The US-South Korea Approach to North Korea

South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s quick April trip to Washington was his first major attempt to reinvigorate talks between the United States and North Korea since the failed Hanoi summit in February, but it yielded minimal results.

Moon and U.S. President Donald Trump affirmed their openness to further talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, the continued pursuit of top-down diplomacy, and the end goal of North Korea’s complete denuclearization. Although Moon emphasized “there will be no daylight [between the U.S. and South Korea] until we achieve our ultimate goal,” the meeting in some ways highlighted the existing fault lines between the two countries rather than bringing them closer together. While it is unlikely that these differences will lead to a larger rift in the U.S. and South Korean approach toward North Korea, Moon’s visit highlights the challenges ahead in his role to help broker a deal between Trump and Kim.

The sticking point for talks in Hanoi proved to be striking a balance between sanctions relief and North Korea’s denuclearization, with Trump and his team reportedly favoring a sweeping deal against Kim’s preference for incremental agreements. As Washington’s “all or nothing” approach excludes a multitude of smaller possible options, Moon’s key objective now is getting the White House to at least somewhat lower its expectations to give diplomacy more space to succeed.

Seoul also has its own interests in nudging Washington to take a smaller agreement with Pyongyang. Moon has stated his chief aim in supporting talks between the United States and North Korea is to advance peace, but in getting there he is hoping to promote inter-Korean economic engagement. In its separate track dialogue, Seoul has prioritized the connection of its rail system with the North’s as well as the reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mount Kumgang tourist resort, in hopes of these eventually leading to more economic opportunities.

But without a breakthrough in U.S.-North Korea negotiations to lift international sanctions, the Moon government’s economic ambitions with Pyongyang have hit a ceiling. After his trip to Pyongyang last September, Moon hoped that Kim might reciprocate with a visit to Seoul in December. However, the December meeting never took place. Many analysts attribute the absence of a reciprocal visit to the lack of progress in talks between the United States and North Korea. Moon anticipated that the Hanoi summit would lay the groundwork for his plans to succeed, but by all accounts was caught off guard by the absence of any agreement. Further, there is nothing to indicate that his economic projects were an important topic of discussion in Hanoi.

Nonetheless, Moon has doubled down on his views. The day after negotiations fell through in Hanoi, in a major address to commemorate the 100-year anniversary of the March First Independence Movement, Moon reiterated the importance of Kaesong and Mount Kumgang as steps leading to peace on the Korean Peninsula, which will in turn usher in a new wave of economic development. It is with this in mind that Moon travelled to the United States to sway Trump.

However, Trump’s comments during Moon’s visit suggest more of the same from Washington. Trump didn’t rule out a smaller deal to keep talks going, but emphasized “at this moment, we’re talking about the big deal. The big deal is we have to get rid of the nuclear weapons.” He also said he would support economic concessions “when the right deal is made, and when the nuclear weapons are gone.” This suggests the United States still views Moon’s inter-Korean economic projects as a potential product of, rather than a contributor to, Pyongyang’s denuclearization.

Kim’s speech to North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly – just days after Moon and Trump met in Washington – could be interpreted as an attempt to exploit these differences between Washington and Seoul. In his remarks, Kim called on South Korea to potentially violate UN Security Council sanctions by prematurely fulfilling promises made in previous North-South declarations contingent upon progress in denuclearization. He also decried Moon’s role as an “officious ‘mediator’” and called on him to speak with the same unified voice against the United States to improve inter-Korean relations.

Kim may have identified gaps between U.S. and South Korean interests and is trying to stoke discord between the allies. But he almost assuredly knows his rhetoric won’t amount to much beyond headlines. Although it is in a difficult position, the Moon government has little incentive to break rank with not just the United States, but the international community in pursuing inter-Korean economic engagement on its own. The most viable option for Seoul is to continue to leverage its influence with Pyongyang and Washington to try to move along talks between the two without also appearing to lean too heavily to either side.

While being in the middle has its strengths, it can also be an unstable spot. With both sides signaling entrenchment in their conflicting positions in the past few weeks, Moon risks languishing between Washington and Pyongyang if he can’t help either make the first move.

Whereas Trump and Kim have both expressed that time is on their side, Moon has less of a claim to this luxury. Moon has tied much of his political capital into diplomacy with North Korea, weaving it into the debate on pressing socioeconomic issues. Despite the lack of tangible economic benefits from the initial flurry of summitry in 2018, Moon saw significant bumps in his approval ratings each time he met with Kim. But as negotiations with North Korea have stalled and with limited progress to show on major socioeconomic issues, the public’s enthusiasm for Moon’s focus on North Korea seems to be waning.

On the one hand, domestic economic factors add to Moon’s constraints in pursuing his economic vision for the Korean Peninsula on his own, making the differences with the United States less of an issue. Even if talks between Trump and Kim were to completely collapse, reallocating resources that could be used for creating jobs and reducing economic inequality – both of which the administration has struggled with – to a North Korea that has rebuffed diplomacy would be politically unpopular at home.

But on the other hand, the longer talks between the United States and North Korea stagnate, the less room Moon has to maneuver diplomatically due to disaffected voters. Until Moon can make more significant headway on the socioeconomic issues South Koreans care most about, he increasingly risks being marginalized if and when Trump and Kim stop blustering and return to the table.

In effect, if he is to continue to be a facilitator, Moon has to keep the process between Trump and Kim moving along, demonstrating progress and the success of his efforts. This matters not only for the Moon government, but for the United States and North Korea, which have so far relied on South Korea at crucial moments to provide much needed momentum. Should Moon not be able to give a strong enough push when called on, Trump and Kim could find themselves stuck in their opposing positions without a way forward.