Pakistan’s Diplomacy After the US Strike on Soleimani

The killing of Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, by the United States caught Pakistan by surprise. For Islamabad, the prospect of a major Iran-U.S. conflict presents a blend of opportunities and challenges.

The apparent winding-down of overt hostility between Tehran and Washington may have calmed nerves in Islamabad, but the damage that the crisis had already created will keep Pakistani diplomacy under pressure in the months to come.

It should not come as a surprise that, overtly, Pakistan has declared a policy of nonalignment concerning the Iranian crisis. However, policymakers in Islamabad understand that the country cannot afford to remain neutral for reasons related to Pakistan’s domestic and regional security and other economic and diplomatic challenges at hand. Within the corridors of power, considerations are focused on what sort of commitment Pakistan can make to its partners in Riyadh and Washington without jeopardizing its overt posture of neutrality.

In the immediate term, the escalation of tensions between Washington and Tehran means that there are expectations for Islamabad to choose a side. The history of Pakistan’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and the United States makes it clear that if either Riyadh or Washington wants to force Islamabad’s hand, they have plenty of tools at their disposal to achieve that goal. While this apparent expectation from Pakistan may not have been demanded openly, Islamabad understands the kind of policy direction the country will be forced to take if and when the pressure is turned on from either source.

In such a scenario, Pakistan can either stand with the United States and its allies in the Gulf, or it can choose to remain neutral, which will be read by the former as amounting to a betrayal on Islamabad’s part. This has already created a lot of distress in the country’s policymaking circles as Pakistan can no longer continue its rapprochement toward Iran with the intensity that existed just a few months ago.

In mid-January, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi visited Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States to clarify that “Pakistan will not join any war in the region.” On the surface this line of argument was possible only after all parties involved clearly signaled that no further escalation would take place. Islamabad should be pleased that the crisis didn’t escalate to a situation where the country had to make serious commitments in the days and weeks to come, which would have put Pakistan’s security policy and diplomacy in the line of fire immediately.

Islamabad’s tough position is clear from the recent Twitter notes that Pakistan’s foreign minister and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo shared after a meeting in Washington. Qureshi in his Twitter message wrote that “stronger trade & investment is imp[ortant] for an enduring partnership” between the two countries and that “engagement between Pakistan and the United States” is an important “factor for stability in South Asia.” Pompeo, on the other hand, noted that “countering Iranian aggression, the Afghan peace process…and regional stability” remains the pivotal focus of the partnership.

The contents of these two tweets not only reflect existing troubles in the bilateral relationship, but also highlight what sort of expectations Washington has from its cooperation with Islamabad. On Islamabad’s part, there is a clear focus on breaking away from Pakistan’s utility as a mere security partner. However, Washington still sees Pakistan’s value in it being a partner that can assist in managing threats from Iran and Afghanistan. If nothing else, the politics in the wake of Soleimani’s killing should clarify to Pakistani leaders that Islamabad’s commercial and defense partnerships with the United States are not mature enough to allow space for anything beyond immediate security considerations along Pakistan’s borders. The fact Pakistan had to reiterate its neutrality in the crisis underscores the country’s established role as a state whose utility is limited to managing security threats for the United States and Saudi Arabia as well.

Elsewhere, Islamabad is annoyed by the international community’s lack of interest in the Kashmir situation in the wake of Solemani’s killing. It’s no surprise that Pakistan’s prime minister has warned of action at the Line of Control (LoC) if the international community doesn’t persuade India to change its belligerent approach vis-à-vis Pakistan. On January 18, Prime Minister Imran Khan, in a tweet, said that “I want to make clear to India and the international community that if India continues its military attacks killing civilians across LOC (Line of Control), Pakistan will find it increasingly difficult to remain an inactive observer along the LOC.”

That said, for many in Pakistan, the Iranian crisis has emerged as a factor that Islamabad could use to implicitly win over Washington’s support on issues that affect the country’s security and diplomacy. In this regard, Pakistan’s case at the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) remains an immediate and most pressing concern. As of now, Pakistan is unclear which side the Americans will take when it comes to its case at the forum: “We want our American friends to tell us what’s their policy,” said Quershi said while speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “You share with us what measures you have taken or intend to” as “we expect U.S. officials to work for it now,” he further added.

The good thing for Pakistan is that the brewing crisis in the Middle East may expedite efforts in Afghanistan to reach a peace deal. If anything, the timeline following Soleimani’s killing points toward urgency. Reports suggest that the Taliban are “ready to agree to a 10-day truce with U.S. forces, as well as a reduction in violence with Afghan forces and talks with Afghan officials if a deal is reached.” On January 18, the Afghan Taliban’s spokesperson, Suhail Shaheen, said in an interview that “We have agreed to scale down military operations in days leading up to the signing of the peace agreement with the United States.”

“It's now a matter of days,” added the spokesman.

So far, to enlist U.S. support for its Kashmir policy and case at the FATF, Pakistan has made noticeable efforts to facilitate American operations in Afghanistan. In the next few weeks, Pakistan should be expected to use the Iranian situation to make it clear to the Americans that conflict with Tehran will undermine Washington’s interests in Afghanistan and beyond. Arguably, Pakistan has been trying to tie its diplomacy to prospective costs for regional stability and the Afghan peace process, which remains a key concern for the United States as well. It shouldn’t come as a surprise if Pakistan’s leadership brought up the consequences of the flare-up of tensions on Pakistan’s domestic security, particularly the potential losses vis-à-vis gains made to fulfill the FATF’s demands against terrorists within its borders.

Reportedly, U.S. President Donald Trump is planning to visit India in February, where a much-awaited trade deal between the two countries is expected to be signed. However, if Pakistan can ensure a peace deal between the United States and Taliban, the country could end up winning much-needed favors, including a visit, that may have come under threat after Soleimani’s killing.

All of this doesn’t mean that Islamabad is not ready to assist Washington covertly when it comes to the crisis with Iran. Arguably, Islamabad wants Washington’s focus away from Tehran as much as possible so that the former could bring the issue of Kashmir and Afghanistan, two core areas of Pakistan’s regional security policy and international diplomacy, back into the spotlight. Offering help behind the scenes while insisting on de-escalation in public might suit Pakistan’s interests going forward.