What Will Biden Mean for the US-South Korea Alliance?

After difficult relations with the United States under President Donald Trump, South Korea sees Joe Biden’s election to the White House as a welcome development. Biden and his picks to fill prominent foreign policy positions have all sought to assure allies that they will not be subject to the same heavy-handed treatment experience in the past four years and will once again be seen as vital partners rather than “free riders.” Although Biden’s approach to South Korea may ultimately prove less confrontational and more constructive, it could also be complicated by greater expectations, particularly in areas where the gap in interests between the two countries has widened in recent years.

Where Seoul should expect the most significant positive change from the new administration in Washington is better recognition of what South Korea brings to the table as a partner, especially at the bilateral and multilateral levels. Trump’s “America First” foreign policy hit South Korea harder than most countries. Under Trump’s leadership, the U.S. demanded untenable increases from South Korea in military burden-sharing negotiations and did not consult with Seoul when deciding to suspend combined military exercises in June 2018. On economic issues, the White House almost withdrew from the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement before deciding to push through minor, yet highly politicized, changes to the deal; the Trump administration also restricted steel imports from South Korea. More broadly, Trump’s skepticism of international cooperation caused Washington to all but completely devalue Seoul’s efforts beyond the peninsula, which was particularly unfortunate this year given South Korea’s leadership on tackling the pandemic.

Biden has signaled that come late January all of this will change, with U.S. policy largely reverting back to previously long-upheld norms. Just days before the November election, Biden made a number of promises in a special contribution to the South Korean state-run Yonhap News Agency. In the article he pledged, “As President, I'll stand with South Korea, strengthening our alliance to safeguard peace in East Asia and beyond, rather than extorting Seoul with reckless threats to remove our troops.” Statements in the same vein from his picks for secretary of state, national security advisor, and secretary of defense all suggest that Biden is serious about following through on this commitment. Removing Trump’s all-encompassing cost-focused approach to the alliance will assuredly lift a massive weight off of Seoul’s shoulders in managing the military relationship, which was also spilling over into public sentiment at home. Without threats from Washington to upend the alliance hiding around every corner, South Korea will be able to better pursue its own interests in the relationship, including upgrading its military capabilities in the process of regaining wartime operational control from the United States.

Additionally, while Trump frequently ignored or even belittled South Korea’s accomplishments on the global stage, Biden has already offered praise and expressed interest in working together in many of these areas. In one of his first reported calls with a foreign leader as president-elect, Biden commended South Korean President Moon Jae-in for his “strong leadership on COVID-19, noting his commitment to cooperate on addressing the pandemic, building global health security, and stimulating global economic recovery.” The U.S. president-elect also mentioned he was looking forward to working together on climate change, an area both Biden and Moon have placed great importance on but Trump has disregarded. U.S.-South Korea cooperation at the multilateral level was a core pillar of the relationship in the decade before Trump took office, and reinstituting that same emphasis would certainly help to amplify Seoul’s work, especially considering the United States’ traditional role in upholding the liberal international order upon which much of South Korea’s international influence and prosperity is built on.

However, all of South Korea’s challenges with the U.S. will not go out the door with Trump. One of the most significant outcomes of the Trump presidency has been the rapid deterioration of Washington’s relationship with Beijing. While Biden appears to be opting for a more qualified competition with China as opposed to Trump’s full-court press, tension between the two major powers is not going away any time soon. Seoul, though, still does not perceive Beijing to be the same threat Washington does nor is it willing to push back too forcefully against China, which is by far South Korea’s largest trading partner and a crucial player in advancing inter-Korean ties. Under Trump, these divergent views on China contributed to underlying tension in the relationship but did not come to a head like the bilateral security and economic issues did. This may be because the administration as a whole viewed, or at least prioritized, South Korea’s role in the region in too narrow of a context, more or less limited to the Korean Peninsula.

Greater recognition from the Biden presidency, however, could come with greater expectations for South Korea in initiatives that could be seen as containing China. It is not clear what will change and what will stay, but Biden seems to be preparing to keep at least some aspects of Trump’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. Seoul has been hesitant to participate in major initiatives falling under this umbrella, largely adhering to its own regional strategy and pursuing cooperation in relevant overlapping areas. Biden could expect South Korea to step up and play a more direct role in the United States’ regional plans, which might pose a major challenge if the overwhelming focus remains on security issues.

That said, the next administration seems to be preparing a more wholistic approach. With a greater focus on non-traditional security concerns like climate change and public health, Biden could clear the way for greater South Korean participation in the United States’ Indo-Pacific policy with less political baggage with China. Even so, areas like decoupling value chains with China in high-tech industries will still ensure some tension between Washington and Seoul.

South Korea may also be consulted more in how the U.S. addresses the North Korea issue, but this will not necessarily translate into significant diplomatic progress between Pyongyang and Washington. Rather than offering a Trump-style summit to kickoff diplomacy that he has disavowed, Biden could follow Moon’s suggestion of negotiating a peace agreement with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un before denuclearization talks, though there is nothing to suggest he is willing to do so just yet. Biden appears to be moving on from the Obama administration’s “strategic patience” as evidenced by calls for principled diplomacy and will have a higher threshold for meeting with Kim than Trump did, but beyond that it is not yet clear what exactly his plans are. Tackling the peace process with North Korea first would be a major break with past U.S. policy, so it may prove a bridge too far for now. Nevertheless, how Pyongyang reacts to the first several months of a Biden presidency (whether or not it engages in provocations such as a missile test) will be just as crucial as any well-laid plans in shaping Washington’s approach.

Overall, the alliance will not be without its problems as Biden tries to build back U.S. credibility and the gap between Washington and Seoul on how to approach China and North Korea continues. However, this should still be better for Seoul than the turmoil of the Trump years.