Understanding Sinophobia in Central Asia

In the less than three decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China has emerged as a key player throughout Central Asia. Yet, despite increasingly prominent political, economic, and security relations, China for most Central Asians remains a little known, poorly understood, and even feared country. Since the 2000s, articles critical of Beijing’s policies have proliferated in Central Asian media. Over the past three years, several demonstrations have been organized in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to challenge the Chinese “soft expansion” in the region. Aware of the potentially negative impact of increasing Sinophobia on its foreign policy, China has countered with public diplomacy and soft power policies, including in Central Asia. 

However, is Beijing succeeding, or will it succeed, in reversing this trend in the region? And could Sinophobia jeopardize China’s presence and relationships? 

China’s Deeply Anchored Economic Presence in Central Asia

Soon after independence, Beijing started developing strong diplomatic relations with all the governments in the region. China’s good neighbor policy quickly materialized into significant economic relationships. With between $26 and $45 billion in annual trade, China has been for more than 15 years the first or second trading partner of every state in Central Asia, now far ahead of Russia, which had largely dominated until 2008. Beijing has become the main investor in several key sectors such as oil, gas, mineral ore extraction, infrastructure, and banking, and has gained increasing visibility with the multitude of consumer goods it exports to the region. 

In 2013, China’s ambitions in the region were significantly substantiated with President Xi Jinping’s announcement of hundreds of billions of dollars of investment in what would come to be known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to connect, by trade and infrastructure, Asia with Europe and other continents along ancient trade routes. In addition, the Chinese and Central Asian governments have developed a common narrative on regional security and signed a set of cooperation agreements to address nontraditional threats such as violent extremism. 

Despite its success in emerging as a global power, China’s development model, which combines state capitalism and an export-oriented economy with authoritarian one-party constitutionalism, remains unpopular compared to other models, in particular the Russian one, which between one-half and three-quarters of Central Asian youth view as a benchmark. These concerns are further fed by clichés and phobias inherited from the Soviet regime, which after the Sino-Soviet rupture had portrayed China as an enemy of Islam and of all Turkic peoples. 

Such apprehensions about China are not specific to Central Asia. From Asia to Africa and Latin America, Beijing’s ambition to become the world’s leading power and its fast-growing presence abroad have triggered debates, resistance, and even Sinophobic sentiments. To counter this trend and, subsequently, to mitigate potential or existing tension with local governments and populations abroad that down the road could threaten China’s investments and ambition to achieve great power standing, Beijing has embarked on an aggressive public relations policy. In the wake of the 17th Communist Party National Congress in 2007, then-President Hu Jintao insisted on the necessity of building China’s global cultural soft power. His successor, Xi, continued and even intensified this policy, requiring media outlets in 2014 to “increase China's soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s messages to the world.” In other words, China set itself the goal of “winning the hearts and minds of people beyond its borders,” as formulated by Joseph Nye. 

In Central Asia, Beijing’s soft power policy has meant first overcoming local populations’ ignorance and fears about China by promoting its culture. This has materialized through a trinomial approach, combining dissemination of Chinese history, art, and philosophy together with the teaching of Mandarin and an increased commitment to local education. Second, to counter increasing concerns in Central Asia about its economic influence, Beijing has worked to soften the hard power dimension of its foreign investments and trade by demonstrating its contribution to local economic development and consequently to local populations’ wellbeing. It has thereby aimed to set itself up with its economic partners as a new and sound model of development, different from and more reliable than the ones hitherto offered by Western and international organizations.

China’s proposed “Beijing Consensus” versus the “Washington Consensus” promoted by Western states has been attractive to some populations that were disappointed or impoverished by the liberal reforms introduced by international organizations in Central Asia. According to a survey conducted by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, young people in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan consider the Chinese model of development superior to that of the United States or Turkey. However, the impact of China’s overall soft power policy has been modest. Although preferred to the American model, China’s economic model of development remains much less popular than those of several other countries. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung survey among young people in Central Asia shows that while support for the U.S. model remains very low (between 3 and 8 percent), the Chinese model fares little better, with only 1 percent support in Tajikistan, a high of 9.5 percent in Kazakhstan, 3.6 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and 5.2 percent in Uzbekistan. In all these states, both the U.S. and Chinese models remain far behind the Russian model, which is favored by almost half in Kazakhstan (46.7 percent) and Uzbekistan (45.3 percent), and by about three-quarters of interviewees in Kyrgyzstan (71.8 percent) and Tajikistan (76.7 percent). Other models, such as that of the European Union, or the Turkish model in the Kyrgyz and Tajik case, are also viewed more favorably than the Chinese model. 

