The Battle for Myanmar

On February 1, 2021, Dr. Sasa awoke to terrifying news. Although his phone had no signal, it didn’t take him long to learn that civilian leaders and activists around the country had been rounded up and arrested as part of a coup carried out by the Myanmar military.

“At first, I didn’t even realize what was happening. I remember looking outside and the street was flooded with military vehicles. It was like a dream. I was thinking to myself – is this real?” recalled Sasa.

Soon after, he fled his hotel room in Myanmar’s ghost town capital of Naypyidaw, disguised himself as a taxi driver, and headed toward the northwestern border to avoid arrest.

Today, Sasa has become one of the faces of the anti-military resistance movement, helping to establish the National Unity Government (NUG), a shadow government of politicians deposed during the coup, and now serving as its official spokesperson.

In the year since that panic-stricken morning, the military has continued carrying out systematic attacks across the country, detaining tens of thousands of people and killing nearly 1,500 of its own civilians, including babies only a few months old.

As Myanmar enters its second year under military rule, the growing armed resistance movement, the rising number of defections from the armed forces, internal shakeups within the regime, and the economic strain from the coup suggest that the junta’s grasp on power could be in jeopardy. But even with the progress that has been made, the strength of the military’s capabilities and the lack of international support could mean that the end is still a long way off.

Immediately after the coup, protests and strikes erupted across the country in what became known as the Civil Disobedience Movement. Within two months, the NUG had taken form and announced the establishment of a People’s Defense Force (PDF), a network of local, anti-junta armed groups, which began appearing around Myanmar at an unprecedented rate.

“If you look at the PDFs over the last ten months, more than 200 local defense forces have been born. In the history of Myanmar there have never been these kinds of local resistance forces in urban places,” said Sasa.

After several months, in a landmark turn on September 7, the NUG formally declared the beginning of a people’s “resistance war” against the military. Since the establishment of the defense force, there had already been a stream of attacks levied against security forces, but the official declaration signaled a change in tactics that has seen an escalation in clashes between the two sides as well as an increase in soldier casualties.

Nyi Thuta, who was one of the first captains from the military to defect from his base on March 4 and now works in arms production for PDF forces, believes the resistance managed to build up a strong opposition to the junta in a short amount of time.

“Initially, we started with the protests and then some defensive attacks. But since September we are trying to stage more offensive attacks, which has taken the military by surprise,” Nyi Thuta told The Diplomat. “We’ve been able to send them a message that we can do something about what they are doing to our country.”

Although the declaration of war signaled an uptick in the scale of PDF attacks against junta forces, many of the groups involved in these offensives were only affiliated with the NUG by name, operating independently and receiving little in terms of material support.

It wasn’t until early November that allied groups under the direct command of the NUG carried out their first coordinated attack against the security forces, killing seven soldiers and injuring another 13 in the country’s largest city, Yangon. The number of attacks against junta forces, by both NUG-sanctioned PDF forces and guerrilla groups acting independently, continued to increase over the months since, with the current death toll of junta soldiers believed to be well over 1,000.

The junta hasn’t taken the resistance sitting down. Security forces continue staging deadly attacks on both civilians and PDF fighters, launching airstrikes and setting entire villages on fire. In the last few months, several villages in northwestern Chin State have been burnt to the ground. Loikaw, the capital of Kayah State in eastern Myanmar, has become the latest city to be emptied, with residents fleeing the increased fighting.

Off the battlefield, the junta has also continued with a steady stream of raids, arresting anyone deemed an enemy of the regime, often on falsified or trumped up charges. Those who have been arrested are usually held for months and sometimes tortured before being subject to sham trials run entirely by military-appointed judges where guilty sentences all but guaranteed. Some are killed during the interrogations.

To counter the junta’s barbaric tactics, the armed resistance has sought support from Myanmar’s raft of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), many of which have been at war with the military for decades.

These EAOs, like the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), one of the largest groups in the country, have maintained their distinct chains of command but have helped shelter, train, and arm PDF fighters. Padoh Saw Taw Nee, the spokesperson for the Karen National Union (KNU), the political wing of the KNLA, says that while they are not a member of the NUG, the two groups “will still work together to fight against their common enemy.”

