The Taiwan Relations Act at 40

April 10, 2019 marks the 40th anniversary of the United States’ Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The TRA serves as one of the defining documents authorizing U.S.-Taiwan relations, alongside the Three Joint Communiques issued by Washington and Beijing and the Six Assurances offered from the United States to Taiwan. Over the course of 40 years, and due the TRA’s legally binding mandate, relations between the two sides have flourished and deepened, further buttressed by shared values that came with Taiwan’s democratization in the 1990s. Yet, while the TRA remains a cornerstone for both U.S. policy toward Taiwan and the United States’ “One China” policy, the spirit of the document as envisioned by its founders has come under increasing strain from China’s growing challenges to both Washington and Taipei – detracting from the TRA’s declared intentions and effectiveness in managing U.S.-Taiwan relations and safeguarding Taiwan.

History of the TRA

The strategic environment that shaped U.S. policy toward Taiwan – and the passing of the TRA into law – falls against the broader backdrop of Cold War politics that marked the latter half of the 20th century. In the immediate aftermath of the Chinese Civil War, President Harry Truman declared that Washington had no intention of becoming involved in any cross-strait scenario. A shift in U.S. thinking, however, came with the Korean War and the assessment that belligerent moves by communist forces, including against Taiwan, threatened U.S. security interests in the Pacific.

Thus, Washington continued its formal relationship with the Taiwan-based Republic of China (ROC), including maintaining an embassy in Taipei, signing the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, and stationing U.S. troops on the island. However, in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet split, the United States sought to normalize relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Efforts began under the Nixon administration in the 1970s and spanned three separate presidencies. During the negotiations, the PRC maintained three bottom lines: (1) no diplomatic relationship could be maintained with Taipei if the United States were to establish official relations with Beijing, (2) the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC must be severed, and (3) U.S. troops must be removed from Taiwan. The first point is, in effect, the PRC’s assertion of its “One China” principle, which holds that a country must “recognize the government of the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China” when establishing formal ties with Beijing and thus “sever or refrain from establishing diplomatic relations with the Taiwan authorities.”

U.S. diplomats and representatives finessed language to avoid endorsing the PRC’s view. It is important to note that Washington had pressed for a “two China” arrangement – first as a possible solution to cross-strait conflict in the 1950s and then later for representation at the United Nations – but both Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek were adamant that the PRC and ROC, respectively, represented the legitimate government of the entirety of China, to include Taiwan. The formulation that Washington came up with in the Second Communique – or the Normalization Communique – adeptly weaved in multiple layers of ambiguity to allow the United States flexibility in its approach to the triangular relationship. More explicitly, the United States “acknowledges [emphasis authors’] the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China.” Unpacking the nuance, the United States simply takes note of the Chinese stance. Further, the use of the adjective “Chinese” fosters a deeper cloud of obscurity, as it could mean either the PRC or the ROC – with both sides, at the time, maintaining the same territorial claims.

The United States and PRC signed the Normalization Communique on New Year’s Day, 1979. The Carter administration submitted the Taiwan Enabling Act, its proposed blueprint for engaging Taiwan in lieu of a formal relationship, to Congress on January 26, 1979. Assessments of the Taiwan Enabling Act by Congress found the document inadequate, particularly on the security front, with both the House and Senate committees adding sections that called for provisions on Taiwan’s security. Official records from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted that such additions were “designed to reassure the people on Taiwan and alert the PRC to our expectations concerning the future.” Now known as the Taiwan Relations Act, the bill passed 339-50 in the House and 85-4 in the Senate and was subsequently signed into law by President Jimmy Carter.

At the time, the founders of the TRA had deemed the legislation necessary to the maintenance of peace, security, and stability in the western Pacific and to the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other ties between the United States and Taiwan, as outlined in Section 2a. By declaring these goals, the Act elegantly underscores the mutual reinforcement between robust U.S.-Taiwan relations and broader U.S. regional security interests. In terms of policy guidance, the TRA does not decree whether the relationship is official or unofficial, but rather focuses on the conduct of relations with Taiwan in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a formal defense treaty.