Although regularly praised for its commitment to the local economy, the development of local infrastructure, several economic sectors, and local trade, Beijing’s commercial and economic offensives have inspired mixed feelings. China’s presence and investments are disparaged as self-beneficial, overly invasive, and even challenging to the development and independence of the region. Many Central Asian specialists or journalists consider that China is transforming the economies of Central Asia to suit its own interests, to weaken their potential for autonomy, and to further establish their status as Chinese economic protectorates. The key accusation concerns the limiting of Central Asian economies to the role of producers and exporters of primary resources. As regional experts explain, Chinese investments are not aimed at the development of local production but at the creation of conditions to aid the export of Chinese products. Consequently, several essential economic sectors in Central Asia such as light industry, construction, processing, and agriculture, could be negatively impacted by Chinese competition. 

In addition, as argued by the University of London’s Bhavna Dave, local people fault China for promised investments that do not materialize and the potential negative effects resulting from the opacity of contract negotiation and signing. Chinese companies are criticized for their unclear objectives and practices, for violating local legislation and instead enforcing Chinese laws, and for underpaying local employees or not hiring local staff and therefore not contributing to reducing the growing unemployment in the region.

Despite being sometimes fed by rumors or false assumptions, such criticisms undermine China’s goal of being recognized as a driver of local development and are at odds with the Chinese attempt to demonstrate solidarity with developing countries by assisting their economic and social development. In Central Asia, China’s quick economic progress over the last 20 years is seen as a model of domestic development from which to draw inspiration, but also as a threat to its partners. That’s due not only to the economic dependency Beijing’s policy generates in its own interests, but also to the ensuing risk of political influence over its partners’ domestic affairs. Such grievances are not specific to Central Asia. The opacity of China’s economic system and perceived inability to hire local staff and help reduce unemployment have been denounced in other countries and continents, such as in Africa. Moreover, Western or Turkish companies working in Central Asia have faced similar criticisms. However, China’s ostentatious economic presence in Central Asia, combined with its geographic proximity, feed phobias, especially in the three bordering countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. 

Central Asian Populations More Receptive to Chinese Economic Opportunities Than to Chinese Culture

Despite Beijing’s efforts to use culture to improve the image of China and mitigate the fears it inspires in the region, Central Asian populations have remained only moderately receptive. First, China has paid a penalty for starting late in promoting its culture in the region. In the 1990s and 2000s, Beijing focused on the development of its political and economic relations and made little use of its cultural options in the region, thus unintentionally maintaining the many clichés about itself. In the second half of the 2000s, when the Chinese government embarked on a real policy of cultural promotion, Central Asia was already imbued with rhetoric and suspicion about China’s threat to the region. 

China has had undeniable success, however, especially in promoting the learning of Mandarin and its ability to attract a growing number of Central Asian students to its universities. Yet China appears to be chosen by default, motivated more by financial criteria and because access to universities in other – especially Western – countries is difficult. In Kazakhstan, only about 14 percent of students wanting to study abroad choose China, far behind Russia (29.6 percent), Europe or the United States (40 percent). In addition, a survey conducted in 2017 among young Kazakh students studying in China showed that only a quarter of them mention a cultural interest in China. Moreover, those who mention their interest in Chinese culture consider this criterion as secondary: 95 percent of respondents chose China owing first to the ease of obtaining visas and logistical support from the Chinese administration to study in China, and secondly because of the low cost of living and studying there.

