Tsai Ing-wen 2.0

On January 11, President Tsai Ing-wen’s re-election ended her rocky first term as Taiwan’s leader on a high note. Her landslide victory over Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Han Kuo-yu provided her with a clear mandate from the Taiwanese public: They want Tsai to continue to lead. Yet, in hindsight, Tsai’s popularity throughout her first three-plus years in office was never as high as it was the night of her re-election.

Tsai’s first term saw many highlights: same-sex marriage legislation finally passed, a formal apology was offered to indigenous Taiwanese on behalf of Taiwan’s government for the first time, and the New Southbound Policy (NSP) was mildly successful in reducing Taiwan’s economic reliance on China. However, Tsai had her share of fumbles, most visibly in her government’s handling of much-needed pension and labor reforms, as well as the passage of the same-sex marriage law, all of which contributed to low public approval ratings and culminated in easily the lowest point of her tenure: the disastrous 2018 local elections. Reflecting on her first term, there were many learning moments for Tsai, and, historically, her record has been mixed – even though her supporters’ hopes are high for a successful second term.

This article will first provide a comprehensive assessment of Tsai’s first term, broken down by issue, with particular emphasis on topics of concern in Taiwan domestic politics. It will then look forward, evaluating what her performance means for her second term, particularly with forthcoming leadership changes in her administration and more detailed policy plans to accompany the formal start of her second four years in office in May.

Key Domestic Political Issues

Indigenous Apology

Taiwan’s indigenous Austronesian tribes make up only around 2 percent of the country’s population of more than 23 million, and their communities are largely marginalized throughout society, facing wage and labor discrimination and higher unemployment levels than other Taiwanese. Tsai made history just months into her presidency by offering a formal apology for the long-running persecution of Taiwanese indigenous communities over the course of four centuries of colonization and occupation by European, Japanese, and Chinese governments. Tsai, whose paternal grandmother was a member of the Paiwan tribe, said she would ensure that the government worked to give indigenous peoples greater autonomy and help enact policies that protect their lands and cultures. Though she received a mostly positive reception from indigenous activists at the time, a lack of substantive progress has caused Tsai’s apology to ring hollow to many who once had high hopes. Although her apology still holds historic significance, indigenous issues have not been a priority on her agenda and indigenous groups still struggle to convince the DPP to write and deliver productive policies in support of their communities.

The apology, despite the lack of follow-through, could be viewed as a marked shift away from the long-term erasure and overt politicization of Taiwan’s indigenous communities and their unique concerns. It also aligns with broader efforts and calls for truth and reconciliation over the Republic of China government’s past wrongdoings,. Such calls manifested elsewhere in the formation of the Transitional Justice Commission, which has focused on the 38-year White Terror era under KMT martial law and the 228 Massacre of 1947. Such moves foster dialogue within disparate segments of society, allowing for greater cohesion over shared experiences and traumas, while cementing a sense of a unique national identity that has bearings for Taiwan’s politics in the future.

Pension Reform

Pension plans for retired military personnel, teachers, and civil servants were in dire need of reform when Tsai took office in 2016. These groups were given a preferential 18 percent interest rate on their savings accounts, a plan originally set up during the KMT authoritarian era to secure political loyalty from these three substantial and influential segments of society. By 2017, however, these rates – coupled with broader demographic trends, such as longer life expectancy and falling birth rates – were threatening to bankrupt Taiwan’s pension system and its government.

As a candidate, Tsai campaigned on pension reform, but the policy her administration put forth once she was in office inevitably angered the beneficiaries of past KMT largesse. The challenge for Tsai was to reform pensions in a way that did not alienate existing personnel serving in the military, education, and civil service sectors, thousands of whom work in her administration and keep the country running. When the pension reform plan was announced, a number of individuals from these fields protested against Tsai, the protests at times turning violent. Although her reform plan was adopted, it ended with Tsai having to formally apologize for cutting pension rates, rather than celebrate the needed change.

