Thinking Beyond a United Front in Dealing With North Korea

The United States is in the final stages of reviewing its North Korea policy. Whatever criticisms there may have been about President Donald Trump’s strategy in reaching out to Pyongyang, it is clear that the Biden White House will continue to push for engagement with North Korea, and not just unilaterally. The challenge for the United States, though, is whether or not it will be able to rally South Korea and Japan in particular to share its longer-term vision for the Korean Peninsula. But just as envisioning a strategy to deal with the Chinese threat that would be embraced by both Tokyo and Seoul remains a challenge, crafting a comprehensive roadmap that can be solidly supported by key U.S. allies will be an uphill task.

It is, of course, almost foolhardy to compare the differences between developing a policy on China and one for North Korea. After all, China is the world’s second largest economy and the regional hegemon of the Indo-Pacific, which is looking to develop a global system that provides an alternative vision for governance, growth, and security. At the same time, the priorities that various governments have in their relations with Beijing can differ considerably, even among the most like-minded and traditionally supportive of U.S. allies. For Tokyo, countering the Chinese security threat on the one hand while continuing to pursue strong economic ties on the other would be the optimum outcome, thereby keeping the current status quo of having solid relations with Washington while continuing to boost Japanese investments to China. Such a scenario of decoupling economic interests and security concerns is proving to be increasingly difficult, however, not least as such a move would be out of step with Washington. In short, reaching a consensus about how to define and tackle the China threat in itself can be a source of friction, if not outright division.

North Korea’s isolation from the rest of the world, on the other hand, at first blush poses less of a strategic conflict when it comes to alliances. The fact remains that the United States as well as Japan, South Korea, and even China are united in their expectations for a denuclearized North Korea. Moreover, with preconditions to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un no longer on the table, there is a consensus in the region about engaging with Pyongyang to maintain stability at the very least, if not secure a North Korean retreat from its missile development endeavors. Indeed, following the meeting of their respective national security advisors in Annapolis on the U.S. east coast in early April, Japan, South Korea, and the United States announced in a joint statement that they would work together to implement the U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea in addition to “preventing proliferation, and cooperating to strengthen deterrence and maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.”

The challenge, however, goes beyond how to coordinate efforts to denuclearize North Korea. The prospect of Pyongyang abandoning its nuclear program is hardly a straightforward path, and Kim Jong Un’s regime is only expected to further its capabilities to develop WMDs even more.  Furthermore, the willingness of Pyongyang to reengage with Washington seem to be on shaky ground. But equally significant are the different perspectives and focus areas that each country brings to the table, which may hamper collective action.

For Washington, North Korea has been and remains first and foremost a security issue. As such, it will continue to focus on addressing the dangers of Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs, as was made clear in the joint Japan-U.S. statement following the first face-to-face meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide.

Nonetheless, North Korea goes far beyond a security concern for both Tokyo and Seoul, given their geographic proximity to the rogue regime. The political, as well as emotional, calculus can thus not be underestimated in Northeast Asia. It is not by chance that Washington officials without fail state the need to remember the plight of Japanese abductees still remaining in North Korea. Rather, it is a clear U.S. acknowledgement that the return of the abductees from the 1970s and ‘80s is a non-negotiable part of Japan’s demands for a deal with Pyongyang, which needs to go hand in hand with denuclearization negotiations.

For South Korea, meanwhile, denuclearization is only of the many aspects of reconciling with the North.  From coming to terms with the history and legacy of the Korean War and bringing together divided families, the ultimate goal of reunification remains a strong political driving force. For President Moon Jae-in, the prospect of reuniting with the North is an unwavering personal commitment, even as the actual results of reaching out to Kim remain in question as he enters his final year in office.

Yet envisioning North Korea’s future even if it were to comply with the U.N. resolutions is already a point of contention. While Washington can claim victory once Pyongyang’s missile program is dismantled or at least the threat is significantly decreased, the burden of bringing North Korea back into the international fold will fall largely on the countries of Northeast Asia, especially South Korea and Japan, alongside China. From financial assistance to meet with immediate needs to dealing with the anticipated emigration from the North and investing in longer-term growth projects, the prospect of rebuilding the country after decades of isolation is daunting to say the least.

Given the impasse in dealing with Pyongyang, it could also be argued that such discussions are premature. Yet as Washington presses forward with a revised North Korea policy, it is imperative for the United States to articulate a roadmap for the region that includes a Pyongyang that is part of the international community as supported by Washington, Seoul, Tokyo, and other partners in the Indo-Pacific.