The Japan-US “2+2”: Taking Stock of the Alliance

On April 19, the U.S. secretaries of defense and state and their Japanese counterparts convened the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) ministerial meeting. More commonly known as a “two-plus-two,” the meeting has served as an occasion for both sides to articulate shared goals and aspirations for the U.S.-Japan alliance. This iteration was particularly important, as it was the first SCC after both the United States and Japan released their respective defense strategy documents — the U.S. National Defense Strategy (January 2018) and Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines (December 2018) — and therefore served as the first opportunity for the four cabinet ministers to share notes on the thinking that informed these documents on each side.

The joint statement and the accompanying fact sheet that were released following the SCC have a few notable characteristics. First and foremost, they clearly articulate the degree to which the two government take security challenges in the new domains — cyber and space, for example — seriously. In particular, the joint statement made it clear for the first time that a cyberattack against Japan may be considered as “an armed attack” under Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, implying U.S. commitment to help Japan defend itself in such cases. In this context, both the joint statement and the fact sheet place prominent focus on cooperation in “cross-domain” operations — the concept put forward by Japan’s NDPG as the organizing principle for Japan’s defense posture.

Second, these documents likely served to mitigate concerns in Tokyo about the unpredictability of the Trump administration on its approach to the security issues that are important to Japan. It is noteworthy that the joint statement referred to “achieving North Korea's abandonment of all of its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and related programs and facilities in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions” as a shared goal. This served as a clear message not only to Pyongyang but to Seoul that Tokyo and Washington are on the same page on what they see as an endgame for the North Korean nuclear issue. It also went a long way to assuage seeping concern in Tokyo that Washington might decide to sign a deal with North Korea that neglects Japan’s security concerns. Similarly, the articulation of their shared concern over China’s assertive behavior both in East and South China Seas, including U.S. reaffirmation that the Senkaku Islands are covered in Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty, was another welcome development.

While these are all decidedly positive outcomes from the SCC, they may present Japan with considerable challenges as Tokyo begins to operationalize some of the articulated goals. For example, during the joint press availability following the SCC, U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shahan repeatedly used the word “integration” to describe various aspects of the alliance, from “integration of our complementary strategic vision” down to “integration of industrial bases.” Even though defense relations between the two countries have considerably deepened in the last two decades on strategic, policy, and operational levels, “integration” is still a highly politically charged term in Japan when used in the context of national defense and alliance cooperation, even after Japanese government changed its interpretation of Article 9 to allow for allied defense. Already, there are some criticisms about the “expansionist” direction that Japan is heading in its alliance with the United States, suggesting that the Japanese government is steaming ahead with U.S.-Japan cooperation on some areas such as cyber before the domestic discussion on how to think about cyber threats matures. As the two sides continue to consult on how to optimize the cooperative opportunities in these emerging areas, Japan may face strong domestic resistance from those who worry that Japan may be increasing the risk of having to participate in an unwanted military operation under the name of “integration.”

In particular, the “integration of industrial bases,” when suggested from the U.S. side, can easily push the discussion about the future of Japan’s indigenous defense industry in a counterproductive direction. When the Abe government revised Japanese government’s standing policy of arms exports and established the new “Three Principles of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology” in April 2014, there was optimism that the these newly established principles — called the “new 3Ps” — would almost immediately revitalize Japan’s fledging defense industry. Five years since the new 3Ps took effect, however, the Japanese defense industry has not been able to take the full advantage of the much-awaited policy changes, with most companies unwilling to change their mindset in the way that would be necessary to use the new policy to expand their business. To send the message that the two governments would like to see “integration of industrial bases” too openly now — especially when concern is spreading among the Japanese defense industry about more and more Ministry of Defense contracts for major weapon systems being fulfilled through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) from the United States – could be counterproductive. It could invite a knee-jerk reaction from the industry to stubbornly resist the trend rather than adapting to the challenge.

Finally, although the Japanese government has so far demonstrated an unprecedented show of resolve in implementing the existing plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), how to ensure the political sustainability of the U.S. force presence in Okinawa continues to complicate day-to-day management of the alliance. The recent tragedy of a murder-suicide committed by a U.S. Marine and involving an Okinawan woman has renewed calls against the current replacement plan within the prefecture. The victory of an anti-base former journalist against a former cabinet minister from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in Okinawa in the by-election for the House of Representatives greatly encouraged the anti-FRF force inside and outside Okinawa, and is likely to further complicate the Japanese government’s efforts in proceeding with the construction of the FRF.

There is no question that the SCC on April 19 served as an opportunity for the United States and Japan to renew their alliance commitment, reaffirm their shared threat perception, and articulate their vision for alliance cooperation. In particular, the reaffirmation of the two allies’ shared approach to some of the most urgent security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region was a critical accomplishment not only for the alliance, but for sustaining Japan’s confidence in the alliance itself. At the same time, the vision that came out of the SCC will challenge Japan’s ability to work through the domestic hurdles it still faces as it continues to modernize its defense establishment.