Biden-Suga Summit: A ‘Homework Summit’ for Japan

On April 16, U.S. President Joe Biden hosted Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide at the White House. It was the first in-person bilateral summit Biden hosted for a foreign leader, and Suga’s first trip to the United States since taking office last September. Following the bilateral summit, the two leaders issued a joint statement, entitled “U.S.-Japan Global Partnership for a New Era.”

Suga came to Washington to accomplish one thing: To start forging a personal, hopefully close, relationship with Biden. Given the magnitude of the challenges Suga faces at home – from a resurgence of COVID-19 cases in Tokyo, Osaka, and other major cities (which inevitably raises questions about the feasibility of hosting the Summer Olympics in Tokyo in a few months), persistent security challenges posed by North Korea, and China’s ever-growing assertiveness – it was important for Suga to ensure that his country can count on support from the United States, its only ally, on a wide range of internal and external issues.

At first glance, it seems that Suga accomplished his goal. In the press conference held immediately after the bilateral summit meeting, Biden referred to Suga as “Yoshi,” subtly hinting at a good personal rapport. In the joint statement released after the meeting, the two leaders affirmed that the Japan-U.S. alliance remains a “cornerstone of peace and security” in the Indo-Pacific region. They also launched several key initiatives, including a new Competitive and Resilience (CoRe) partnership under which the two countries will closely cooperate in three areas: (1) competitiveness and innovation, (2) global health and health security, including COVID-19 response, and (3) climate change, clean energy, and green growth and recovery. In addition, the two leaders announced the U.S.-Japan Climate Partnership, an initiative that solely focuses on cooperation in tackling climate change. The U.S. show of support for Tokyo hosting the Olympic games as planned in summer of 2021 also provided a nice boost for Suga as well.

Prior to the summit meeting, there was much speculation on how forward-leaning the Biden-Suga joint statement would be in reference to China and Taiwan. Here, the joint statement by the two leaders articulated their countries’ shared concern about China in a way very similar to the joint statement issued following the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) or “2+2” meeting in March 2021. Together, Biden and Suga called out China’s behavior in the East and South China Seas as “inconsistent” with international norms. They also expressed their “serious concerns” in regards to the human rights situation in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. The joint statement also reiterated the importance of the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait – it was the first time in 50-plus years that the world “Taiwan” appeared in a joint statement by the leaders of Japan and the United States. In addition, the statement specifically reaffirmed that “Article V of the [U.S.-Japan Security] Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands” and that both Tokyo and Washington “oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of the Senkaku Islands,” which are also claimed by China. Suga certainly received the reassurance that Japan constantly seeks from the United States on its commitment to help Japan defend the Senkaku Islands.

Looking forward, however, both the SCC joint statement last month and the Joint Leaders’ Statement on April 16 left Suga and his government with a large pile of homework. Take the COVID-19 response, for example. While vaccines became available for people over 16 years old in most parts of the United States by mid-April, with the projection that the most adults in the United States will be vaccinated by the end of the summer, Japan just began vaccinations for seniors aged 65 and above on April 12, with some estimates showing that it would take until September before vaccines become readily available for others who want to be vaccinated. That statistic, along with the recent resurgence of COVID-19 cases in parts of Japan and reactivation of the state of emergency declaration, will raise questions about the feasibility of Japan moving forward with hosting the Summer Olympics, which are slated to start in late July.

In addition, the Joint Leaders’ Statement also endorsed the March 2021 SCC Joint Statement, in which Japan committed to strengthen its own defense capabilities. The two countries committed to conclude the negotiation to renew their Host Nation Support (HNS) deal, which determines Japan’s financial contribution to the cost of stationing U.S. troops in the country, for a full five-year term in “timely and meaningful” manner. Unlike the Trump administration, which would have been satisfied if Japan just paid the sum that they demanded, the Biden team will likely pursue a mixture of financial as well as quasi- and non-financial contributions from Japan to renew the HNS deal in a “meaningful” manner. Taken together, this would put Japan in a position to have to come up with a roadmap that clearly demonstrates Tokyo’s will to bolster its own defense capability and participate more fully in alliance cooperation. It also put the onus on Japan to push forward with the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to the previously agreed relocation site off of Hennoko in Okinawa.

In non-security areas as well, there are challenges. The Japanese government will likely face pushback from the business sector, which continues to have a deep economic interest in China, as Tokyo continues its cooperation with the U.S. and other like-minded countries to strengthen the resiliency of supply chains and emerging technologies – which often means making sure that China cannot have access to them. In addition, the United States is much farther ahead in fostering a business environment that encourages innovation, with Japan continuing to play catch-up.

On the positive side, what little suspicion that may have existed in Japan about the Biden administration somehow shifting its China policy away from the hardline stance during the Trump administration should be gone by now. Instead, the series of diplomatic events since the beginning of the Biden administration – the virtual Quad summit, the SCCs in Tokyo and Seoul, and Suga’s visit to the White House in mid-April – all speak to the reality that the Biden administration looks to Japan as an essential partner as it reconstructs its foreign policy. But the flip side is that the Biden administration expects Japan to rise to the occasion. Now that Japan has got what it always wished for – attention as the key ally of the U.S. – it is incumbent upon Suga and his government to follow through.