As one of the military’s oldest and strongest adversaries, the KNU/KNLA has seen and been victim to the worst of what the armed forces are capable of. Yet, Taw Nee believes that today’s military is significantly weaker than in the past, especially given its current struggles with recruitment.

“Now they are struggling to keep up the fighting. They have a lot of problems within their institution and their manpower is getting worse and worse because no one wants to join the army,” Taw Nee told The Diplomat.

Since April, the military has been forcing the wives and children of its soldiers to undergo training, as well as recruiting civilians and retired army personnel, as it continues to suffer heavy casualties.

While some EAOs like the KNLA have embraced working with PDFs, the Arakan Army (AA), another one of Myanmar’s more powerful EAOs, has so far withheld its support from the resistance effort. Prior to the coup, the AA engaged in years of intense fighting with the military, which ended with an informal ceasefire in November 2020. While the AA has largely stayed out of Myanmar’s ongoing civil war, small flare-ups with junta soldiers in Rakhine State, where the AA predominantly operates, could be testing the limits of the truce.

If the AA were to engage militarily, it would significantly alter the current landscape of Myanmar’s civil war given the group’s manpower and weaponry, and how overstretched the military has become with conflicts raging across the country.

“The military has withdrawn troops from Rakhine State to other newly-challenged areas, so if the Arakan Army started fighting against the military, they [the junta] would face enormous pressure,” said Ye Myo Hein, a fellow with the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the former executive director of the Tagaung Institute of Political Studies.

“I’m sure they [the AA] will confront the military at some point, but I’m not sure they will join the NUG or PDFs because the AA have their own political agenda. They cling to more independence, more autonomy.”

While no decision has been made, in early January, the NUG held virtual talks with the AA leadership, including commander-in-chief general Twan Mrat Naing, in the third publicized interaction between the two groups since the coup. The NUG reportedly once again invited the AA to join with its resistance forces and sources with knowledge of the talks said the meeting signaled “progress.”

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Along with the NUG’s efforts to foster partnerships with EAOs, the shadow government has also made significant headway in encouraging defections from the army. The exact number of defections is unknown. Nyi Thuta believes the figure stands somewhere near 2,000, while Sasa asserts that it’s closer to 10,000, but even at the lower end of the scale, the number is significant.

“This is the largest number of defections from the military in Myanmar’s history. Defection is the main help to the resistance right now. We are trying to cut the military off at its roots and eliminate them,” said Nyi Thuta, who has worked to encourage and support other soldiers who want to defect since he left his base almost 11 months ago.

“Because of this, members of the military no longer trust each other as much and this is one of the big advantages we have right now.”

And this lack of trust seems to have permeated the top echelons of the junta with the recent replacement of several high-level figures.

In early January, local news outlet Myanmar Now reported that the chief of Myanmar’s Air Force, General Maung Maung Kyaw, had retired from his position – three years before the formal retirement age. Ye Myo Hein says that based on accounts from inside sources, the decision came quite suddenly and Maung Maung Kyaw “had no idea he would be replaced.”

In addition to being a key player in both the coup and the regime it created, Maung Maung Kyaw’s family also has significant financial ties to the military, making his early retirement all the more surprising and showing the extent to which the military could be looking to significantly alter its structure and approach in the face of a rapidly-growing resistance.

The head of the military’s Northwestern Regional Command, Maj. Gen. Phyo Thant, was also recently replaced due to “low performance.” The northwestern command oversees junta operations in Chin State and Sagaing Region where violent clashes have been reported between resistance fighters and security forces and where junta forces have suffered significant casualties. The NUG claims that between June and August, nearly 1,000 junta soldiers were killed across Chin and Sagaing.

While the recent reshuffling suggests discontent with the status quo, Ye Myo Hein says it is too early to tell whether it indicates any schisms within the military.

“It’s hard to know whether there are cracks within the institution,” he said. “So far I have not seen any significant fission within the military because the commander-in-chief [Min Aung Hlaing] can still decide everything he wants. It’s very obvious that he can replace anyone, even the commander-in-chief of the air force, without any disagreement.”

