India-Pakistan Talks Are a Nonstarter

A senior adviser of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan set off a small storm in India last month when he suggested in an interview to an Indian media outlet that New Delhi had approached Islamabad for talks. Given that it has been the consistent position of Narendra Modi’s government from 2016 on (and formal Indian policy since 2013) that India will not engage Pakistan bilaterally as long as the problem of cross-border terrorism emanating from that country remains, many were left wondering what exactly was going on behind the scenes – and what made Moeed Yusuf, the adviser in question, say what he did.

While New Delhi’s denial of Yusuf’s comments was swift, many were equally quick to point out that even if India had communicated such a message to Pakistan, Yusuf’s remarks, by outing the effort, had killed the very possibility. Perhaps that was the aim after all: To once and for all end the possibility that India and Pakistan could engage diplomatically (even through backchannels) to come to some arrangement about the future of Kashmir.  

While the whole episode may not amount to much – beyond providing temporary fuel for the excitable commentariat in South Asia – it does raise four more fundamental questions both countries will have to ask and answer going forward: the why, what, when, and who of India-Pakistan talks.

Let us start with the “why.” Successive prime ministers in India have seriously considered the possibility of resolving the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan, often through active backchannel talks even when, on the surface, relations between both countries remained tense. To be sure, the impulse shaping such outreach was equally about legacy (and perhaps, the tantalizing possibility of a Nobel Peace Prize) as well as realpolitik. Kashmir continues to sap India’s military and diplomatic energy. Geography dictates that for India to break out of its continental trap, a modus vivendi with Pakistan, as unpleasant a possibility as that may be, is an imperative. 

Up to the middle of his first term in office, Modi also, broadly speaking, looked forward to calming things down with Pakistan. His pragmatism for a time, overrode his Hindu-nationalist ideological background. As an example, and hard as it is to imagine it now, Modi actually dropped by Pakistan on a surprise visit on his way back from Russia almost five years ago (and briefly attended then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s granddaughter’s wedding), becoming the first Indian prime minister to do so in over a decade. 

But, for a variety of reasons – not the least of which is that Pakistan’s deep state showed very little interest in letting go of, or even reining in, the militant proxies it fields against India – by the middle of 2016, Modi had adopted an extremely tough line toward Pakistan. Instead of softening the de facto border between India and Pakistan in Kashmir – which is what an eventual resolution of the Kashmir dispute would involve, given that neither side would be interested in territorial compromise –  Modi firmly shut the door on it with the Jammu and Kashmir decisions in August 2019. With that, the Indian government resolutely signaled that Kashmir remains non-negotiable. At the same time, by playing up the Article 370 revocation, the Modi government has effectively ensured that any future compromise with Pakistan around Kashmir will only come at a serious political cost, especially at a time when his government faces a grave economic downturn it is unable to arrest. 

That brings us to the “what” around any future India-Pakistan talks: What could be on the agenda if not Kashmir (Pakistan’s core demand) and terrorism (India’s)? In theory, many things could. Regional connectivity, governance issues, and shared climate change threats immediately come to mind. But here again, Indian domestic political circumstances ensure that any outreach to Pakistan will be seen as a comedown for the Modi government. 

Over the summer, as India sought a way out of its pickle when it came to the Chinese army’s encroachments in Ladakh, Modi supporters sotto voce suggested he was eager to wish the problem away – running contrary to his self-promoted tough guy image. And it is not beyond the realm of possibility that India may eventually have to live with a shifted border in Ladakh. So, simply put, Modi can’t afford to be seen as being placatory (however unreasonable that suggestion may be) toward both China and Pakistan. 

Finally come the related questions of “when” and “who.” Assume Modi – a man not entirely indisposed to dramatic decisions without considering their impact – does go ahead with a limited outreach effort to Pakistan in the future, perhaps nudged by a Biden administration in Washington eager to see things calming down in South Asia. The key variable, should his government go down that road, would be the political climate inside Pakistan. 

Over the past few years, many have suggested that India directly talk to the Pakistan Army. Talks between the Indian National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval and Pakistan’s then-NSA General Nasser Khan Janjua took place as late as January 2018. But as long as the current flux in Pakistan’s politics persists, India will find it difficult to choose and settle on interlocutors, given that their fates going forward remain unknown. It is not a small matter of irony that the last time India and Pakistan came close to a Kashmir deal brokered through backchannel talks, around 2008, Pakistan was led by a military dictator, Pervez Musharraf, who had fought one war with India, in 1999, and came close to fighting another two years later, in 2001-02.

Put differently, New Delhi is agnostic toward regime type in Islamabad as far as negotiating with Pakistan is concerned. What it does care about is a semblance of political stability in Pakistan, which would render substance and shelf life to any such talks. Right now, perhaps for the first time in Pakistan’s history, the country’s military finds itself cornered. This, simultaneously, disincentivizes Pakistan’s army from agreeing to talk to India as well as leaving New Delhi wondering about the way the dust will settle in Pakistan, politically speaking.

All foreign policy decisions are determined, varying measures, by domestic circumstances as well as structural, geopolitical, demands. But when it comes to India and Pakistan, the former continues to play an overwhelming role.