The TRA in Practice

To consider how the TRA has fared through four decades of change, one has to evaluate how it has been interpreted and upheld in terms of both the letter and the spirit by subsequent administrations. The United States and Taiwan continue to enjoy strong people-to-people exchanges through tourism and education. This is seen in Taiwan’s inclusion in the visa waiver program in 2012 and the U.S. Global Entry Program in 2017, as well the enduring successes of the State Department’s Fulbright Program on the island and the overall effectiveness of the American Institute in Taiwan as a de facto embassy. Similarly, the two sides enjoy strong trade relations and Taiwan is currently the United States’ 11th largest trading partner. While not without setbacks – seen in the stalled Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) talks over ractopamine in pork, among others – there is a clear trend that commercial relations have flourished over time, in line with the original vision of the TRA. Moreover, Taiwan remains a key market for many American businesses and plays an integral role in their supply chains.

On the other hand, the defense and political dimensions of U.S.-Taiwan relations have proven to be even more complex than cultural and commercial ones. U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation is one of the most important legacies of the TRA, as it serves both symbolic and substantive objectives. Not only does the United States provide Taiwan with arms as it would a treaty ally or strategic partner, but it also takes an active stake in Taiwan’s own defensive capabilities.

The TRA mandates the United States to make available arms of a defensive character to Taiwan, as determined by the U.S. Congress and president based solely on Taiwan’s needs. The policy was subsequently qualified by the U.S. pledge in the 1982 Joint Communique – that it will not pursue long-term arms sales and that neither the quantity nor quality of arms would exceed those since normalization of U.S.-PRC relations – and President Ronald Reagan’s assurances to Taiwan that the United States had not set an end date for arms sales nor had it agreed to engage in prior consultation with the PRC on arms sales. The 1982 Communique was criticized by the Nationalist government on Taiwan as undermining the spirit of the TRA.

To this day, arms sales remain one of the most debated aspects of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Controversies abound, from the process of arms sales to the types of platforms most suited for Taiwan’s defense.

The TRA’s mandate for a U.S. military response to Taiwan contingencies has left more room for ambiguity. While the TRA does not commit the United States to defend Taiwan, it keeps the possibility open by calling on Washington “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” To date, the PRC has not renounced the use of force against Taiwan, and has reinforced this notion by codifying the policy option in the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, which was reinforced by Xi’s bellicose rhetoric in his 2019 New Year’s speech. Furthermore, the PRC’s use of coercion against Taiwan to pressure its political leadership merits more scrutiny on how the United State can maintain the capacity to resist the PRC’s increasing use of military, psychological, economic, and political coercion against Taiwan.

Admittedly, the TRA was born from a geostrategic environment that bears little resemblance to present-day Asia. The PRC of 1979 was predominantly preoccupied with internal stability and growth, rather than regional geopolitical ambitions, and U.S. assessments at the time found an armed attack on Taiwan unlikely in the near term, given limited People’s Liberation Army (PLA) capabilities. In the decades that followed, however, the PRC has modernized its military to include fielding advanced fighters and deploying roughly 1,500 ballistic missiles across the strait from Taiwan. Beijing has increasingly flexed its military muscle to force desired outcomes, from intimidating the people on Taiwan in the lead up to the island’s first democratic elections in 1996 to publicizing a PLA exercise storming a mock-up of Taiwan’s Presidential Palace ahead of the 2016 elections.

Elsewhere in the region, the PRC has salami-sliced its way toward consolidated control of disputed territories in the South China Sea and regularly confronts Japan in the East China Sea. Beijing’s regional ambitions and desire for regional dominance are clear from its conduct in maritime disputes and Xi Jinping’s expansionist Belt and Road Initiative. The stark contrast is captured by the United States’ recent characterization of the PRC as a “revisionist” power. With U.S. assessments of China putting it at a near peer competitor status and expectations that China will grow increasingly confident in the PLA’s capabilities, Washington faces a mounting task with its TRA obligation to retain the capacity – both military and, necessarily, non-military – to resist the PRC’s use of force and spectrum of coercion against Taiwan.

While ambiguity on the prospect of U.S. intervention has been sufficient to deter the PRC, especially following displays of U.S. military power after the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, there are growing questions over what the United States would do in a future Taiwan Strait scenario. Also coloring the discourse in Washington is whether Taiwan is committed to maintaining adequate self-defense capabilities. Many critics point to Taiwan’s defense spending falling below the pledged 3 percent of GDP level across successive administrations and question the readiness of the military and the will of the political elite and civilian population.