The fragile success of Chinese soft power policy in Central Asia should be put into the perspective of local populations’ short-term objectives and interests. Young people’s positive views of China often stem from pragmatic benefit, such as increased job and business opportunities, rather than from a sincere admiration for the Chinese economic, political, or cultural model. In general, interest among the Central Asian population in learning Mandarin or studying in China results from job perspectives and does not necessarily correspond with genuine interest in Chinese culture. At Confucius Institutes, most only attend language classes and leave the institute once they pass the Chinese Proficiency Test (HSK). Moreover, dissemination of Chinese history, literature, and culture has remained limited in scope. Very few Chinese novels and written works have been translated into Russian or into any Central Asian language. Beyond the popularity of some films, such as those featuring Jackie Chan, Chinese cinema has received a cold reception in Central Asia and remains in the shadow of Russian and Indian films, which enjoy a comfortable heritage in the region, as well as of American movies and South American soap operas. 

Finally, China’s limited progress in demonstrating its contribution to economic and social development in Central Asia or in arousing a genuine interest in its culture has consequently done little to address the local population’s stereotypes and fears about its potential political interference. Phobias linked to Beijing’s growing presence remain quite strong in Central Asia. Discourse on the Chinese “soft expansion” into Central Asia have become frequent in Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik newspapers and websites. The ideas that China does not evolve historically, that it pursues atemporal objectives that stretch across several centuries, or even millenia, and that Chinese authorities on principle conceal their imperialist objectives, are widespread. 

Assessing the Magnitude and Limits of Sinophobia in Central Asia

Neither China nor Central Asian governments have been able to prevent Sinophobia in Central Asia. Anti-Chinese sentiment might even make deeper roots in the region. Recent events, such as the revelation of the “re-education” camps, in which (in addition to hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs) several thousand ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz living in China are interned, contribute to a mistrust of the intentions of China in general, and of the Beijing authorities’ views of Islam and Muslim peoples. Moreover, nationalist circles, which have taken off in the region in the last decade, might instrumentalize what could be an economic crisis likely to worsen significantly with the COVD-19 pandemic in order to spread xenophobic discourse in general and anti-Chinese propaganda in particular. 

It is, however, difficult to assess the extent of Sinophobia in Central Asia. First, our analysis is skewed because media and bloggers tend to overstate Sinophobic feelings of the population in alarmist articles. Demonstrations against the Chinese presence that were widely reported in the media, such as those in several cities in Kazakhstan or in Kyrgyzstan in 2019, actually rallied local populations only moderately, succeeding in gathering in most cases between 100 and 300 people.

It is nonetheless likely that many have been reluctant to organize or participate in protests, fearing retaliation by local authoritarian regimes that have almost systematically repressed dissenting opinions and demonstrations of any kind. The 2019 anti-Chinese protests in Kazakhstan resulted in hundreds of arrests. The authoritarianism of local regimes has to date made it possible to channel and limit the expression of Sinophobia and to prevent, for the time being, the structuring of domestic lobbies against the Chinese presence. It is no coincidence that it is in Kyrgyzstan, the least authoritarian state in the region, that Sinophobia has been expressed much more openly since the 2000s.

The authoritarianism and repression of Central Asian governments constitute an essential obstacle to assessing Sinophobia in the region. All have made relations with China a sensitive topic. They all control and even censor research on the subject, preventing the collection of precise information attempting to address independently the Chinese question in the region. As mentioned by the researcher and orientalist Parvis Mullojanov in the case of Tajikistan, the majority of research has focused on studying only the positive aspects of cooperation with China. At the same time, any attempts at critical consideration of various aspects of Chinese expansion in Tajikistan are characterized in the spirit of Soviet times as “intrigues of external enemies” or “geopolitical competitors” of China. This finding can be generalized throughout Central Asia, despite national variations, including relatively greater freedom of expression in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

At the same time, however, local governments’ authoritarianism and censorship is likely to be counterproductive by contributing to fueling sometimes false apprehensions and negative reactions against China. Fears about the Chinese presence often stem from the opacity of Chinese agreements and contracts with Central Asian countries, and from the population’s lack of real information. Some of Vadim Ni’s, of the Ecoforum of NGOs of Kazakhstan, findings in a research project conducted with the NGO Crude Accountability on the impact of Chinese investments in Kazakhstan demonstrate that Sinophobic feelings are not necessarily irreversible: some local protests against Chinese investments due to environmental concerns have, for example, been reduced after open discussions among local authorities, Chinese contractors, and local populations.