Labor Reform

Arguably, the biggest bungle of Tsai’s first term was her administration’s handling of labor reform. In 2016, Taiwan had the fourth-longest working hours in the world, averaging 2,104 hours per year – compare that to the United States, which averaged between 1,700 and 1,800 hours. Tsai sought to propose reforms that would be “win-win” – not upsetting workers or industry – yet neither side was satisfied by initial negotiations. In the end, the changes to the Labor Standards Act sided more with corporations than with workers. Most significantly, rather than give a fixed two days off, new laws would give one fixed day off and one “flexible” day off, on which companies could still require workers to come in if needed. It also lowered the minimum number of hours between shifts from 11 to eight. The total of overtime hours that could be worked was increased, but because of the other changes to time off and “flexible” work days, this was seen by some as a way for companies to require more work days, rather than benefiting workers.

These changes to the Labor Standards Act resulted in mass protests in front of the Legislative Yuan. In a strange moment of solidarity, both progressive “third force” parties like the New Power Party (NPP) and the Social Democratic Party marched together with the KMT in opposing the changes – granted, for differing reasons. The most damning moment for the DPP, however, came with the passage of the bill. The amendment was changed in under 17 minutes, with review of the change approved in under two minutes. The DPP also strategically changed the location of the bill’s review in order to confuse and block the NPP and KMT from proposing or debating changes. To activists, passing a bill in this rushed fashion was reminiscent of the KMT’s passage of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement, which ended up catalyzing the 2014 Sunflower Movement. In the end, all of civil society, across Taiwan’s political spectrum, was disappointed with Tsai and the DPP with their labor reforms.

Same-Sex Marriage Legislation

Tsai took an unexpected strategy toward legalizing same-sex marriage. She campaigned on marriage equality during her 2016 campaign, creating high expectations from progressive parts of Taiwanese society that legislation would be forthcoming shortly after she took office. Once elected, however, Tsai took a far more strategic approach. She stopped openly endorsing marriage equality, and instead argued it was not her place to rule one way or another on the subject and that both sides ought to be given a voice on the matter. Tsai then said that Taiwan’s Constitutional Court was the appropriate body to address the issue. Activists were upset at Tsai’s change in heart and were worried that the DPP may have changed its stance on marriage equality. To their relief, in May 2017 the court ruled Taiwan’s civil code unconstitutional and gave the Legislative Yuan two years to pass new legislation that allowed same-sex couples to marry, otherwise same-sex marriages would become legal by default under existing institutions.

What was originally a celebration for LGBTQ activists quickly turned into one of marriage equality’s biggest struggles. Following the court’s ruling, well-organized anti-LGBTQ groups mobilized around the country in an attempt to block any legislation from passing. For the next two years, society was fiercely divided on the issue, largely along age lines, with higher support for same-sex marriage among younger Taiwanese. Marriage equality activists spent much of their energy countering homophobic disinformation spread by anti-LGBTQ groups but in the end were unsuccessful. Public reservations on the issue became clear in 2018 via multiple referendum questions that accompanied the local election ballots, with some in favor of marriage equality and some against. Overwhelmingly, voters showed they were strongly against not just marriage equality, but also against changing the definition of marriage or allowing homosexuality to be taught in school. The 2018 election, it should be noted, had much lower young voter turnout than the 2020 election, in which Taiwan’s youths were a major driving force behind Tsai’s landslide win.

In the end, Taiwan did succeed in passing same-sex marriage legislation, but only after Tsai and the DPP – which had a legislative majority – gave homophobic groups two years to polarize society and promote anti-LGBTQ disinformation. Instead of amending the civil code to include same-sex marriage, a new, separate law was made to administer the issue – thus failing to achieve true marriage equality. For LGBTQ rights advocates, the resulting legislation had a number of shortcomings. For example, same-sex couples are not allowed adopt children, nor can international couples get married if one partner is from a country that has not yet legalized same-sex marriage. The word “marriage” was not even included in the final bill. Same sex marriage was a momentous step for progressive politics in Taiwan, but the process was painful and the results bittersweet.

