Does the World Need to Recognize the Taliban?
Can the international community continue to recognize Afghanistan without recognizing the Taliban?
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan collapsed on August 15, 2021 following the Taliban’s remarkably quick takeover of the capital, Kabul. Taliban militants entered the Presidential Palace after former President Ashraf Ghani’s flight, seized the seat of power, and proclaimed the beginning of a new era in Afghanistan. Taliban officials released a video on the evening of the takeover, in which Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban’s co-founder, voiced his wonder about their unanticipated victory and added his concern that the group would soon encounter serious obstacles to their rule in Afghanistan.
Baradar’s concern was not groundless. Following the takeover, thousands of Afghans rushed to the airport in Kabul, trying to flee the country. In early September, Afghan women flocked to the streets to protest the Taliban and the regime’s perspective toward their rights. Despite a Taliban ban on demonstrations without government approval, the protests continued.
In addition to the lack of popular support, the Taliban has also grappled with government dysfunction. Since the Taliban took power, Afghanistan has been engulfed in an economic and financial catastrophe, paralyzing banks and private firms, sending poverty and inflation rates surging, and threatening to destabilize the new Taliban administration from its very first days.
The Challenge of Recognition
Challenges to the Taliban’s power in Afghanistan have not all been internal. In late September, the Taliban announced the formation of an all-male cabinet, made up of prominent Taliban figures, some of whom are designated as terrorists by the United Nations and appear on U.N. and U.S. sanctions lists. After the cabinet announcement and the establishment of their government, Taliban officials started to seek international recognition. However, most of the international community, including the U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Iran, and Russia, have so far denied recognition to the Taliban, considering that the group has not met the requirement of establishing an inclusive government, and that the Taliban took over Afghanistan by force in the first place.
The European Union coordinated with Taliban officials regarding the evacuation of European staff from Afghanistan. However, the European Commission’s spokesperson, Peter Stano, stated that communicating with the Taliban did not amount to recognition and that the EU would not rush into recognizing the Taliban’s government.
In late January, Norway hosted talks between the Taliban and Western diplomats, as well as members of Afghan civil society. While a Taliban delegate characterized the talks as “a step to legitimize (the) Afghan government,” Norway’s Foreign Minister Anniken Huitfeldt said that the talks were “not a legitimation or recognition of the Taliban.”
Earlier, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian had stated in a televised interview that the recognition of the Taliban was “not currently of relevance for France.”
In a similar vein, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said at a U.N. summit in September 2021 that recognizing the Taliban’s government was not on Russia’s agenda. Russia, like major Western countries, had encouraged the Taliban to establish an inclusive government. Following the Taliban’s cabinet announcement, Lavrov reiterated that Russia was not considering recognizing the Taliban’s administration in Afghanistan.
Despite recruiting efforts to lobby for the Taliban government’s international recognition, Pakistan has also decided not to rush into recognizing the Taliban’s rule itself without consulting regional and international powers including China, Turkey, and the United States.
Regarding the question of recognizing the Taliban’s government, Iranian officials stated that they were supporting the demands and will of the Afghan nation. Iran’s government was also hoping for the formation of an inclusive cabinet by the Taliban. Nonetheless, following the cabinet announcement, Iran’s supreme leader said that recent events made Tehran realize that the Taliban were “no friend of Iran.”
China, meanwhile, was the only regional power to congratulate the Taliban on establishing their government. That being said, facing a wave of reluctance by regional powers toward the Taliban, Beijing is also hesitant to be the first in granting recognition to the the Taliban’s government. Similar to Pakistan’s policy in this regard, China intends to decide on the recognition of the Taliban in a concerted move with Iran, Russia, and Pakistan.
The Distinction Doctrine: Recognizing Afghanistan and Recognizing the Taliban
The recognition of a state differs significantly from that of a government. When a government is recognized, it is considered to be the sole representative of the state in international relations. This means that when a country’s regime or government changes, it requires acknowledgement from other countries. Against this backdrop, a new government is usually recognized only when other states have determined that it has the support of the majority of the people. It is also important to assess the new government’s willingness and capabilities to fulfill its international obligations. To this end, the Taliban do not meet the minimum criteria for the recognition of their government, as the group does not have the backing of the Afghan nation. Neither has the Taliban government proved efficient in fulfilling Afghanistan’s international obligations, including, but not limited to, the protection of human rights and women’s rights.
By contrast, a state is recognized or requires recognition when it fulfills the requirements of statehood. As laid down in the Montevideo Convention (1933), the criteria of statehood are a “permanent population, a defined territory, permanence, and a government.” Afghanistan meets these requirements of being a state, and officially became an independent state in 1919. The non-recognition of the Taliban government does not pose a threat to the recognition of Afghanistan as a state, since the government – a criterion of statehood – does exist and operates, even if it is not internationally recognized. Consequently, the recognition of a state does not necessarily oblige other countries to recognize the given state’s government as well. Taking this to the extreme, Switzerland broadly recognizes states; however, it does not recognize governments.