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Although the end of the conflict is still out of sight, the military is also facing financial stresses, which may force it to alter or even wind down some of its operations. In its annual report for the 2020-2021 fiscal year, which ended on September 30, Myanmar’s Internal Revenue Department showed a 35 percent decrease in tax earnings from the previous year. The decrease corresponds to 2.551 trillion kyats (about $1.44 billion) across every category, including income taxes, commercial taxes, and special commodity taxes.

Since the coup, people across Myanmar have stopped paying taxes and bills as a method of silent protest, with many refusing to pay even their electricity bills. According to the NUG’s numbers, as of early September, shortly before the fiscal year ended, 98 percent of customers in Yangon, 97 percent in Mandalay, and about 80 percent in the remaining states were refusing to pay their bills to the state-run power company, which the NUG estimates corresponded to a loss to the junta of about 2 trillion kyats.

In response, junta forces have deployed a series of intimidation schemes, particularly in major cities, to coerce people into paying their bills. In November, the military announced that if electricity bills were not paid by a set deadline they would turn off the electricity in major cities like Naypyidaw and Mandalay – and it kept its word, leaving many without power for weeks.

The resistance movement countered these threats with attacks on electricity company offices. Local outlet Myanmar Now spoke to one of the fighters from a guerrilla group in Naypyidaw who staged an attack against one of the offices in early November. He said that they wanted to warn the staff at the office that “they did not have the authority to terrorize civilians as they please.”

The boycott efforts against military-run companies have continued, despite the military’s best efforts, and have proven to be highly effective.

”The people of Myanmar have sanctioned themselves and have stopped buying military products. You see it all over the country,” said Sasa. “The military generals think that they will be able to force the [resistance] to join by putting excessive military pressure onto them, but it has not happened as they want.”

In early November, Justice for Myanmar, an organization that works to monitor and expose the junta’s human rights abuses, published a report indicating that boycott efforts against military-owned telecommunications company Mytel had cost the company nearly $25 million in losses in a three month period between February and April of last year.

Myanmar Brewery, another company owned and run by the military as part of a joint venture with Japanese company Kirin, has similarly been affected by boycotts, recording a near 50 percent drop in third quarter profits in November. Shortly after, the military conglomerate that manages Myanmar Brewery filed to dissolve the company under Myanmar’s bankruptcy laws.

The boycotts, coupled with sanctions, have been detrimental to the junta’s revenue stream, according to Justice for Myanmar.

“The Myanmar military’s terror campaign is financed by their business partners that continue to line their pockets as they commit crimes against humanity and war crimes,” Justice for Myanmar spokesperson Yadanar Maung told The Diplomat via email.

“Sanctions have led to key business partners of the Myanmar military ending their partnership, which hits their bottom line. This coupled with the extensive boycott campaign sends a strong message to the generals that they can no longer continue business as usual.”

The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union have all imposed sanctions on top military leaders, including coup leader and commander-in-chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, as well as on several military-owned conglomerates, but many don’t believe the efforts go far enough.

“There is an urgent need for the current sanctions [against the] regime to be strengthened. There must be sanctions against all Myanmar junta-controlled businesses and their significant business partners as well as the military’s private network of arm brokers in order to cut all funds to the murderous military junta,” said Yadanar Maung.

However, as international lobbying efforts continue, the junta does seem to be reeling from the restrictions that have come about in the last year.

On January 6, the junta announced in the state-run media that it would be rolling out power outages at peak usage times in the mornings and evenings. One reason the notice gave for the planned outages was the “fourfold increase in gas prices,” which has also forced the junta to suspend two emergency power projects.

The day after the notice was made public, the junta also announced that it would be imposing a new tax on SIM cards, forcing users to pay an additional 20,000 kyats ($11.25) to activate each card. The standard price for SIM cards is 1,500 kyats, meaning that the new taxes will increase the cost of access to mobile data by more than 13 times. The announcement also specified that service providers will have to charge customers a 15 percent commercial tax, a 10 point increase from the previous 5 percent tax.

While these individual efforts are not yet enough to prove that the military is at a breaking point, Ye Myo Thein does say that it does show the junta “struggling under a lot of financial pressure.”

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Although the war in Myanmar shows no signs of slowing, with new deaths recorded nearly every day, the international community has dragged its feet in taking action, including efforts to recognize the NUG as Myanmar’s legitimate government.

