Myanmar’s Search for Elusive Peace

When Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) swept to power in the November 2015 general elections in Myanmar, she noted pointedly that securing peace in the country would be her top priority. “We can do nothing without peace in our country,” she said in a speech to mark Independence Day in January 2016.

Even at the time, those familiar with the dynamics of peace and conflict in Myanmar could have been forgiven for being skeptical. For decades, fighting has been ongoing between the state and a diverse array of ethnic groups over myriad issues, including political autonomy, economic development, and a recognition of their cultural diversity. Broader governance issues in the country, from changing civil-military dynamics to conceptions of center-periphery ties, have also complicated how to manage peace and conflict.

So it should come as no surprise that as Myanmar moves toward its next election in 2020, it is clear that securing peace in the country has proven much more challenging to actually implement in practice. Peace in Myanmar is elusive due to a series of challenges, most notably internal disagreements between ethnic groups; violence in various parts of the country, including in Rakhine state; and the role of outside powers, which complicates Naypyidaw’s ability to continue to manage the complex conflict dynamics in the country.

Internal Disagreements

The first challenge for securing peace in Myanmar has been internal disagreements. While securing a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) is a key government priority within the peace process, in reality the NCA aspect of the peace process has been in limbo for nearly seven months, if not more. It has been difficult to bring all groups into the fold of the NCA, let alone getting to further political dialogue and moving ahead on forming a federal union. This is due to a series of factors, including leadership changes within the signatory groups, deadlocks in the formulating of common positions, the fundamental lack of a negotiation strategy to resume dialogue, and differences observed between the government and the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military.

It came as little surprise, for instance, that the recent meeting of the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST), the highest decision-making body of the NCA signatories, did not make any substantial decision on the process, but rather called for an ethnic armed organization (EAO) summit in May. Among other things, the stepping down of the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) chairpersons from their leadership positions in the PPST may have shaken the ongoing peace process, reflecting the broader power struggle at play within the ethnic armed organizations and NCA signatories.

A government delegation did hold separate meetings with the KNU and PPST on March 8 and 9, respectively, to overcome the stagnation. But such efforts to find consensus have been dogged by disagreements over process, which serve only as manifestations of more fundamental differences in worldviews and the commitment to advancing peace. For instance, despite the government’s willingness to resume the official dialogue, the PPST has indicated that it would like to hold another top-level meeting with the government prior to that occurring. The government, in contrast, prefers that any top-level meeting of this kind be official as a way to ensure that decisions made there are respected. In the meantime, what we are likely to see is the KNU, RCSS, and PPST continuing to meet informally with government representatives to explore solutions to the current impasse.

Even if these disagreements and differences were to be bridged, there are other issues at play that will be difficult to overcome. For example, take the issue of federalism. While the NCA contains principles that lay out how a Union or Federal Army may be formed that could serve as a starting point for a dialogue on security issues, positions on this count are far from aligned. Preparation for such a federal security system includes a whole series of matters, including security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

Another issue is that of inclusiveness. For example, the current Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD) limits the direct participation of civil society organizations and women’s organizations in security affairs, which is a major sore point for some as well as an issue in and of itself because it prevents true input from being incorporated in an inclusive fashion. And despite the significant role played by border guard forces and peoples’ militias in security issues, the FPD limits their role because the Tatmadaw refuses to consider them as separate entities from its chain of command and the ethnic groups worry they may further complicate issues regarding their own legitimacy.

Ongoing Conflict and the Rakhine Factor

An additional complicating factor for the pursuit of peace in Myanmar is the ongoing conflict in parts of the country. Over the past year, fighting between ethnic armed groups and the Tatmadaw has flared in different parts of the country, including Kachin state, northern Shan state, and Chin state. In addition to the negative fallout from this conflict – including massive displacement, human rights violations, and intensifying distrust between the groups and the government – this ongoing conflict also belies any effort to forge peace in a meaningful way.

Though this is an issue in several parts of the country as the Tatmadaw battles several ethnic armed groups, a particular case in point is the dynamic in Rakhine state. Here, myriad challenges – including strong Arakan nationalism, a fierce military presence, religious extremism, and high incidences of transnational crime – combined with government-related issues, have obstructed any meaningful peace in this area.

Most notably, of late, the Arakan Army’s (AA) major offensive in Rakhine state, combined with Naypyidaw’s response with a version of counterinsurgency employing search and destroy tactics, has produced tens of thousands of internally displaced people within the last month or so. As is often the case, there is an ongoing blame game about who is responsible for what, with the Myanmar government and military accusing the AA of smuggling drugs along with the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) to fund its army and operations, and AA suggesting that its support comes from a real sense of nationalism that has popular support. There are also inherent limitations that the AA faces, including limited forest cover in terrain and the difficulty of keeping logistics routes and bases open.

But at issue for those concerned about wider peace is that this complicates Naypyidaw’s objective of trying to stabilize Rakhine as a precondition for the return of countless Rohingya that fled into Bangladesh, and to demonstrate to Dhaka and other outside observers its commitment to progress in this realm. If conflict continues to intensify, given the high military presence in the region, it will obviously limit the extent to which any repatriation can proceed.

Thus far, government efforts at peace in Rakhine state have not proven promising. To take just one example, Naypyidaw has formed the 13th peace support committee in Rakhine state, which includes members of the Arakan National Army. But it did so without even informing these actors and getting their consent or feedback. All indications are that this committee will soon likely be in limbo like the dozen committees before it.

