Indian Hindu Nationalism’s Nepali Cousin

In the Indian general election slated for April and May, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is expected to struggle to maintain its hold on power. In a possible bellwether, the BJP lost several important state-level elections in December 2018. The BJP faces challenges from its main rival, the Indian National Congress, as well as other regional parties on issues related to governance, corruption, unemployment, and caste- and language-based identity issues.

In addition, religion will play a major role in the election.

Since its founding in 1980, the BJP’s calling card has been Hindu nationalism (despite certain BJP leaders, such as Atal Vajpayee, prime minister from 1998-2004, advocating a “softer” form of it). India is a secular state, but in recent years the BJP has focused on divisive religious issues like the protection of the cow – an animal that is sacred to Hindus, who make up about 80 percent of the Indian population, but not for Muslims, who are India’s largest minority.

One of the BJP’s most radical ideologues, the Hindu monk-turned-politician Yogi Adityanath, has made cow protection a centerpiece of his work since becoming the head of government in Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state, in 2017. Adityanath’s government has cracked down on illegal slaughterhouses – many of them owned by Muslims – and local authorities have sometimes turned a blind eye as vigilante mobs lynched traders suspected of selling cattle for beef.

But the crackdown on cow slaughter in Uttar Pradesh has had unintended consequences. As the Indian environmental magazine Down to Earth reported in January, the new policy has disrupted an age-old symbiotic relationship between Hindu farmers, who need to dispose of old, unproductive cattle, and Muslim slaughterhouse owners and leather workers, who bought them. Many Hindu farmers now release cattle they can no longer afford to feed into neighboring villages, where they wreak havoc by eating crops. In some places, the feral cow problem has become so serious that farmers are rounding them up, driving them into forests in Nepal (which borders UP), and letting them go.

One BJP activist told Down to Earth: “It doesn’t create tension among villages and the animals are left safe as Nepal is a Hindu nation.”

The activist’s reasoning can be critiqued on several levels; for example, the cattle are liable to be eaten by the tigers and leopards that roam Nepal’s forests. But the statement also illustrates a common Indian misconception about Nepal, a small neighbor whose internal politics the average Indian pays little attention to.

Historically, Indian Hindu nationalists held up Nepal as an example of how India could adopt a strong Hindu identity. Ruled by Hindu kings from the 18th century until 2006, Nepal was never colonized. But in 2007, Nepal became a secular republic. While some Hindu laws remain in place, today the country’s main Hindu nationalist party controls only a single seat in parliament. Unlike in India, where Hindu nationalist politics has been on the rise since the late 1980s (when the BJP first won a substantial number of seats in parliament), “Hindu nationalism” as a movement cannot be said to be strong in Nepal. A closer examination of the reasons why exposes important fault-lines in Nepali politics today, and provides perspective on the Hindu nationalist movement in India.

A Hindu Nation Is Born

The modern Nepali state was created in the late 18th century when Prithvi Narayan Shah, the king of Gorkha, a small state in today's western Nepal, conquered several dozen adjacent kingdoms in the Himalayas, the foothills, and northern fringes of the Indo-Gangetic plain. In the main record of his proclamations, Dibya Upadesh, Shah characterized Nepal as a “true” or “pure” Hindustan (land of the Hindus). Conquest was justified as necessary to protect Nepal from incursions from India, where religious “others” ruled. At the time, the Mughal empire was gradually being replaced by the British Empire. The religion of the British, Christianity, was seen by Nepalis as equally foreign as the Mughals’ Islam. (The last great Hindu kings in India, the Marathas, were defeated by the British by 1817.)

The Rana dynasty, which ruled Nepal from 1846-1950 while retaining Prithvi Narayan Shah’s descendants as figurehead kings, further entrenched Hinduism in the affairs of the state. They drew up the country’s first legal code in 1853, which was partially based on the ancient Hindu text the Manusmriti. The law prohibited the slaughter of cows and prescribed the rights and obligations of the kingdom’s subjects based on their caste status. (For example, low-caste criminals were subject to more severe punishments than those from high castes.)

The legal code formally ranked each caste, ethnic, and religious group in the country according to a Hindu caste-based hierarchy. This was relatively straightforward for Hindu groups, which today form around 80 percent of the country (comparable to the proportion of Hindus in modern India). But Nepal also had a large minority of Buddhists, as well as smaller populations of animistic Kirantis and Muslims. The law incorporated these groups into the hierarchy. Muslims, for example, were deemed to be “impure, but nonenslavable.” In response, some lower castes and traditionally Buddhist ethnic groups began to emulate high-caste Hindu culture in an attempt to improve their caste status – a process that anthropologists call “sanskritization.”