The consequences of the non-recognition of states and governments are also quite different from each other. In international law, the state is the legal entity; in most cases, the government is the state’s representative, with the authority to act on its behalf. The repercussions of an entity not being classified as a state raise the risk of a legal vacuum. The absence of a (recognized) government, on the other hand, does not necessarily imply a loss of the state’s legal title, and may just necessitate some type of curatorship. Or, as Brad Roth puts it, when a state’s constitutional order is swept away as a result of regime transition, “the state’s international legal personality and existing international commitments remain unaffected.” Therefore, Afghanistan, as a legal entity, is still a party to the international treaties it has signed and the bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) it has concluded with other states.
According to the Estrada Doctrine, which was Mexico’s key foreign policy pillar from 1930 to 2000, states do not issue pronouncements in the sense of grants of recognition in circumstances of regime change, but instead limit themselves to maintaining or withdrawing their diplomatic agents as they see fit. Therefore, despite the fact that recognition is a subject where politics and international law are closely intertwined, not maintaining ties with a newly formed government may also be a merely political action, and should not be conflated with the international legal duty of a country to recognize or refuse to recognize a government or state.
International Community’s Differing Takes on Relations With Afghanistan and the Taliban
Along with the denial of recognition to the Taliban, some countries like the United States have indirectly refused to have further political, economic, educational, or cultural relationships with Afghanistan as a state. Following the takeover of the Taliban, the U.S. stalled the Fulbright program, a prestigious U.S. scholarship for international students, for Afghanistan and refused to proceed with the interviews of already selected Afghan semi-finalists (of which the author is one). This happened despite the fact that since 2003, Afghanistan and the United States have had an MoU to conduct the Fulbright program for Afghan students every year. In response to their continuing queries, some Afghan Fulbright semi-finalists received private emails from the U.S. Department of State stating that the resumption of the Fulbright program in Afghanistan was conditioned to the recognition of the Taliban government by the Biden administration.
Washington also froze Afghan central bank assets amounting to almost $9.5 billion. U.S. officials have stated that they blocked the release of these assets due to uncertainty regarding the government of Afghanistan.
By contrast, another camp in the international community has not conditioned the continuation of relations with Afghans and Afghanistan to the recognition of Taliban rule by their governments. For instance, the EU has promised a 1 billion euro aid package to help avert the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi has clarified that the aid packages, which are to be distributed among Afghan people, had nothing to do with recognizing the Taliban, and that recognition was a separate process that needed further evaluation of the Taliban’s future performance.
In an unprecedented effort, Germany has offered an additional quota for Afghan students for German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) scholarships. This happened even as the German government repeatedly stated that it would not recognize the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan. Thus understood, the continuation and increase of cultural and educational relations with Afghanistan does not signal Germany’s inclination to recognize the Taliban government.
Furthermore, in early October, the International Cricket Council's (ICC) Acting CEO Geoff Allardice said that despite the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan’s participation in the T20 World Cup was not in jeopardy. One of the ICC board members added that the board had to set its political considerations aside, as disqualifying the Afghan team based on regime change was not a reasonable decision to make. The Afghan team did not receive any financial backing from the Taliban government, but paid for its own traveling costs, and was flown by Qatar Airways to Doha, where they participated in the T20 World Cup. Ignoring the Taliban’s desire to change the Afghan flag and national anthem, the team held up the Republic’s flag before the game started, and played the Afghan national anthem.
Russia, having repeatedly refused to recognize the Taliban, still hosts the Afghan ambassador appointed by the former government of Afghanistan, and maintains relations with the staffers of the previous Afghan administration. The Afghan Embassy in Moscow is allowed to display the country’s old flag, and the Taliban are referred to as a terrorist organization on the Embassy’s official website. The Taliban also remains banned as an extremist group by Russia, a detail mentioned, by law, in every news report referencing the Taliban.
By and large, the “distinction doctrine” properly sets out that countries can recognize a state or continue their relations with it, without being bound to first or simultaneously recognize the given state’s government. On the issue of recognizing the Taliban as the rightful rulers of Afghanistan, the international community is currently united against it; even the Taliban’s staunchest supporters have been unwilling to take such a step thus far.
At the same time, there are divergences in how to approach Afghanistan as a state. One side of the international community – including Germany, the EU, Russia, Qatar, and the UAE (the site of the ICC’s headquarters) – appear to pursue the distinction doctrine and continue relations with Afghanistan and Afghans as in the pre-Taliban period. By contrast, the United States appears to follow a more political perspective on this issue, rather than adhering to international legal doctrine, and has sharply curtailed ties with Afghanistan and with Afghans.
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Maryam Jami is a researcher at the Institute of War and Peace Studies (IWPS). She frequently writes on politics, international relations, international and comparative law, and war and peace studies. Her works have been published by the Oxford Human Rights Hub Journal, Fredrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), the Australian Outlook, the International Review of Human Rights Law, Afghanistan Women and Peace-Building Journal, Groningen Journal of International Law, and the Glocality journal.