New Southbound Policy

Though the New Southbound Policy is primarily economic in nature, it is also tethered to the Tsai administration’s foreign policy. Its success or failure would has direct bearing on the livelihood of Taiwan’s electorate. The NSP’s overriding goal is to diversify Taiwan’s trading portfolio. In recent decades, the economy has relied heavily on China, giving Beijing significant political leverage over Taiwan. Tsai spearheaded the NSP as a means of lessening that reliance. In the past four years, the policy has helped increase trade and tourism links between Taiwan and South and Southeast Asia. As of February 2020, outbound investment to NSP countries rose 16 percent and inbound tourism increased 6 percent. Further, a breakdown of Taiwan’s 2019 tourism numbers shows that the country saw an all-time high of 11.84 million, an increase of 7 percent from 2018 – despite Beijing wielding the economic “stick” of reduced Chinese tourism in a failed attempt to punish the Tsai administration. These numbers served as a positive sign for Taiwan’s tourism industry. In effect, the NSP has so far been a relative success and will likely expand over the next four years.

National Defense

On the national defense front, Tsai not only inherited from her predecessor the daunting task of transitioning Taiwan’s military to an all-volunteer force (AVF), but also a number of concomitant challenges. These include a general lack of interest by young Taiwanese in a military career, demographic challenges, and the question of budgetary tradeoffs in paying a more professional military higher wages, among others. While early attempts to meet recruitment goals were largely unsuccessful – even with target dates being pushed back and revisions made to target numbers – the Ministry of National Defense is currently optimistic that it is on track. Part of the rationale in shifting to an AVF included domestic considerations centered around the unpopularity of conscription. However, it is unclear if this view still holds, given the difficult transition process and increased Chinese military aggression. Indeed, one January 2019 online opinion poll showed support for reinstating conscription.

With regard to the domestic economy, Tsai campaigned on revamping and transforming Taiwan’s economic structure. After taking office, she laid out policies to achieve this, including the NSP, but also a “5 plus 2” industrial innovation plan, with seven industries of focus and prioritization. National defense and aerospace are among the seven, with Tsai prioritizing the need for Taiwan to bolster its indigenous defense industry to better equip the country for its self-defense, while at the same time creating local jobs and driving economic growth. Progress remains to be seen – with attention focused predominantly on Taiwan’s indigenous submarine and trainer jet programs – though the trainer jet program has reportedly created 1,200 jobs. The submarine program, offering both upstream and downstream opportunities, is projected to create 10,000 jobs in the northern port city of Keelung alone.

The 2018 Midterm Election

After an initial two-plus years of rocky reforms, Taiwan was not happy overall with Tsai’s performance. Her first midterm election was an unmitigated disaster. The 2018 midterm was effectively a de facto referendum on how Taiwanese voters viewed Tsai and the DPP’s progress. In mayoral races around Taiwan, the DPP lost seven out of 13 cities and counties. No one expected the KMT would win so many cities back after their own catastrophic loss in 2016. The most important of these races was Kaohsiung, a southern port city and historical DPP stronghold.

The DPP was defeated in the Kaohsiung mayoral race by Han Kuo-yu, whose momentous rise took Taiwan by storm. Although Han is now known as the KMT presidential candidate who lost to Tsai by a large margin, back in 2018 his meteoric rise gave everyone in Taiwan pause. Capitalizing on populist rhetoric and strong disillusionment with the DPP, Han managed to sway a deep green city into giving him, a candidate advocating closer ties to China, a chance at running their city. Han’s popularity snowballed, and over the next year he became the potential savior of the KMT. After the midterm, Tsai’s re-election odds appeared dim.