The Shahs and Ranas also emphasized the need to maintain ritual purity within their kingdom. As the anthropologist Richard Burghart describes, travel into Nepal was restricted for foreigners, and even Nepalis who travelled outside of the Hindu realm were required to undergo a purifying ritual upon re-entering. The country’s relative isolation also limited the spread of subversive ideas, helping the Ranas to maintain control of the state until the mid-20th century.

In 1950, Nepal underwent a revolution that simultaneously ousted the Ranas, reinstated the Shah monarchy, and ushered in a decade-long period of democracy, with ministerial cabinets serving under the king. The Nepali Congress party, which led the revolution, was heavily influenced by the secular, socialist, modernizing vision of the Indian National Congress (INC) party that had led India’s independence movement. The Nepali Congress won the country’s first elections, held in 1959, but was quickly deposed when King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev seized power in a coup in 1960.

Under the period of party-less monarchical rule that followed, King Mahendra in many ways continued the process, set in motion by the Nepali Congress, to secularize aspects of the law and bureaucracy. He replaced the religiously-based national code and legally abolished caste-based discrimination in 1963. His son, King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah, often included ethnic and religious minorities in ministerial appointments after acceding to the throne in 1972.

Simultaneously, however, the monarchy sought to bolster Nepal’s Hindu identity. Mahendra declared Hinduism the state religion in 1962. The move contrasted with his secular tendencies, but historians have explained it in terms of political considerations vis-à-vis India. INC leaders had denounced the king’s 1960 coup, and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had accepted exiled Nepali Congress leaders into his country, from where they staged a brief armed insurrection back into Nepal in 1961-62. Mahendra, by shoring up his Hindu credentials, could bolster support among conservative Nepalis (mainly high-caste Hindus) as a bulwark against the secular Nepali Congress and their INC allies.

Nepal’s monarchy also developed connections with the Hindu right in India, especially through the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), an Indian Hindu nationalist organization founded in the 1920s. Though the group was briefly banned after one of its former members assassinated Mohandas Gandhi in 1948, it expanded in subsequent decades through a proliferation of local-level branches, becoming a significant grassroots movement in opposition to the secularism of the INC. The RSS formed various spin-off organizations, known collectively as the Sangh Parivar (“Sangh Family”) including a labor union, a student union, and political parties – the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and its successor, the BJP.

For members of the Sangh Parivar, the Hindu monarchy in Nepal was a symbol of Hindu strength. In the 1980s, the Parivar’s international arm, the Vishva Hindu Parishad, bestowed upon the Nepali monarch the grandiose title “World Hindu Emperor.” As journalist Prashant Jha noted in a 2007 piece for Himal Southasian magazine, the Shah monarchs also cultivated close ties with the Indian Hindu right through the Gorakhnath temple, an important center for Parivar activism, located just across the border in the city of Gorakhpur, Uttar Pradesh. The Shah monarchy had been visiting the temple for generations because it houses one of the family’s patron deities. Its chief priests, whom the Shahs patronized, have been involved in Hindu right-wing politics since the early 20th century. The current chief priest of Gorakhnath is none other than Yogi Adityanath, the chief minister currently leading the crackdown on cow slaughter in Uttar Pradesh.

Secularism and Its Discontents

In 1990, a popular movement for democracy forced the Nepali monarchy to concede to a new constitution that established multiparty democracy under the aegis of the king, who remained the head of state. The country remained officially Hindu, though for the first time certain groups began openly agitating for secularism.

An early push for secularism came from indigenous ethnic groups – known as Janajati – who make up just under a third of Nepal’s population. Many Janajati groups had traditionally practiced Buddhism but had, to varying degrees, adopted Hinduism. A new, urban Janajati intelligentsia critiqued high-caste Hindu groups’ historical control of the state through the monarchy and the new democratic political class, which was similarly dominated by Chhetris (the warrior caste of the monarchy) and Brahmins. Some Janajati activists began to advocate for a return to Buddhism, eschewing major Hindu festivals.

Though religious proselytizing remained banned, prosecutions for proselytization declined after 1990, as described by anthropologists David N. Gellner and Chiara Letizia in the book Religion, Secularism, and Ethnicity in Contemporary Nepal. Religious conversions had been heavily restricted before, but now people were free to convert to religions like Islam and Christianity of their own accord. Christians were included in the national census for the first time in 1991, though their numbers remained low.

In 1996, Maoist rebels launched a countryside-based insurgency against the democratic government and the monarchy that rocked the country for the next decade. The Maoists targeted landlords, moneylenders, and other “class enemies,” and also called for an end to caste- and ethnicity-based discrimination.

Though they were not as virulently anti-religion as their Chinese counterparts, Nepal’s Maoist rebels called for secularism and the abolition of the Hindu monarchy. For the Maoists, secularism was connected to class struggle in that economic inequality often – especially in rural areas – mapped onto caste hierarchies: large landowners tended to come from the higher castes.

