Mohammad Taqi on Kashmir

Tensions between India and Pakistan remain high after New Delhi’s decision to do away with a constitutional provision providing for autonomy for the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Announced in early August, the Indian decision seemingly caught Pakistan off-guard and was paired with a massive paramilitary operation to lock down the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley. Nearly two months on, Kashmir remains tense as both India and Pakistan seek support for their narrative on the global stage. The Diplomat’s Senior Editor Ankit Panda spoke to columnist and commentator Mohammad Taqi about the ongoing dynamics in the region and the prospects for Kashmir.

The Diplomat: We’re now several weeks out from the Indian government’s decision to abrogate Article 370 of the Indian constitution. With the hindsight we have now, why do you think the Modi government made the move on 370 when it did?

Mohammad Taqi: It seems that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government wanted to hit the ground running after its massive electoral victory. The annexation of Indian-administrated Kashmir was certainly not a capricious decision and has been a part of its manifesto. Narendra Modi and his team had their domestic and diplomatic ducks in a row and were flush with political capital. In his previous stint, Modi had reset the nuclear war threshold with Pakistan after the Pathankot and Uri attacks by showing that limited conventional military engagement was possible in retaliation for Pakistan-backed jihadist incursions in Kashmir. He essentially had called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff with success and has gone on to build on it. He also used the current absence of the Kashmir state assembly to arrogate that house’s powers to New Delhi, in an illegal and unconstitutional manner. Modi felt confident enough to scrap the Article 370 in a move that violated India’s own constitution. India had also read the international mood correctly in that Pakistan is isolated diplomatically and would not be able to rally any allies other than China. In effect, Modi government felt that Pakistan was boxed-in and the time was ripe to abrogate the Article 370. The BJP’s calculus seems to be that they would be able to contain the domestic fallout of using force and curbing rights and liberties in Kashmir, without much hassle.

What signs are you looking for in the coming months that the abrogation of Article 370 will lead to an appreciable change in the demographics of the Kashmir valley?

For now, Kashmir looks like a pressure cooker with its lid on. How the forcibly-imposed union territory status would play out in terms of non-Kashmiri people and businesses moving into the Valley, might become apparent when the new normal reveals itself. While many have bragged to bring prosperity to Kashmir by way of investments and so on, big business does not like turmoil. A series of protests, which remain a matter of when, not if, will put brakes on many such grandiose designs. Changing the property ownership and residency laws by eliminating Article 35(a), with the proclaimed intent to uplift the indigenous people and their ostensible integration is something that Stalinist Soviet Russia or more recently China, Israel and Pakistan have done. The Muslim Kashmiris are a minority within a minority in India, and even a small-scale non-Kashmiri ingress could change the demographic makeup in the valley.

The situation in Indian-administered Kashmir remains tense and reports of heavy-handed tactics by Indian authorities continue to emerge. What’s the mostly likely effect on the regional status quo of a continued Indian crackdown?

For the foreseeable future, the status quo ante is likely to prevail vis-à-vis Pakistan and China because the former cannot change it and the latter is not interested in changing it. Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has been about Pakistan and not the Kashmiris. The issue has ostensibly been the Pakistan army’s raison d'être but it truly is a mere justification for that outfit’s bloated budget allocations. The Pakistan army is as much a business enterprise as it is a war machine today. Its outsourcing of war to jihadist proxies is both a function of its monetary priorities as well as using the irregulars as force-multipliers. The otherwise verbose and gloating Pakistan army’s coy response to the Indian annexation of Indian-administered Kashmir indicates that it is unable or unwilling to up the ante. Pakistan’s precarious economic situation makes it very difficult for it to use the jihadist proxies as it could entail imminent reaction from the watch dogs like the FATF and the financial institutions like the IMF. China, on the other hand, has tremendous business interest in India and around the region. Despite an occasional whimper about Indian-administered Kashmir, Chinese – with an eye on their Belt and Road project -- are unlikely to stoke any chaos in their backyard that threatens more snags in their ventures than they are already hitting.

Pakistan’s options in reacting to the Indian move have been largely limited. Islamabad has mostly resorted to trying to shift the narrative on Kashmir internationally, with mixed results. What else can Pakistan do?

Very little, if anything. The diplomatic cold shoulder that Pakistan has received around the world, along with a tanking economy make it prohibitive for Pakistan to do much. Historically, Pakistan’s best bet would have been to back the political forces that favor an independent Kashmir, but it has actively undermined those, as it would also mean giving up the Pakistani-administered Kashmir as well as the Gilgit Baltistan. In fact, Pakistan is doing quite the opposite as it curbs the voices calling for independent Kashmir, on its side. Pakistan has been putting its eggs almost exclusively in the jihadist basket, but the world today has no appetite for jihadi militancy or terror.

The Pakistani military exercises considerable influence over the country’s foreign and security policies. Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa’s three-year term has been extended, too. How does the Pakistani military view its options? Should India expect a resort to jihadist groups across the Line of Control?

Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation is the net result of the country’s army controlling its foreign and national security policies. Using jihadist proxies to prosecute foreign policy has backfired big time. There is very little room for the Pakistani army to use its proxies in a sustained manner in near future. While the possibility of a so-called spectacular, complex terrorist act a la Mumbai always exists, a misadventure like that would turn Pakistan into an international pariah and seems unlikely at this point.

How will Kashmiri political leaders look to position themselves in a post-370 Jammu and Kashmir?

The Kashmiri leadership both secular and Islamist would probably find more traction in the immediate aftermath of Article 370’s abrogation, as the Valley seethes with anger over what many there deem to be a humiliation piled on it. The secular leadership which has drawn criticism for years of dynastic politics and the Islamists for doing Pakistan’s bidding, might find the coercive clampdown in the Valley and their own arrests neutralizing some of those past blemishes. What remains to be seen is how they negotiate their politics vis-à-vis New Delhi which is gung-ho about bending Kashmir to its will. This is uncharted political territory for the Kashmiri leadership where India is trying to bring its de facto control in sync with a de jure paramountcy as well. The political campaign(s) will likely revolve around regaining some form of autonomy, but the task is uphill. What the Kashmiri has been remiss in doing over the years is taking the case of human rights abuses to the international stage themselves. While Pakistan lacks credibility to present the Kashmiri’s case at world stage, the reception may be different if done in a robust manner by the leaders and people affected by India’s highhandedness.

This interview has been lightly edited.