Japan’s Aegis Ashore Alternative Raises More Questions

On December 18, the Japanese government made two important decisions for the future of Japan’s defense capabilities.

First, Tokyo decided that Japan will indigenously develop long-range cruise missiles. Based on the surface-to-air missiles that are currently used by Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF), these cruise missiles, couched as a “stand-off missile capability,” are expected to enhance Japan’s remote-island defense capability. In addition, the Japanese government also decided on the purchase of additional two Aegis destroyers. Together, these two programs will replace Tokyo’s original plan of acquiring Aegis Ashore to continue to bolster its defense capabilities.

These decisions will likely have a significant impact on Japan’s defense planning over the next few years.  Most importantly, these decisions mean that one of the key organizing principles for the current National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the Mid-Term Defense Programs (MTDP) is no longer viable.  Thus, a mid-course correction of the MTDP is required at minimum, if not a whole revision of both the NDPG and MTDP.  

In this context, Tokyo’s decision to indigenously develop long-range cruise missiles is potentially profound. Even though Defense Minister Kishi Nobuo justified the government’s decision on the missiles as an additional defensive measure, it has already sparked a debate within Japan whether it means Tokyo is shedding its “exclusively defense-oriented” posture — one of the fundamental principles in post-war Japanese defense policy — and opening a path toward acquiring more capabilities that can be used for preemptive strikes. While the government deferred the decision on whether to acquire “enemy base attack capability” and will subject that idea to further discussion, this question is likely to linger as Japan moves forward with these two programs.

Furthermore, these decisions mean that the two new acquisition programs, neither of which was envisioned in the current MTDP, will need to be added to an already long list of acquisition programs with big price tags. The option to purchase two additional Aegis destroyers as an alternative to the acquisition of Aegis Ashore had already been drawing criticisms that it would not only be more costly but also delay the delivery the capability compared to the original plan. Now that the government is struggling with its effort to boost the Japanese economy, which has been deeply damaged by the COVID-19 pandemic, any effort to introduce expensive new acquisition programs is likely to go under additional scrutiny. 

More importantly, given the current fiscal environment, the introduction of two new acquisition programs that are outside of the scope of the current MTDP could mean considerable revision to existing acquisition programs. These include purchases to enhance Japan’s amphibious capabilities and investments in space and cyber capabilities that are considered critical for Japan to achieve the “cross-domain defense force” envisioned in the current NDPG. The investment that needs to be made for the replacement of F-2 fighter — in which the Japanese government chose Lockheed Martin as the top partner for its development — could also be affected.  

Given these circumstances, Japan should publicly announce that it will go ahead with revising the existing NDPG and MTDP.  When the political, as well as fiscal, impacts of these decisions are so large, they need to be placed within an overarching narrative. How will the introduction of these new acquisition programs allow the government to bolster its defense capabilities? Will the “cross-domain defense force” concept remain as the organizing principle of Japan’s defense planning? If so, how does the government envision balancing investments among the numerous programs with big price tags to make them fiscally sustainable? More fundamentally, now that Japan has taken the step to indigenously develop cruise missile capability under the name of “stand-off missile capability,” which can be easily turned around and used for preemptive strikes, how can these decisions be justified while the government claims it continues to uphold the principle of an “exclusively defense-oriented” defense posture for Japan? 

The December 18 announcement leaves us with more questions than answers about Japan’s future defense planning. While mid-term course correction on the MTDP may serve as the short-term solution, the only way for Japan to fully answer these questions is to revise the NDPG and MTDP to provide a convincing narrative that takes full consideration of the impact of these decisions on Japan’s defense planning.