables included:

• Support for anti-communism. Specifically, whether one thinks anti-communism is important because of the continuing threat posed by North Korea. Notably, the respondents who agree are equally distributed across age cohorts.

• Monthly income. Reordered as low, middle, and high, this variable is meant to measure income- or class-based voting.

• Age cohorts. This variable is meant to measure cohort effects.

Controls are included for education, gender, geography (the effects of regionalism plus a capital effect for Seoul), and occupation.

The findings are instructive. Across all three elections, those who find value in anti-communism as an ideological bulwark against North Korea are more likely to vote conservative (on average, about 1.6 times more likely). In all but the 2012 election, there is no statistically significant difference between high-income and low-income voters. In 2012, high-income earners were more likely to vote conservative – an interesting finding, and something to consider for future analysis, but a finding limited to 2012 only. The controls for regionalism show expected effects. Those from Honam are highly unlikely to vote for a conservative (compared to everyone else, there is about a 5 percent chance a Honam resident votes conservative), and those from Gyeongsang are much more likely to vote conservative compared to those from elsewhere.

The most notable finding, however, is for age cohorts. For the 2002 and 2007 elections, those aged 60+ were, respectively, 6.2 and 7.7 times more likely to vote for a conservative candidate than respondents in the 19-29 age category. And in 2012 those voters 60 and over were a whopping 14.9 times more likely to vote conservative – in this case, voting for Park Geun-hye (who, coincidentally, beat progressive candidate Moon Jae-in). In the same year, those 50-59 were over 6 times more likely to vote for Park.

As this analysis shows, anti-communism still matters and those 60+ in age, and to a somewhat lesser extent the 50-59 age cohort, represent a bulwark conservative base in South Korean society. Notably, the enormous boost enjoyed by Park Geun-hye is likely due to her relationship to Park Chung-hee and the positive association many older voters in South Korea make with that era. For some conservatives, recognizing the legitimacy of her impeachment would run counter to the attitudes of their constituents. Not everyone agreed with the Constitutional Court’s decision to uphold the impeachment and remove Park Geun-hye from the presidency. Immediately following the announcement, many Park supporters took to the street in protest (three of them, all 60 or older, died in the process).

It should come as little surprise then that a candidate like Hong Joon-pyo received the support he did from older age cohorts; he represented the old guard. In Seoul during the special election, I was repeatedly told in interviews with South Korean citizens that the easiest way to understand politics was by generations.

What Now for the Conservatives?

What does it all mean for conservatives going forward? First, how Moon fares on North Korea does matter, but maybe not as much as one might otherwise think. North Korea policy is one of the few issues on which conservatives and progressives have a clear cut difference in policy positions, and North Korea policy is currently a highly salient issue (in South Korea and beyond). Since Moon’s election, Gallup Korea polls report that those who assess his administration favorably do so because of his North Korea policy.

The baseline position of a median South Korean voter already leans conservative on security issues, and Moon understands this. It is arguably what sets him apart from his progressive predecessor and former boss, Roh Moo-hyun (Moon was Roh’s chief of staff). Roh was known for being more cavalier in his foreign (especially North Korea) policy. Respect for the political landscape is likely why Moon was willing to support the deployment of the U.S. Army’s Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system, despite initially opposing it. He also appointed a number of security-minded people to key posts, including Song Young-moo, a former admiral, as minister of national defense (eventually replaced by similarly qualified Jeong Kyeong-doo). Having Chung Eui-yong as national security adviser, to coordinate with Washington over North Korea, was a move made in a similar vein. The recently concluded cost-sharing deal for American troops is one example among several of the way Moon’s administration has avoided conflict that that conservatives could exploit.

Given their well-known position on North Korea, conservatives stand to gain from any setbacks or failures – real or perceived – encountered by the Moon administration. The same polls that report favorable attitudes toward Moon’s achievements in North-South relations also highlight rising discontent. The Gallup Korea poll on presidential approval from early February shows that among the 47 percent of respondents approving of Moon, 29 percent say they do so because of his North Korea policy (another 8 percent say so because of his diplomacy). Among the 44 percent who disapprove, 10 percent say so because of Moon’s North Korea policy/“pro-North” tendencies. While not a trivial number, a 10 percent hit also isn’t damning. There is still broad support for Moon’s North Korea policy, and one should expect that support to remain unless people are given a reason to think otherwise. With North Korea, that remains a distinct possibility.

However, where Moon is taking the biggest hit is on the economy. Among the 44 percent who disapprove of the job the Moon is doing, 39 percent say they do so because of his inadequate handling of economic problems. This number was even higher in January, at 41 percent.