Disinformation During the Midterms and Broader Influence Campaigns

Disinformation existed in Taiwan long before the 2018 midterm, but the election in particular highlighted how pervasive of an issue it had become. Although most think of Chinese disinformation campaigns when they think of fake news in Taiwan, the most commonly spread disinformation was centered around LGBTQ issues. As part of their countermobilization against same-sex marriage, anti-LGBTQ groups utilized private messaging apps to spread false medical reports and fake news stories about how society would collapse upon itself if same-sex couples were permitted to marry. These campaigns did not originate from China; rather, they were initiated and spread domestically.

There were, however, numerous cases of disinformation thought to be linked to China. Han’s rise was not driven purely by domestic forces. When he first started gaining popularity, a number of social media fan pages had their numbers artificially inflated by accounts based in China. Although no smoking gun has been found tracing any direct Chinese Communist Party (CCP) connections to Han’s sudden rise in popularity, it became clear after the fact that accounts from China were behind a number of online campaigns to boost his popularity among Taiwanese. On the other side of the token, the midterm elections saw an upsurge in the spread of disinformation and misinformation against the DPP – all sharing a common thread of painting Tsai and the DPP as ill-equipped to govern.

The aftermath of the midterm elections saw a concerted effort by the Tsai government to counter threats of disinformation – particularly ahead of the 2020 elections – though these initiatives themselves were subject to criticisms from the opposition of being politically motivated and brought up sensitive and charged debates around implications for Taiwan’s freedom of speech and freedom of the press. While Taiwan’s digital democracy efforts to combat disinformation have received praise from international and domestic audiences, there remains a critical gap of full domestic support that will only come with a truly bipartisan consensus that disinformation poses undue risks not only to Taiwan’s elections, but to its overarching democratic system of governance. The same can be said of Tsai’s plans to address broader components of Chinese influence operations toward Taiwan, seen in plans such as the Anti-Infiltration Act.

Cross-Strait Relations

From an international lens, the single issue that will always be front and center for a Taiwan president is how he or she manages the relationship with Beijing. At the same time, while many of the above domestic issues are consistently at the forefront of the minds of domestic audiences, considerations for cross-strait relations do come into play. This was seen in the lead-up to Taiwan’s 2020 elections.

Prior to that, Tsai’s cross-strait policy did not receive widespread domestic attention. After her inauguration in May 2016, she has continuously affirmed her commitment to maintaining the status quo, grounded in the cross-strait developments set in motion through the rapprochement policy of her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou. But the CCP has maintained a consistently hostile posture toward Tsai, whom it has failed to coerce into endorsing the so-called “1992 Consensus” positing that Taiwan is a part of China. Not long after Tsai’s inauguration, in which she did not endorse the 1992 Consensus, while still expressing hope that both sides of the strait would continue to talk, China unilaterally terminated direct contacts between Beijing and Taipei. This was followed by a pressure campaign against Taiwan – breaking the unspoken “diplomatic truce” with the previous administration by poaching Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and blocking Taiwan’s participation as an observer in numerous international fora, among numerous other examples.

For the 2020 election, Beijing’s increasingly belligerent stance toward Taiwan helped bolster Tsai’s domestic support. A year before the polls, in a January 2019 New Year’s speech, Chinese President Xi Jinping hinted at the possibility of pushing a Hong Kong-style “One Country, Two Systems” model on Taiwan. Tsai refuted with her own speech, disavowing “One Country, Two Systems” and pledging to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty. Soon afterward, Han Kuo-yu visited Hong Kong to negotiate a trade deal, with clear intentions of fostering closer ties with the CCP – a move he later tried to downplay as the KMT nominee, amid accusations of being too “pro-China.” Finally, all this came to a fore with the protests in Hong Kong. China’s heavy-handed approach to the protests and its continued efforts to erode Hong Kong’s autonomy became a DPP talking point, as the party sought to demonstrate that it was the most capable of safeguarding Taiwan’s sovereignty against the CCP.

