PRC v. ROC: The Diplomatic Standoff

For decades, the world has witnessed protracted competition for the right to represent “China.” The China schism dates back to 1949 when the Red Army, led by Mao Zedong, was victorious in the Chinese Civil War, leading to the founding of the People’s Republic of China and the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) government to the island of Taiwan. Over the course of the past 70 years, diplomatic recognition for the Republic of China (Taipei) and the People’s Republic of China (Beijing) can be seen as a symbol of shifting power and influence from the island to the mainland government.

The historical arc of this status rivalry provides important context for understanding Beijing’s evolving approach to cross-strait ties. Between 1949 and 1979, military confrontation continued as the KMT and the Communists vied for control with the hope to remake China as one, despite the distinct governmental systems that took root. A handful of developments during the 1970s shook up diplomacy and cross-strait relations.

First, the 1971 replacement of Taipei with Beijing as the sole “China” representative at the United Nations and the UN Security Council came as a watershed moment for the island, leading other nations to switch their recognition accordingly. Separately, the mainland’s Deng Xiaoping initiated “opening and reform” policies to transform the economy and introduce market features. Taiwan was among the mainland’s largest investors, helping to fuel decades of growth, and to a certain extent, facilitating China’s “rise.” (Taiwan was among the four Asian “tigers” that led the region’s significant economic growth from the early 1960s through the early 1990s.) In 1979, the United States officially severed ties with Taiwan in favor of Beijing, while also maintaining a commitment to the island, notably preserving the United States’ right to provide the island with defensive arms for its security. Lastly, Beijing introduced the “one country, two systems” concept as a vehicle for reintegrating Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan with the mainland, emphasizing “Chinese reunification.”

Against this backdrop, both parties sought to win over friends internationally to boost legitimacy as the “rightful” China, particularly with the emergence of new countries across the globe that sprung up with the onset of decolonization through to the end of the Cold War. Despite the cross-strait thaw that persisted through the mid-1990s, Taiwan’s pivot from dictatorial rule to democratization highlighted stark differences between the island and the mainland.

The politics between Beijing and Taipei have grown further afield during the tenures of Taiwanese presidents from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) with heightened rhetoric about Taiwan’s democratic values and way of life and de facto political autonomy. Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan’s sitting president, hails from the DPP, while the 2000 election of Chen Shui-bian ended more than five consecutive decades of KMT rule. The issue of diplomacy is more polarized still as Taiwan prepares for presidential and legislative elections slated for January and May of 2020. The current Taiwan government, led by Tsai, has been firm in its rejection of overtures and cautionary messaging from the mainland, a marked shift away from the conciliatory tone and policies of her KMT predecessor Ma Ying-jeou.