The Philippines’ (Too) Quiet Opposition
With a rich history of opposition politics, the current quiet is disconcerting.
After the Philippine midterm elections earlier this year, marking the midway point for President Rodrigo Duterte’s single six-year term, some members of the opposition party decided to join the ruling coalition in Congress. Despite aggressive campaigning by opposition candidates against the human rights abuses under the Duterte government, some decided it was time to join the majority.
That opposition politicians would affiliate themselves with the ruling party reflects not only the quality of the country’s party system, but also the decrease in the number of voices demanding accountability from the Duterte government.
Three years after winning the presidency, Duterte continues to enjoy a high public trust rating. His candidates clinched the majority in the Senate despite the failure of the so-called “war on drugs,” public outrage over Duterte’s perceived weakness in asserting the country’s maritime rights in the South China Sea, and the imposition of higher consumer taxes.
One explanation for Duterte’s continuing popularity is his constant bullying of critics, which forced many groups to either tone down their criticisms or keep mum about the state of affairs.
Early on, Duterte intimidated his rivals. He jailed an incumbent senator, which served as a warning to other members of the opposition, and succeeded in forcing the removal of a sitting chief justice. Duterte has been consistent in ridiculing the influential Catholic Church, discrediting the media, and demonizing the left.
Meanwhile, Duterte declared martial law in southern Mindanao, launched an all-out-war against communist rebels, and pursued a bloody campaign to wipe out illegal drugs (and their users).
The overall effect of these tactics to quell the opposition is to create fear among the population, distract and disarm critical political forces, and prevent the formation of a bigger and broader movement that can challenge the government. As a result, each political bloc has been so busy responding to Duterte’s incoherent rants against them, individually, that many haven’t been able to focus on building a more powerful movement against the government’s controversial policies.
For example, in 2018 there was an effort to organize a united opposition protest. Amid this, Duterte’s military concocted a “Red October” plot, which divided the ranks of the opposition after some politicians and former soldiers distanced themselves from activists and communists. This made it difficult for all of the various opposition forces to coalesce and form a united coalition in the midterm election.
This is not to argue that there is no palpable dissatisfaction after Duterte failed to fulfill his campaign pledges, such as ending the illegal drug problem in three to six months, eliminating corruption in high places, and outlawing the practice of labor contractualization (temporary jobs). Dissatisfaction sill very much exists. But at the same time, the seething anger against the senseless drug-related killings could not be turned into a massive outpouring of condemnation in the streets. This is quite a puzzle considering that the Philippines has a history of ousting dictators and corrupt leaders through uprisings.
At a time when many countries are facing intensified urban uprisings, Manila is relatively quiet. There are no riots, general strikes, street barricades, or violent confrontations with the police, even though the Duterte government is already accused of committing gross human rights violations that are now being processed at the International Criminal Court.
It is not enough to argue that Duterte’s bullying was the key factor in silencing his critics. His brutal methods are already documented and his antics are well-known. But there is little discussion about how the opposition is performing its role.
Aside from the disappointing decision of some of its members to join the majority bloc in Congress, the mainstream opposition party has done little to mobilize people and create a bigger platform for disgruntled citizens to vent their sentiments against the Duterte government.
After appealing for votes in the midterm polls, the opposition has not offered new alternatives or political actions that their supporters can organize behind to engage the ruling party. It seems their next option is to merely wait for Duterte to end his term in 2022, unless he decides to change the constitution and remove term limits.
The opposition’s lackluster performance has become more obvious if compared to the actions of opposition parties in other countries, which have been actively supporting citizen movements demanding reforms in governance and even the removal of elected governments. Mass uprisings have erupted in other countries over issues of election irregularities, the passage of self-serving laws, and anti-poor economic policies. The absence of a similar urban uprising in Manila is glaring.
The opposition today is different from the opposition that hounded the presidency of former President Gloria Arroyo more than a decade ago. Aside from filing impeachment complaints, the opposition back then worked in tandem with civil society groups in mounting mass actions in the streets, which further eroded the popularity and credibility of the Arroyo government.
A noisier opposition is not unknown in the Philippines. For a start, the opposition should review the experience of the political resistance during the years preceding the ouster of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986. The “parliament of the streets” during that period united opposition politicians, activists, and human rights advocates in the fight for democracy and justice while Marcos was struggling to remain in power.
Beyond that time period, this is a reminder that the opposition does not have to wait for the next election to push its agenda. Instead of placing an unfair burden on Vice President Leni Robredo, recently ousted from a short-lived term as the country’s anti-drug czar, to do all the work for them in questioning the policies of the Duterte government, the opposition should distribute that responsibility more evenly. In addition to looking at Philippine history, there needs to be greater attention by opposition players to contemporary developments in other countries to draw out lessons learned and best practices. Given the Philippines’ rich history of opposition politics and the current trend of populist movements around the world, the Philippines’ quiet opposition should be far more united, forceful, and noisier than it is today.
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Mong Palatino is a regular blogger and Global Voices regional editor for Southeast Asia and Oceania.