While Hong Kong became a key factor, it was not the only major variable that led to Tsai’s victory. In the end, Tsai was able to leverage her position, effectively painting her administration as the defender of Taiwan’s values and democratic system against those that threaten it, while the KMT sent mixed messages, some in defense of the Republic of China (ROC), others pushing for closer relations with an aggressive Beijing.

Looking Ahead

Tsai’s second term will begin on May 20 without the fanfare of the large public inauguration she had in 2016. Due to the global COVID-19 pandemic, she will begin her second four years with a small livestreamed ceremony.

Domestic priorities in Taiwan, now and for the foreseeable future, will center on managing the pandemic: keeping the number of cases at home low, sharing best practices and providing personal protective equipment (PPE) with partners and friends across the world, and calling for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), where its experts and specialists can make substantive and technical contributions to global health debates and discussions.

The success story of the Tsai administration in handling the virus on the homefront has bolstered her approval ratings while raising Taiwan’s global profile. Still, the next nine-in-one election is more than two years away, and as she and the DPP learned in 2018, a strong general election showing by no means guarantees victory in the next local election.

That said, a few trends that emerged during her first administration will likely come into greater play in the next four years. As discussed above, the political playing field in Taiwan has expanded in the past decade with the emergence of new political parties, such as the NPP, the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), and the Taiwan Statebuilding Party. Interparty dynamics will carry more weight as these parties mature and their members hold more seats in local capacities, as well as in the legislature.

What may become the biggest shake-up in Taiwanese electoral politics, however, is a change to the voting age. In an earlier amendment to the Referendum Act, citizens aged 18 and above were permitted to vote in the 2018 referendum, but not the local election itself. This reinvigorated the debate as to why the voting age for elections is still locked at 20. In late March, under new leadership, the KMT submitted a proposal to lower the legal voting age from 20 to 18 and the eligible age for public office candidacy from 23 to 20. The DPP and other parties have likewise voiced support for such an effort, though it would require an amendment to the Republic of China constitution. If this amendment passes, it will drastically impact how future elections will be managed by parties. Each year a new cohort of 20-year-olds become eligible to vote in Taiwan. If citizens 18, 19, and 20 years of age are eligible to vote in the next election, it will bring three years’ worth of new cohorts to the ballot box, making the youth vote significantly more important. While the DPP was able to rally votes for Tsai in the last election, new third force parties like the NPP and TPP were much more successful at capturing the youth vote. Although third force parties can only grow so much in Taiwan’s hybrid electoral system, their ability to appeal to young voters should still give them a new level of significance previously unseen by third parties.

On the cross-strait front, little is likely to change in the next four years, as Beijing has made it clear that it will refuse any official contact or dialogue unless the Tsai government endorses the 1992 Consensus and its associated adherence to the “One China” formulation. This is in spite of Tsai’s continued commitment to preserving the status quo, i.e., not seeking to replace the ROC government with a Taiwanese state. China will continue to attempt to pressure the DPP government through the variety of tactics in its toolbox: poaching ROC diplomatic allies, squeezing Taiwan’s international space by restricting access to international organizations (governmental or otherwise), military maneuvers in the vicinity of Taiwan and its outlying islands, perpetuating the narrative through formal and informal channels that the party is ill-equipped to govern, and working to co-opt divisions within Taiwan’s society in support of CCP goals. The same challenges Tsai faced in her first term will persist, if not worsen.

There will unlikely be major changes in the state of cross-strait relations, but potential shake-ups within domestic politics, such as a lowered voting age and a larger role for third force parties, will increase the number of voices in Taiwan’s political discussions and have implications for the future trajectory of cross-strait relations. Youth and third force parties often overlap and both groups identify more strongly as uniquely Taiwanese. This reality will shape how the two major parties formulate their policies to adapt to the needs of the electorate, likely increasing the political distance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.