“The international community has failed the people of Myanmar. Half the population of Myanmar could be living below the poverty line this year; the healthcare and the education systems have collapsed,” the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, told The Diplomat.

“Especially with the escalation of violence, it's important for all of us to assess and part of the assessment is engagement with the NUG and the degree to which the NUG can be engaged more fully with the international community.”

Small victories have been recorded, from which the NUG has claimed some level of legitimacy. Sasa points to the decision made by the Credentials Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, the body responsible for approving diplomatic representation, in December to defer the junta’s submission to represent Myanmar within the U.N.

While the decision was not a formal endorsement of the NUG, it meant that the current representative, Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun, who was appointed by the deposed civilian government and has publicly pledged his loyalty to the shadow government, would retain his post.

However, the parameters around which Kyaw Moe Tun can continue to serve as Myanmar’s representative remain unclear. Ahead of the U.N. General Assembly last September, the ambassador was told that he could retain his seat but, as part of a compromise reached by the U.S., China, and Russia, he would not be allowed to speak.

As two of the regime’s biggest allies, Russia and China, which also hold permanent positions on the U.N. Security Council, have been key in blocking sanctions against the regime as well as any efforts to formally recognize the NUG. Both are major trade partners with Myanmar, and now the junta, and have supplied the regime with arms and military equipment, including air-to-ground missiles and radar equipment, that have been used in attacks against civilians.

“Russia has a long history of good relations with the military and the junta is a key purchaser of weapons from Russia. Russia is trying to extend their arms market across the world and they want to show their purchaser that they also get a political guarantee,” said Ye Myo Thein.

“With China, they have cautiously approached the junta – they haven’t given blank check support, but they want stability along their borders. Although they know the military atrocities are too much and it is destabilizing, they still believe the military is the only player to bring stability back to the country.”

Closer to home, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has also been slow in addressing the ongoing crisis in Myanmar. Under Brunei’s chairmanship in 2021, the bloc excluded the regime from attending its summit in October as well as its ASEAN-China summit in November, instead requesting that a “non-political representative” be selected. The junta ultimately refused to meet the terms and Myanmar went unrepresented on both occasions.

While again not a formal endorsement of the NUG, given the mandate of non-interference which usually governs ASEAN, many Myanmar observers saw the move as a promising sign, especially given that several member states also individually condemned the junta.

But ASEAN’s role in countering the regime and lending the NUG any credibility now seems in flux with Cambodia assuming the chairmanship for 2022. Unlike its predecessor, Cambodia is touting engagement with the junta as its strategy of choice and seems to have extended an open invitation to the regime for all upcoming ASEAN meetings.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen even traveled to Myanmar in early January to meet with the junta’s leadership, including Min Aung Hlaing. The trip was criticized by several ASEAN states, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, which have claimed that the visit was a departure from the bloc’s previously established position of disengagement with the military.

Critics also said that Hun Sen’s trip failed to uphold the five-point consensus that ASEAN developed at an emergency meeting held last April, which calls on the military to immediately cease violence, allow humanitarian assistance into Myanmar, and engage in constructive dialogue with “all parties.”

In a call with Hun Sen, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsieng Loong told the ASEAN chair that until there was “significant progress” on advancing the five-point consensus, the bloc should maintain its decision to invite “a non-political representative from Myanmar to ASEAN meetings,” according to Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

With Hun Sen engaging in what many have called “cowboy diplomacy,” a term referring to risky and unilateral diplomatic tactics, it’s hard to predict what his – or ASEAN’s – next steps will be.

But even with positive developments from the growing resistance movement and financial pressure on the junta, if the international community as a whole doesn’t take stronger action and now with Hun Sen leading the charge, the chances of Myanmar falling deeper into civil war over the course of the next year is high, according to Andrews.

“Things are quite bad now and they’re getting worse. We’re talking about a very brutal, almost criminal enterprise that is engaging in a systematic assault against the people of Myanmar,” said Andrews.

“An entity, the brutality of which knows no bounds, having greater capacity, more weapons and more ability to inflict harm and hardship – I just shudder to think what could transpire if there’s not a change in the dynamic.”