In addition, undeniable Sinophobia should not overshadow the Sinophilia expressed by a part of the Central Asian population, which credits China for its significant investments, for attenuating Central Asia’s landlocked character, and for building infrastructure (roads, railways, tunnels, electricity lines, and so on). In addition, and very importantly, for thousands of Central Asians, the proximity of China offers a unique opportunity to make a living through small businesses and trade, a situation that most Western, Japanese, Turkish, or Iranian companies cannot match. 

Finally, whatever the current extent of Sinophobia in the region, and even if it were to increase in the short or medium term, it is unlikely to jeopardize the strong economic relations between the two regions. Even in a worst-case scenario where relations would have to be slowed down due to riots or blockages by some anti-Chinese activists, Central Asian countries would very likely resume strong relations with China once the situation returned to normal, as has been exemplified in some Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia. From 1998, as Suharto loosened his grip on power, violent demonstrations emerged against the Chinese minorities living in the country and against China’s policy in Indonesia. The unrest did not, however, jeopardize the development of relations between the two countries, which have grown significantly, and China is today by far Indonesia’s top economic partner, trading two times more than the second economic partner of the country, Japan. 

No state in Central Asia, and even less the three bordering states, could afford to yield to pressure from anti-Chinese lobbies or activists and challenge their big neighbor. Moreover, no other country, whether it be regional players like India, Turkey, or Iran or Western players like the United States and the European Union, will be able to compete with China, even if they increase their investments in the region. China’s influence is likely to be remain significant in Central Asia over the long term through its overwhelming economic and investment capacity. 

The Real Stakes of China’s Influence in Central Asia

Therefore, when it comes to the prospects of China’s future influence in Central Asia, the main question might not be whether growing Sinophobia could challenge Beijing’s engagement in this region, which is very unlikely. The more essential stake will be the cumulative impacts of China’s economic and potentially growing authoritarian influence on the five countries combined with, to varying degrees in each country, the Central Asian regimes’ authoritarianism and neopatrimonialism.  

First, concerning Central Asian countries’ economic paths: While it is undeniable that the Chinese presence has brought economic benefits to the region, certain risks raised by local experts of excessive economic dependence or the consequences of over-indebtedness with regard to China are legitimate. The neopatrimonialistic system of all Central Asian countries has contributed to increased risk. In Tajikistan, which is one of the poorest countries in Asia and where political and economic circles are closely intertwined, President Emomali Rahmon sees in his big neighbor an exceptional creditor to help him address a situation of economic crisis and of probable insolvency, to fund substantial projects, and to maintain a system riddled with corruption that nourishes his own financial interests as well as those of his close circles, and is necessary for the survival of his regime. 

Second, concerning Central Asian countries’ human rights values and future political paths, Beijing has promoted a narrative that advocates Asian values as a way of unifying the states of the region and disparages so-called Western values such as democracy, universal human rights, and freedom of expression, as allegedly neither desirable nor globally transferable. China has preached instead a principle of a type of democracy merged with national characteristics with so-called Asian concepts such as family-centered stability. Beijing’s “noninterference” policy materializes into an interfering kind of noninterference, i.e. into measures that support and legitimize local regimes, for example by validating their fraudulent elections. This approach can only charm authoritarian regimes that work to justify their repression against dissent and their lack of commitment to human rights (often in the name of stability and the fight against the terrorist threat allegedly coming from outside). Yet the main risks to stability and the future of the region are domestic and related to governments’ inability (due, among other things, to the neopatrimonial nature of the regimes – including corruption among the highest elites) to secure the social contract and development in sectors as fundamental as education and healthcare.

It is incumbent upon other actors, notably Westerners, to put forth innovative propositions in order to balance some of the risky impact of Chinese influence, including the short-sighted view that consists of undermining, in the name of stability, essential principles of human values such as democratic principles and human rights, which constitute the foundations of the United Nations and the OSCE to which the five Central Asian countries have subscribed.