The discontent is not surprising or unexpected. Most South Korean presidents must contend with the popular demand for economic improvements under post-developmental conditions. High household debt, youth unemployment (and underemployment), and a fall in exports make for a difficult position. It plagued Park Geun-hye’s administration and it’s presenting enormous challenges for the Moon administration, too. During his New Year’s address, Moon vowed to create jobs and provide support for innovation and relief for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) feeling a pinch due to rising wages – all part of his “income-led” growth plan. Meanwhile, youth unemployment remains high as does the number of young “NEETs” (Not in Education, Employment, or Training).

Herein lies both a challenge and an opportunity for South Korea’s conservatives. Presenting a concrete (and realistic) plan for economic reform and revitalization that differs from the progressives would go a long way in attracting new voters. There is some evidence that conservatives are willing to entertain such a strategy. In a recent party debate, prominent conservative politicians, including Oh Se-hoon (former Seoul mayor and candidate for Liberty Korea Party leadership), tested those waters. Oh specifically criticized Moon’s income-led growth strategy, implying that it is populist. He called for welfare advances without populism – but didn’t specify what that means exactly and how it would differ significantly from the Moon administration’s economic policies.

Moon Jae-in is unlikely to adequately address the structural issues causing economic angst among South Koreans. And while his administration has made a concentrated effort to portray improved North-South relations as supporting economic growth, it’s unclear how, exactly, improved relations with North Korea would lead to job creation or greater competitiveness for South Korea’s exporting industries. The conservatives, however, are currently more caught up in factionalism than presenting a clear and programmatic alternative. Opposition to engaging North Korea is well established, but unless North-South talks collapse and the security situation deteriorates, opposition to engagement is not going to win a sufficient level of support for the next general election in 2020.

Seizing on economic anxiety and proposing a solution is the surest way to political recovery for conservatives. However, at no point in the last three elections have either the main conservative or progressive parties campaigned differently on a traditional left-right dimension. On issues like the economy, parties tend toward convergence. In fact, conservatives and progressives are more or less similar in how they present themselves to voters on major economic and social issues, according to the Manifesto Project, which tracks political parties over time on relevant dimensions. This is a problem for conservatives, who have yet to indicate how they might speak to a base that includes voters younger than 55 and outside of Yeongnam.

It remains to be seen how conservatives will move beyond traditional conservative ideas. Another candidate like Hong Joon-pyo seems unlikely as party head in 2020. Running on an anti-communist platform isn’t going to play with large swaths of the population, as a vast majority of South Koreans do not think Moon is going to sell out the republic.

Back to Their Roots?

A more likely scenario is the elevation of a politician like Kim Moo-sung. The former Saenuri Party chairperson (2014-2016), Kim has both the name recognition and clout necessary to lead a reinvigorated conservative movement. Importantly, Kim was probably the most senior member of the Saenuri Party to support the impeachment motion, saying publicly: “In order to reinvent the conservatives and to take the responsibility before the people, I will lead a discussion inside the Saenuri Party to sponsor a motion to impeach [Park Geun-hye].”

Kim Moo-sung can trace the origins of his political career back to former President Kim Young-sam (recently deceased). The latter Kim is one of the few South Korean politicians who is praised by both conservatives and progressives. The first civilian president, he was a long-time member of the opposition to authoritarian rule but pragmatic enough to join forces with former members of the Democratic Justice Party (the party created by dictator Chun Doo-hwan) in order to take power and rule effectively (ironically, Kim would oversee Chun’s conviction and imprisonment).

Was Kim Young-sam a conservative? That’s a hard sell, given his democratic activist bona fides. He was more likely a pro-democratic pragmatist. This is precisely the image Kim Moo-sung portrays. Will he, or someone like him, make a run for Liberty Korea Party leadership? It’s possible but doesn’t seem imminent – not now, anyway.

A winning conservative strategy is likely one that prioritizes reversing the image of conservatives as anti-democratic. This doesn’t seem like a hard feat to accomplish but given the ongoing rift between pro- and anti-Park conservatives, presenting an image of the party that appeals to the country’s democrats (small d) is more of a challenge that it seems.

As recently as December of last year, prominent conservatives (Kim Moo-sung included, representing the anti-Park faction) were openly debating whether Park’s impeachment was justified. More recently, the party has had to apologize after several far-right members of Liberty Korea Party claimed that the 1980 democratic uprising in Gwangju, which was violently crushed by South Korean soldiers, was merely a riot instigated by North Korean special forces. This is not the first time this false claim has been made by conservative voices.

If conservatives hope to be a viable competitor again for national leadership, they will need to rekindle the pro-democratic pragmatism of the 1990s coupled with more specific policy alternatives. They are not currently heading in that direction, but politics is a fast-moving game. There is plenty of time between now and the next general election.