Has Duterte Really Played His Last Peace Card With the Communist Rebels?

In early December, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte declared that he was open to resuming peace talks with communist rebels.

After assuming power in 2016, Duterte began talks with the National Democratic Front (NDF), which has been waging Asia’s longest-running communist insurgency. He then terminated the talks in 2017, ordered the arrest of NDF peace negotiators, and launched an all-out war against the rebels.

His martial law declaration in Mindanao was aimed at defeating communist-led armed groups on the island. He declared a state of lawlessness in several regions such as Negros, Samar, and Bicol, which led to the deployment of more government troops in an apparent mission to liquidate insurgency hotspots.

Duterte also formed a national task force to end the local armed conflict. He mobilized the bureaucracy and local government units to reject communists and their sympathizers. He was joined by the military in red-tagging groups accused of directly and indirectly supporting communists. Duterte even asked foreign institutions to include the Communist Party of the Philippines in their lists of terrorist groups.

Duterte’s crusade turned bloody in many provinces, especially Negros. The aggressive anti-communist drive was blamed by human rights groups for the escalation of extrajudicial killings and the arrests of more than 300 political prisoners in the past three years.

That has continued on into 2019 as well. Duterte’s security officials have boasted in recent months that the counterinsurgency campaign has popular support. More provinces were declared to be insurgency-free. Several local governments have passed resolutions condemning the Communist Party.

But in what appears to be another change of course, amid existing concern that the government has been preparing to wage a massive crackdown against Leftist groups, Duterte announced on December 5 that he has dispatched his labor secretary to seek informal talks with communist leaders. He said that this was his “last card” to attain peace and finalize a peace agreement with the rebels before the end of his term in 2022.

Duterte’s announcement was welcomed by peace advocates and even by the NDF. More broadly, this has raised the prospect of a resumption of the stalled negotiations and the conclusion of the drafts on economic and political reforms before the signing of a truce agreement.

But Duterte’s shift and his contradictory impulses on this subject means several questions remain unanswered. First, what motivated Duterte to change his mind about the peace process after more than a year of attacking the communist movement?

Some have suggested that the government is trying to negotiate from a position of strength. If this is also the mindset of the government peace panel, they probably expect the NDF to capitulate and agree to an expedited finalization of the peace process.

Alternatively, some media reports have suggested that this shift is tied to the Duterte administration’s wider priorities. Duterte may view the peace process as part of his legacy, especially since restoring law and order is his principal platform. He has already succeeded in signing an agreement with Muslim armed groups, which have been fighting for self-determination since the 1970s. Peace may also be good for the economy: given the slow implementation of the government’s infrastructure ambitions, lifting martial law in Mindanao could be part of an effort to entice foreign investment in the region.

The second question is whether any agreement is even possible. Irrespective of Duterte’s previous policy changes on this front and his motivations for a shift, this question is important given what this would mean for peace and conflict in the country.

Here, there are reasons to be cautious in expecting success given the serious challenges that both sides must first work through. These include issues such as whether or not the Duterte government will allow the release of detained NDF consultants and other political prisoners, and whether the NDF will agree to hold the negotiations in the Philippines, as demanded by the military, rather than in another country.

To be sure, these issues can be resolved through backchannel talks. But both sides must be committed to trying to understand the political stakes inherent in this process amid their other commitments and broader interests. Both sides must also agree to deliver confidence-building measures to boost trust and push forward the peace agenda.

Most of all, while Duterte may have his own partisan reasons for restarting the talks, peace advocates must not lose focus in advancing their own demands if the process is to succeed. These include the easing of military operations in communities, the release of activists accused of being communist rebels, and pursuing accountability for human rights abuses committed by state forces in the past three years. This is also the right time to remind both the NDF and the government to address the roots of the armed conflict and come out with a real blueprint in bringing justice, peace, and progress to all the regions of the country.