The Role of Outside Actors 

Beyond internal dynamics such as disagreements and ongoing conflict, the pursuit of any peace process has also been complicated by the trajectory of Myanmar’s ongoing alignments with other outside actors, most notably China and India. While the ultimate evolution of the peace process rests with Naypyidaw, one should not underestimate the role that Beijing and New Delhi play in how the Southeast Asian state manages the wider dynamics involved in terms of peace and conflict in the country.

China continues to exert significant influence in the peace process, as it has previously. Indeed, Beijing has been increasingly active in facilitating meetings between the government and members of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), a seven- member alliance of ethnic armed organizations situated in Kachin and northern Shan states. By any stretch of the imagination, China is taking a role beyond that of a facilitator, as it is portrayed in some reports about its presence in Myanmar.

Beijing’s involvement in this respect is not entirely new or particularly surprising. China understands that the viability of its economic interests in Myanmar, including the advancement of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor with respect to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), rests in some measure on peace and stability in the country. China also understands that continuing to play an active role in the process gives it the leverage it needs to apply to any government in Naypyidaw and to balance against the influence any other outside government may want to exert.

But Chinese involvement complicates the peace process for the Myanmar government. It means that Naypyidaw has to acknowledge Beijing’s role over certain ethnic groups and its preference for an outsized role in the peace process relative to outside actors. This is true even as the extent of Beijing’s influence among these groups remains unclear. For instance, while Beijing’s more primary allies, such as the United Wa State Army, may be more willing to follow Beijing’s line, other groups, such as the Kachin Independence Army, may seek an alternative approach. If Beijing is unable to retain its control over these groups and fully realize its economic interests, it could complicate how the peace process looks for the government. How this plays out will be interesting to watch, especially following the BRI summit that is expected in April.

India’s role within the dynamics of the peace process is often less appreciated but equally important, particularly the intersection of the northeast of India and Myanmar. Especially significant in this regard is the fact that the Tatmadaw’s recent clampdown on armed groups with ties to India’s northeast risks complicating Myanmar’s wider security calculus and further limiting the military’s bandwidth on yet another front.

Especially notable in this regard was the fact that the Tatmadaw took control of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) headquarters without a significant violent confrontation on January 29, and subsequently raided several camps belonging to an assortment of armed groups from India’s northeast. This was a groundbreaking development. The Indian government has been asking repeatedly for years that the Tatmadaw crack down on these groups, but there has been a hesitancy to do so for fear of complicating peace and conflict in Myanmar itself. This was the first clash of its kind between the Tatmadaw and the NSCN-K of since 2000.

The specifics are still unclear. Some have suggested that the Tatmadaw simply wanted to seize control of the logistics route of the AA from Kachin to northern Rakhine via Sagaing; others have said this is more of an effort to strengthen bilateral ties with India to stabilize that border (some have even alleged Indian intelligence may have provided the Tatmadaw with coordinates for various camps for the operation). But for now at least, events on this front have yet to overwhelm policymakers or the military to the extent that it would undermine the peace process. That could change, of course. Though the NSCN-K may not have enough capability now to challenge the Tatmadaw and is currently under pressure from Indian security forces, in response to the raids, NSCN-K Central Executive Committee member U Kyaw Wan Sein warned that clashes could occur if the Tatmadaw continued its operations in the area.

Future Prospects 

All in all, the dynamics and trajectory of the peace process, as the above examination of three key factors has shown, suggests that the future prospect of peace remains unclear and is likely to continue to prove elusive. Even if it is the case that the Tatmadaw’s consolidation of military control in specific areas such as Kachin and northern Shan does occur and the level of conflict stabilizes, there are other nonmilitary factors that remain uncertain, such as rising ethnonationalism in certain areas and intensifying conflicts between ethnic armed organizations. Without meaningful political dialogue soon, the situation is unlikely to improve.

The prospects for such a dialogue, however, remain rather bleak, in part due to the fierce internal disagreements that remain. Aside from the fact that a breakthrough in the peace process is unlikely, the very confidence in the process itself is being questioned by stakeholders. Parties are still arguing over the definitions of different issues nearly four years after signing the NCA, let alone moving toward resolving them. These issues are difficult, especially those related to governance and federalism. For stakeholders, it seems increasingly clear that the objective is just keeping the process alive past the 2020 elections, rather than implementing agreements.

On the role of outside powers too, things are still unclear. For instance, while one could expect China’s role to become more prominent after the upcoming BRI summit in April as so-called early harvest projects continue to get underway with Myanmar, reinforcing the importance for stability in places such as Kachin and northern Shan states, it is unclear if the ethnic groups can be treated as being managed by Beijing or as increasingly separate entities. The role of India also remains unclear given the changing dynamics we have seen as well as how New Delhi under the government of Narendra Modi has been responding more stridently to issues of cross-border security in recent years.

Some observers have been keen to note that technically the government has some time left to make a final attempt at forging peace before elections in 2020. But with little meaningful progress seen thus far, the government’s pursuit of this as a continued agenda item risks being seen only as a campaign slogan ahead of the elections rather than anything that would address long-standing issues and have a positive impact on the people. For all the rhetoric, in reality, Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD government’s efforts to build peace thus far in the face of stubborn obstacles amount to nothing more than building castles in the air.