The Kashmir Hiccup in Malaysia-India Relations

Over the past few weeks, a diplomatic row has played out between Malaysia and India over the Kashmir issue. The spat highlights one of the complicating factors in relations between the two Asian states.

While Malaysia and India have long had a bilateral relationship, ties have been elevated over the past decade, first to a strategic partnership in 2010 under former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and then to an enhanced strategic partnership under Narendra Modi in 2015. This is despite occasional differences over issues such as trade or the treatment of minorities in both countries, with Hindu-majority India having a sizable Muslim minority and Muslim-majority Malaysia having a small Indian population.

That general trend has continued with the rise of the new Pakatan Harapan government in Malaysia following the May 2018 elections, with collaboration continuing to be advanced at the working level. But some of the Malaysian government’s policies have nonetheless raised eyebrows in New Delhi, whether the warming of ties with Pakistan or the refusal to extradite controversial Islamic preacher Zakir Naik to India, where he is wanted on charges of funding terrorism and money laundering.

In late September, another complication arose in the Malaysia-India relationship when Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad mentioned the Kashmir issue in his remarks to the United Nations. In his address at the 74th session of the UN General Assembly on September 27, Mahathir suggested that New Delhi had “invaded and occupied” Jammu and Kashmir, a disputed Muslim-majority region also claimed by Pakistan. The comments came at a particularly sensitive time on the issue, considering that India had taken the controversial move of stripping its portion of the Kashmir valley of autonomy in August.

Mahathir’s comments threatened to spark a diplomatic row between the two countries. On October 4, India’s foreign ministry asked Malaysia to “bear in mind the friendly relations between the two countries and desist from making such comments.” And despite Malaysia’s Ministry of Primary Industries issuing a statement saying it was open to trade negotiations with India, on October 21, the Solvent Extractors’ Association of India, India’s top vegetable oil trade body, asked its members to stop buying palm oil, a significant move since Malaysia is the world’s second largest producer and exporter of palm oil after Indonesia and India is Malaysia’s third-largest export destination for the product. The row expanded into social media as well, with numerous posts bearing the hashtag #BoycottMalaysia emerging from Indian users on Twitter.

Thus far, both countries have been keen to prevent the diplomatic row from escalating, with the Indian government not playing up the issue beyond the foreign ministry’s initial response and Malaysian officials indicating the country’s willingness to adjust its economic ties with New Delhi. But Mahathir himself has pointedly refused to retract his comments, telling reporters on October 22 that Malaysia would speak its mind on such issues and that Malaysia was simply asking all parties to abide by previous UN resolutions on the Kashmir issue.

Diplomats in both countries no doubt hope that this spat will eventually blow over given the wide range of other issues the two sides collaborate on in their wider diplomatic relationship, including trade, culture, and defense. But for now, given the existing dynamics, the focus has been on options to minimize the current fallout. Malaysian officials are reportedly considering a series of moves, including potentially raising imports of Indian products next year to ease trade tensions, appointing a special envoy to India to shore up economic ties, as well as intensifying efforts to explore new markets in other continents including Africa.

Seen from a broader perspective, though, Mahathir’s Kashmir comments were an important reminder that irrespective of the various areas of collaboration evident in Malaysia’s relations with major powers, Malaysia’s foreign policy under the PH government in general, and Mahathir in particular, is unlikely to shy away from criticizing aspects of the behavior of major powers including India. Mahathir’s concerns are much broader than just Kashmir or India: His UNGA speech also took aim at other powers as well, including the United States, in line with his long-held willingness to rhetorically call out bigger powers evident in his previous stint as premier from 1981 to 2003. And lest this row be attributed to the views of Mahathir alone, it is worth noting that his UNGA remarks mentioning Kashmir came just after the Malaysian government had rolled out a new foreign policy approach that clearly noted the government would continue to advocate for Muslims around the world, whether it be Kashmiris or the Rohingya in Myanmar.

That does not mean that India and Malaysia will not continue to find ways to collaborate despite their differences. Advocates of better bilateral ties are continuing to work on exactly that. But it does indicate that we may continue to see more points of occasional friction emerge in the bilateral relationship even as both sides continue to pursue ongoing collaboration as they have done in the past.