In 2002, the monarchy under King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev dissolved parliament and appointed a caretaker government, claiming that the move was necessary to better prosecute the war against the Maoists. However, Gyanendra proved to be a deeply unpopular king. There was widespread doubt about his accession to the throne; many Nepalis believed a conspiracy theory that he had ordered the infamous “Palace Massacre,” resulting in the death of his brother and predecessor, King Birendra, in 2001. Moreover, Gyanendra demonstrated dictatorial tendencies when he assumed emergency powers in 2005. Widespread dissatisfaction with the monarchy led to a rapprochement between the Maoists and the democratic parties, paving the way for a popular movement of street protests that ousted Gyanendra in early 2006.

Secularism was declared by a re-instituted parliament in May 2006, and again by a new interim constitution promulgated in January 2007. Then, following elections for a constitution-drafting Constituent Assembly, in which the Maoists won the most seats, an overwhelming majority of representatives re-affirmed secularism and abolished the monarchy in May 2008.

Following this rather quick turn of events, a backlash began to grow against secularism among conservative Hindus. Many pointed out – rightly so – that secularism had been ushered in without much parliamentary debate. While support for ending the monarchy remained strong, some leaders began to question if it could have been accomplished without secularism. Similarly, public opinion polls conducted between 2006 and 2012, and analyzed by political scientist Pawan Kumar Sen, suggested that a majority of Nepalis (between 55 and 60 percent) favored a Hindu state. (However, among certain subpopulations, such as non-Hindus and Janajati groups, secularism remained popular.)

The Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), a conservative Hindu nationalist party with long-standing ties to the monarchy, led the anti-secular activists, along with support from several smaller, more radical local groups with ties to the Sangh Parivar.

Nepal’s Hindu nationalists exploited instances where Hinduism seemed to be under attack, such as when a Nepali modern artist exhibited paintings that took artistic licenses with Hindu gods, or when Pashupatinath – Nepal’s most holy temple – began allowing the burial of Christians on its grounds. Though they were generally accepting of Buddhism and Kirantism (which they characterized as “sects” within Hinduism), the Hindu nationalists claimed that secularism would disturb social harmony by inciting religious conflict, namely from Christianity and Islam. Such reasoning has not borne out. When it has occurred, post-secularism religious violence has mostly been directed at these minorities: For example, the bombing of a mosque in the city of Biratnagar in 2008, the bombing of a church in Kathmandu in 2009, the bombing of two churches in Jhapa District in 2015, and arson against a Kathmandu church in 2017.

Due to disputes mostly unrelated to secularism, the Constituent Assembly was unable to finalize a new constitution in the allotted period, so elections were held for a second Constituent Assembly in 2013. Though the RPP had performed dismally in 2008, it capitalized on public unease with secularism to gain nearly 40 seats in 2013, becoming the fourth largest party. Emboldened by their victory (and perhaps by the rise of the BJP in India in 2014), the RPP and other Hindu nationalist groups intensified their protests against secularism in cities and towns across the country.

Ignoring the fact that Buddhist Janajati activists and atheist Maoists had pushed for secularism for years, the RPP and associated groups’ leaders spoke of secularism as a foreign conspiracy, instigated by Christians seeking to dominate the country. Suspicions only increased when foreign diplomats voiced support for religious freedom; for example, an open letter by the British ambassador in 2014 sparked public furor by urging Constituent Assembly members to protect the right to change one’s religion.

The Christian conspiracy theory found a receptive audience in Nepal. Though Christians are only a small minority (about 1.4 percent of the population, according to the most recent census), they have been rapidly expanding in terms of numbers and public visibility. Church services have become more public, often featuring loud musical bands, under secularism. As Luke Wagner, an anthropologist of Nepali Hindu nationalism writes, Nepali society is particularly susceptible to conspiracy theories: “[T]here is a pre-existing expectation there is more to [any] story than the public is told.”

In the end, the RPP and other Hindu nationalists were unsuccessful in fully repealing secularism, but the new constitution promulgated by the Constituent Assembly in September 2015 offered a compromise. While it declared Nepal secular, it defined this as “religious and cultural freedom, along with the protections of religion and custom practiced from ancient times,” implying special protections for Hinduism, Buddhism, and Kirantism. The law against proselytizing remains in place, as does the ban on cow slaughter (the Supreme Court in 2007 declared the ban constitutional because the cow is the national animal, thereby justifying it on secular grounds).

Chiara Letizia, an anthropologist of Nepal at the University of Quebec, has written that, rather than representing a separation of religion and state, secularism in Nepal has come to mean the state’s equal patronization of various religions. The president, as head of state, now attends annual Hindu rituals once attended by the king, but she and other state officials also attend events of other religions and ethnicities, such as the Tamang Buddhist new year, Tharu new year, and Kirant festivals, many of which are now public holidays. (Political VIP attendance at Christian and Muslim events is much less common.)

