2 Questions Hold the Key to Negotiating With Kim Jong Un

There is no shortage of commentary on North Korea and ongoing diplomatic efforts with the Kim regime. Amidst the analysis and punditry, one can find innumerable suggestions and “concrete ways ahead” for dealing with Kim Jong Un. Some say that a “peace regime” and end-of-war declaration are necessary first steps toward North Korean reform. Others suggest that the North Korean government is simply playing by its old playbook and will only extort as much possible while giving nothing in return, so pressure and coercion are the only ways to get Kim to change course. Still others argue for a step-by-step approach with a mix of concessions and boundaries.

But who is correct? Perhaps the better question is, how can so many well-informed, intelligent people come to such different conclusions on how to proceed in negotiations with North Korea?

Taken strictly from a negotiator’s perspective, the differing opinions on how to engage with North Korea are attributable to a person’s answers to two critical questions. First, do you believe Kim Jong Un is pro-reform or anti-reform? Second, do you believe Kim Jong Un is more constrained in his governing power or less constrained?

I emphasize the word “believe” here because there is no way to confirm the answers to those questions; rather, they are assessments that vary based on the individual and their available data.

Therein lies the rub. Because these answers cannot be confirmed, it is possible that either of two people with vastly different conclusions on how to negotiate with Kim Jong Un could be correct, provided their beliefs of Kim’s constraints and view toward reform are the right ones.

The answers to those two questions inform rational negotiation strategies focused on incentive, coercion, process trust, and personal trust. The figure below represents this: