Charting China-US Dynamics Under Biden

Donald Trump left the White House with U.S.-China relations at their worst in decades. Trump’s administration struggled to enact a China policy that produced what its rhetoric proclaimed, while waging a largely unproductive trade war, targeting Chinese immigration and students, and making increasingly aggressive policy pronouncements against China’s coercion and human rights abuses. The main problem was that all these policies were filtered through a president seized at once by capricious disdain for China as a competitor and a reflexive affinity for its worst authoritarian abuses, undermining even those policies that were not self-defeating.

The Biden administration entered the picture with a combination of hope for coherence and a question, despite consistent strong statements by the incoming president as a candidate and his top advisers, whether he would maintain pressure against a China that had become increasingly belligerent against its neighbors and trading partners, crushed political liberties in Hong Kong, and waged a genocidal campaign against the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. 

More than a month in, the Biden administration has consistently kept up pressure on China over those concerns, with no attenuated language aimed at resetting the relationship. China has matched with its own tough language, but so far has been careful not to condemn U.S. officials over their pronouncements, suggesting that the Biden administration’s refusal to be obsequious may actually help clear away potential flashpoints and enable cooperation in areas of mutual concern.

Before there had been any formal communication with the new administration, China’s top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, the director of the Communist Party’s foreign affairs office, staked out a strong and uncompromising position on China’s view of what the United States needed to do to improve relations. Yang’s remarks to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, a non-profit educational group, were scolding and prescriptive:

…we expect the United States to honor its commitment under the three Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqués, strictly abide by the One China principle, and respect China's position and concerns on the Taiwan question. The United States should stop interference in the affairs of Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang, which all matter to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and stop attempts to hold back China's development by meddling in China's internal affairs.

He warned that failing to adhere to these limits was a “redline” that the United States must not cross lest Washington end up harming its own interests.

Three days later Yang spoke with Antony Blinken, the newly confirmed U.S. secretary of state. The U.S. readout of the call reveals that Blinken did not dance around the “redlines” that Yang listed in his remarks at the beginning of the week, telling him that the United States would continue to stand up for human rights and democratic values, specifically in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet, and concluded by warning China against threatening stability in the region, to include moves aimed at Taiwan.

The Chinese readout of the same call shows that Yang reiterated most of the same points against U.S. interference in areas it considers domestic concerns — Xinjaing, Hong Kong, and Tibet — that he made in his earlier public remarks. There was also no condemnation of Blinken’s statements on human rights, instead only referring to his commitment to the United States’ status quo policies toward Taiwan. This is not an unusual omission, but it signals China is not going out of its way to foreclose on cooperation with the United States. (The U.S. readout mentions only Blinken’s statements, not Yang’s.)

In addition to the strong language highlighting areas of concern with China, the United States has not backed off activities that Beijing objects to for the sake of diplomatic appearances.

The same day that Yang and Blinken spoke, the U.S. destroyer John S. McCain conducted a freedom of navigation operation near the Chinese-occupied Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. On the way to the South China Sea the destroyer made a transit through the Taiwan Strait. Both events were publicized by the U.S. Navy.

A week later, President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping had their first official call as heads of state.

The day that Xi and Biden spoke featured an even more provocative signal, a visit by Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to the United States, Representative Hsiao Bi-khim, to the State Department for a meeting with a senior diplomat for East Asia. The visit was publicized just hours before the two leaders spoke.

The Biden administration had signaled its commitment to Taiwan earlier, before it even took office, by inviting Hsiao to Biden’s presidential inauguration as an official guest. She is believed to be the first representative of Taiwan to receive such an invitation since the U.S. severed formal ties in 1979. China’s Foreign Ministry acknowledged Hsaio’s attendance and urged the United States to abide by the “one China principle” but stopped short of condemning the invitation. (China’s “one China principle” asserts explicitly that Taiwan is a part of China, but the United States’ actual “one China policy” is more ambiguous and does not take a position on the resolution of cross-strait disputes other than to condemn the use of force.)

The official readouts of the Biden-Xi call largely mirrored the positions staked out by Blinken and Yang. Biden stressed concern over Chinese coercion and human rights abuses; Xi repeated China’s position against U.S. involvement in those issues. But the Chinese readout also emphasized how much the two countries had to gain from meaningful cooperation.

White House officials revealed that the call with Xi lasted two hours, implying a much more substantive conversation than the simple exchange of largely intractable talking points summarized by the readouts. The day after the call Biden told reporters that he and Xi had a good conversation. “I know him well. We spent a lot of time together over the years I was vice president. But if we don't get moving, they're going to eat our lunch,” he said. The two have an unusually robust history dating back to when they were both vice presidents. 

The Biden administration’s firmness may be signaling to China that it cannot move the United States with small concessions, and China’s repeated resurfacing the prospect of cooperation without highlighting U.S. statements against its coercion and abuses may mean it is more eager to improve the relationship.