Moon’s Closing Act

South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in spent much of May and June trying to turn the spotlight on his foreign policy, heading to Washington, D.C. for a summit meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden, then to the United Kingdom for the G-7 meeting, and then off to Austria and Spain for state visits.

Unfortunately, however, Moon’s steady diplomacy, which earned him the slot as Biden’s second in-person summit as well as a rare invitation to join the sidelines of the exclusive G-7 event in Cornwall, could not overcome regional politics. In fact, South Korea entered the G-7 with the narrative focused on concerns about the specter of China, and Moon left it with questions swirling about Japan’s supposed refusal to meet him on the sidelines of the summit.

At the same time, trouble has been brewing back home in Seoul, with recent political losses leaving the ruling party on thin ice heading into next spring’s presidential election. While foreign policy is important, it is clear that domestic issues are what will decide the race for the Blue House next year. With these challenges in mind both at home and abroad, Moon will have to maintain a very careful balancing act as he wraps up his last nine months in office and looks to keep his party at the top of South Korean politics.

China

Many analysts looked to the events in Cornwall in June with one eye on Beijing. In fact, Moon’s stance toward China has been a point of contention, as he has tried to thread the needle between balancing against Beijing while still recognizing the economic clout China wields.

Because of this seeming ambivalence, Korea watchers have been increasingly concerned about a so-called “turn” toward China, especially during the Trump years, and many were hoping that a return to diplomatic normalcy under Biden would put that issue to bed. Setting aside the fact that there was no real evidence of a turn toward China even when Trump was at his most abrasive, it seems like Moon is willing to take steps to put any doubt to bed. Although skeptics say it was not strong enough, the inclusion of language on the Taiwan Strait in the bilateral statement after the Biden-Moon summit is notable. Moon's attendance at the G-7, with its focus on China, could also be read as a signal of Seoul wanting to be seen in the company of the U.S., the U.K., and others as they laid out their agendas.

Finally, even if Moon had reason to lean toward China, he would do so at his own political peril. Over the last several years, anti-China sentiment in the South Korean public has spiked, starting from the THAAD debacle and accelerating in recent months amidst a series of cultural disputes. With this background, the South Korean public has been increasingly pessimistic if not outright antagonistic about the prospect of cooperation with China. In fact, recent polling by the Chicago Council showed that 60 percent of South Korean respondents saw China as more of a threat than a partner on economics; on security the number jumps to over 80 percent.

Moon is likely to take this public sentiment into account in his dealings with China in his last few months in office. He will seek to avoid directly antagonizing Beijing but certainly show Korean disapproval as necessary in his actions on the international stage, including in fora like the G-7.

Japan

Although South Korea’s often volatile relations with Japan had been relatively quiet as of late, the G-7 summit brought bilateral and even trilateral relations with Washington back to the forefront. The announcement of an upcoming South Korean military drill around the disputed Dokdo islands did not help matters.

Moon’s tenure, while not as directly confrontational as Lee Myung-bak’s or as controversial as Park Geun-hye’s when it comes to approaches to relations with Japan, was nonetheless just as volatile. From major court decisions surrounding wartime laborers to the economic row and boycotts between the two in 2019, South Korea’s relations with Japan have taken some serious hits over the last four years.

Unlike with North Korea, the relationship with Japan has not been one of Moon’s priorities during his tenure, and he’s unlikely to start focusing on it now in the last part of his term. Working through the ongoing historical issues that remain wedged between the two countries will take time and engaged effort (and, most importantly, political will on both sides). Moon is likely to avoid any large moves one way or another.

North Korea

Ironically, given that it was the intense focus of Moon’s first few years in office and a major personal project for the president, North Korea is another area where he would be better off focusing efforts elsewhere. After the historic summitry of 2018, a master class in mediation by Moon between North Korea’s Kim Jong Un and the United States’ Donald Trump, interest in diplomacy waned quickly in both Pyongyang and Washington. The moment, it seems, has passed – at least for now.

Instead of pushing for a reignition of negotiations now, Moon should focus on teeing up his successor, as well as helping nudge Biden toward a more engaged North Korea policy. Although it didn’t make major leaps forward, the constructive tone of the bilateral joint statement’s North Korea sections is promising. Also encouraging is the fact that the document outlined many, many other areas where the ROK-U.S. alliance can focus, outside of the North Korea quagmire.

Domestic Constraints

As the above assessment of three major foreign policy topics shows, while these issues are generally incredibly important for South Korea’s relationships in the region and with its main ally, the United States, Moon is likely past the point where he can make any inroads by the time his tenure ends. Not only is time running out – foreign policy requires sustained focus and effort – but Moon also lacks strong domestic backing to emphasize foreign policy issues over domestic matters.

This is not to say Moon has no domestic backing at all – on the contrary, although his approval rating has dipped in his final year, this is par for the course for South Korean presidents near the end of their terms. In fact, Moon maintains the highest approval rating for any South Korean president at this point in their term. However, despite doing better than other presidents at the same juncture, that doesn’t mean Moon has smooth sailing ahead as his Democratic Party looks to secure another term in the Blue House next year. The Seoul and Busan mayoral by-elections this spring, in which two opposition party candidates won, should serve as a wake-up call, especially given that many voters said they voted more against the ruling party than for the opposition.

To be fair, global events like the G-7 should not be seen entirely as a diversion from important local politics. The fact that South Korea was one of only four countries to be invited as guests in addition to the main seven participating countries is an important sign that these global economic powerhouses want Seoul in on the conversation. And the summit had several concrete takeaways, such as the participating countries’ pledge to procure and distribute 1 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines to developing countries, as well as setting new, ambitious goals to mitigate climate change.

But Moon probably didn’t score enough of a foreign policy win from the G-7 to overcome domestic indifference. This outcome was similar to the Biden-Moon summit in late May, which went off without a hitch and was generally considered a success – largely because it represented a return to good old, pleasant but largely uneventful summit diplomacy. No big losses – but no big wins either.