At no point has the United States made determinations in regards to Taiwan’s eventual status. The TRA simply states that the United States’ decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC is premised on the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means. Furthermore, any effort other than peaceful means to determine the future of Taiwan is of grave concern to the United States. While U.S. policy to this day is that Taiwan’s status is undetermined, various administrations have expressed expectations about the management and preservation of the cross-strait status quo. Reagan declared in 1982 that “the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve.” In 1998, President Bill Clinton articulated a “Three Nos” policy, pledging that the United States would not support Taiwan independence; any one China, one Taiwan formulation; or Taiwan’s participation in international organizations where statehood is a prerequisite. In 2003, President George W. Bush stated that the United States would oppose any unilateral decision by China or Taiwan to change the status quo.

In so far as the process, the original TRA only calls for the future of Taiwan to be determined by peaceful means. There is an open question as to whether the TRA drafters foresaw that the continuation of the status quo would be in the best interest of the United States and Taiwan. Furthermore, subsequent U.S. nonsupport for Taiwan independence and changes to the cross-strait status quo, as well as China’s growing pressure to force unification upon Taiwan, have essentially rendered preserving the status quo as the only viable option for Taiwan.

The TRA Today and Relevance Looking Forward

As detailed above, the strategic environment in which the TRA was originally conceived no longer endures: The Cold War has ended; triangular relations between the United States, Taiwan, and China are ever-more complex with ever-farther reaching consequences; and – perhaps most critically – Beijing has a much larger toolkit at its disposal to implement its policies toward both Washington and Taipei. The founders of the TRA would have been hard-pressed to envision China’s concerted efforts – from whittling away at Taiwan’s international space to influence operations in Taiwan and globally – to undermine Taiwan’s legitimacy. While a lot of attention on the TRA and the U.S.-Taiwan relationship focuses on the cross-strait military balance, China’s effort to shape overall outcomes in the Taiwan Strait through the use of sharp power requires U.S. policymakers to think more broadly about the use of coercion and TRA stipulations to maintain capacity to resist coercion against Taiwan.

Further, understanding of the United States’ “One China” policy – from both its government representatives and the American public – has been diluted, a symptom of its deliberate ambiguity and, more disturbingly, PRC efforts to undermine U.S. policy toward Taiwan. The latter is seen in sustained attempts to conflate the U.S. “One China” policy with the PRC’s own and vastly dissimilar “One China” principle, and is part of a larger, global push to undercut countries’ respective “One China” policies. In doing so, China is moving to tighten the parameters in which countries can operate with regards to Taiwan and constrain the narrative so that it is more in line with Beijing’s stance.

The strategic ambiguity inherent to the implementation of the “One China” policy is also tested by China’s challenges to the cross-strait status quo and, by extension, U.S. interests in a rules-based regional order. This raises the larger question of whether ambiguity remains sustainable in the long term, particularly if China is shifting the goal posts of what the status quo entails closer to its desired position.

Against the backdrop of these developments, perhaps a modern-day reading of the TRA could ask: What role can Taiwan play in turn? The TRA was originally conceived to ensure the viability of Taiwan and reinforce broader U.S. interests and positions in the region. As discussed above, with China’s growing clout, its actions are not only threatening U.S. interests in regards to Taiwan, but now also U.S. interests independent of Taiwan – and beyond the Indo-Pacific. This is seen in growing Chinese investments and influence in Latin America, as well as efforts by Beijing to increase its standing in international organizations, particularly the United Nations, while promoting an alternative option for members states to the U.S.-led, rules-based order. Taiwan has vested interests in these areas, with key diplomatic partners in the Caribbean and Central America and objectives to seek meaningful participation in functional UN agencies. Since current President Tsai Ing-wen took office, China has been squeezing Taiwan on both fronts. Accordingly, a renewed approach to the TRA could include greater integration of Taiwan into broader U.S. strategy to support mutual interests and goals.

In closing, it is worth stressing a point that is now often overlooked. While the architects of the TRA may not have foreseen the PRC’s rapid growth and rise or even Taiwan’s own democratization and growing identity pulling it away from the PRC, they nevertheless felt strongly about Taiwan’s importance to the United States as a vital partner in the region, not as a foil to the PRC nor as any sort of bargaining chip. They did not see Taiwan policy through the lens of managing the U.S.-China relationship, but approached Taiwan on its own merits. This spirit and the letter of the TRA have thus ensured that policymakers do not abdicate the United States’ responsibilities under the illusion that it would aid other U.S. interests in the region, especially when the opposite holds true. A robust U.S.-Taiwan relationship grounded in the TRA reinforces broader U.S. interests and positions in the region now and into the future.