Anti-Secularism or Hindu Nationalism?

Despite gaining enough seats to influence the national debate around secularism in the 2013 elections, the RPP fared dismally when the country went to the polls again in 2017, garnering only one seat in parliament. Some analysts see this as a sign that Hindu nationalism has failed to take root in the modern Nepali republic.

Indeed, following the popular movement against King Gyanendra, Hindu nationalists in Nepal have faced an uphill battle to differentiate Hindu nationalism from the (unpopular) monarchy. (The RPP has split into several factions, partly over the question of restituting the monarchy.)

Furthermore, Hindu nationalist groups’ historical reliance on top-down patronage from the king hindered the development of a grassroots base. This is in contrast to the RSS and the Sangh Parivar in India, which spread in the 20th century first as a social movement, then as a political one.

Wagner, the anthropologist, attended Hindu nationalist rallies during the height of their movement in the lead-up to the new constitution’s promulgation. “They turned out huge crowds, but it was always unclear at those crowds who was there in support and who was there just because of the spectacle,” he told me.

Besides the RPP, Indian Hindu nationalists also attempted to forge ties with other political parties in Nepal, but with little success. Madhesis – an umbrella term for various marginalized groups that share culture and language with Indian groups across the border – have become politically organized in Nepal since 2006. Several parties that represent their interests hold seats in national parliament and also control Province 2, which sits along the border with India’s Bihar state. Some Madhesi leaders are seen as close to the Indian religious right, but the Madhesi parties remain primarily committed to ending what they see as nationwide political dominance of high-caste elites from the hills and Kathmandu. This requires broadening their appeal to non-Hindus, as illustrated when one of the Madhesi parties appointed Mohammed Lalbabu Raut, a Muslim, as chief minister of Province 2 in February 2018.

But anti-secular feeling, as distinct from Hindu nationalism, remains strong. Amish Raj Mulmi, a Nepali journalist based in Delhi, says that he thinks opposition to secularism is “not as much about [Hindu nationalism] as much as it is about a rejection of ‘secularism’ as an ideal imposed by western NGOs and governments.”

Many citizens, and especially politicians, resent what they see as Western influence regarding domestic issues more generally. For example, the government continually squabbles with donors over how much aid should be given directly to the government versus spent by international NGOs. And recently, the international community has pressured the Nepali government to implement transitional justice to address human rights abuses committed during the Maoist insurgency, something it is reluctant to do. By suggesting that foreigners are behind secularism and the spread of Christianity in Nepal, politicians may be striking back at donors regarding funding and transitional justice issues.

Anti-secular sentiment is not uncommon in Nepal’s two major parties: the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP), which was formed through a merger of the Maoists and another left party, the Unified Marxist-Leninists, in 2018; and the main opposition, Nepali Congress, which now occupies the center-right of the political spectrum. Khum Bahadur Khadka, a second-rung leader of the Nepali Congress, actively supported the anti-secularism movement in 2014-15, and Shashanka Koirala, who as party secretary holds its number two rank, has publicly called for a referendum on secularism. Similarly, members of the NCP have often voiced concern about the spread of Christianity under secularism. As prime minister in 2017, the then-Maoist (now NCP) leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal canceled Christmas as a public holiday.

Victimhood and Hindu Nationalism

However, the Hindu right faces difficulty turning anti-secular sentiment into support for Hindu nationalism as long as Hindus do not appear to be under threat in Nepal.

Mulmi, the journalist, told me that Hindu nationalism is “at its heart an idea that sprouts on victimhood.” In India, a history of Mughal rule, colonialism, and the existence of an archenemy in the form of the religious state of Pakistan has created a sense of perceived victimhood, allowing Hindu nationalist groups like the Sangh Parivar to prosper. But in Nepal, the Hindu state was historically dominant, and despite the recent shift to secularism, laws favoring Hinduism  – such as bans on cow slaughter and proselytization – remain in place. “We haven't had a history of Hindus, at least the upper-caste ones, being persecuted in Nepal,” Mulmi said.

The Nepali religious right has sometimes sought to foster a sense of Hindu victimhood, but attempts to do so artificially can backfire.

For example, in April 2018, Sriniwas Acharya, a Hindu religious leader, had just finished a tour of eastern Nepal with the former King Gyanendra when he was shot in the middle of the night at the temple where he was staying in Biratnagar. Acharya survived, but the assailants escaped; his supporters declared the assault an “attack on Hinduism.”

However, a month later, two of Acharya’s bodyguards came forward claiming that Acharya had furnished a pistol and instructed them to shoot him. Apparently, the incident was a false flag attempt to gain support for Acharya’s campaign for a Hindu state. Acharya was arrested by the Nepal Police, but was later released on bail and is awaiting trial.