The US Moral Compass: Beyond Xinjiang

The Trump administration’s decision last year to call out China on its abuse of Uyghurs within its own borders provided a rare demonstration of morality driving U.S. foreign policy. The Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of June 2020 opened the door for Washington to define its relations with Beijing through a lens of moral clarity, pushing back against the Chinese Communist Party’s persecution of Muslim minorities and its systemic efforts to eradicate Uyghur heritage. Washington’s actions, however, have not led China to change its course of action, nor is Beijing likely to veer from its chosen course. Instead, the real gain from the U.S. pushback has been for Washington to be able to claim the moral high ground both at home and abroad. But as the Biden administration looks to restore the U.S. position as a leader of democratic values, the need for Washington to step up and stand up for human rights beyond Xinjiang and support democratic movements in Myanmar, Hong Kong, and beyond is only increasing. 

From rounding up the Muslims of Xinjiang for forced labor to pushing them into so-called re-education camps, China’s gross violation of human rights in the region is all too clear. Pushing back against Beijing and calling out Chinese repression of ethnic minorities in northwestern Xinjiang as nothing short of heinous crimes against humanity has been one of the few positions that started under the Trump administration and has been carried over into the Biden administration. To date, the United States continues to lead the way when it comes to attacking China’s actions, and the imposition of sanctions against Chinese companies, including the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), and individuals for their role in abusing Uyghurs can be seen as Washington’s willingness to put its words into action. After all, the United States prohibits the import of goods produced or manufactured by forced labor, and there is ample evidence that all too many imports from Xinjiang are made wholly or partially by Uyghurs in labor camps. 

Yet it is extremely difficult, if not downright impossible, to ensure that products from the region do not enter the U.S. market unless there is a blanket ban on import of Chinese goods into the United States. For instance, even though Washington has imposed a ban on cotton products produced in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the region also produces over 80 percent of total Chinese cotton and nearly one-fifth of the world’s total supply. Without Chinese producers being transparent about their production line, it is difficult to determine whether a shirt that is made in China is using cotton produced by Uyghur labor.  

Then there is the challenge of making sanctions lead to behavior change by Beijing, or at least to a sharp decline in the Chinese economy. If the end goal of the U.S. sanctions against China is to eradicate the re-education camps and to stop human rights abuses, Washington will need to step up efforts to cripple China’s economic base so that it will have no choice but to capitulate. So far, though, there has been no indication that the U.S. stance against China has actually led Beijing to reconsider its position regarding the Uyghurs. Moreover, given the need for Washington to work together with Beijing on cross-border challenges including dealing with the ongoing pandemic and climate change, it will be difficult for the United States to exert further pressure on China unless it is prepared to incorporate the issue of human rights abuses more comprehensively into its Chinese trade policy.

Granted, the United States is hardly alone in seeing the limitations of sanctions leading to systemic change in the targeted countries. In fact, the reverse can often be argued, insofar as isolation and political pressure resulting from the sanctions can further the resolve of countries to enhance their domestic resilience in the longer term. The European Union’s sanctions against Russia in response to Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, for instance, led to immediate economic turbulence and shortages in Russia. Over the years, however, restricted access to goods and capital have also spurred Moscow to be more resilient to external pressure, not least in encouraging greater food independence as Russia stepped up agricultural production. 

What the United States gains by imposing sanctions and taking a stance against Chinese human rights violations, however, is not about changing Beijing’s actions. Instead, Washington is now able to declare that American exceptionalism is back, and that Washington’s foreign policy once again is guided by a moral compass. That narrative is particularly needed at a time when the Biden administration is looking to promote building values-based partnerships. Certainly, promoting U.S. leadership in Asia based on democratic values would be a win within the United States at a time when the country remains deeply divided. At the same time, Xinjiang is hardly the only region that is facing humanitarian challenges. The Chinese crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong and the military coup in Myanmar that is leading to a crackdown in free speech are only two of the many governance challenges that will need international support to overcome. The real test of Washington’s commitment to democratic values and its ability to lead in ensuring stability across Asia goes far beyond the borders of China.