The New Vision for the Japan-US Alliance Poses Challenges for Tokyo

On January 6 (January 7 in Tokyo), the U.S. secretaries of state and defense virtually met their Japanese counterparts for the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC), more commonly known as the U.S.-Japan “2+2.” The two governments issued a joint statement following the meeting.

Several things in the joint statement were noteworthy. First, its observations of the regional security environment are remarkably straightforward and concrete. The joint statement not only acknowledges recent developments in the region as something that “jeopardizes the regional strategic balance” but also makes reference to specific threats – “nuclear weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles, and advanced weapons systems such as hypersonics,” as well as “increasing malign activities in the cyber, space and other domains, and attempts to change the status quo through coercive or predatory means short of armed conflict.” Combined with the blunt acknowledgement of the two countries’ concern for China’s behavior and the emphasis on the importance of the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait, it is clear that the main driver of the consultation was the two countries’ rising concerns vis-à-vis China, and the sense of urgency that they feel about preserving the existing liberal international order, particularly the “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision shared by Washington and Tokyo.

Second, the joint statement, following the tone set by the joint statement issued at the 2+2 meeting on March 16, 2021, reiterated the two countries’ commitment to “ensure alignment of Alliance visions and priorities through key forthcoming national security strategy documents.” Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has directed the revision of Japan’s three key national security documents — the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), and Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP)— and the revision process is in full swing. On Washington’s part, the drafting of the Biden administration’s first National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy — informed by the Global Posture Review that Department of Defense completed in November 2021 — continues. Put simply, the U.S. and Japan are in an unprecedented period where key national security documents in both countries are being revised at the same time, and their respective processes are informing each other.

Finally, the January 6 joint statement focuses very heavily on how the U.S. and Japan can better cooperate in advanced technologies to “ensure the Alliance maintains its technological edge in critical and emerging fields.” While the details are still under negotiation, the Exchange of Notes on Cooperative Research, Development, Production and Sustainment as well as Cooperation in Testing and Evaluation, when signed, will no doubt provide a critical foundation for the two countries to explore more opportunities for defense technological cooperation from the research and development phase. With critical and emerging technologies also identified as areas of cooperation in the Quad framework, the joint statement has elevated the importance of technological cooperation within the alliance.

Moving forward, however, this will force a few difficult choices on Japan. First and foremost is the question of resources. In his virtual summit meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden on January 21, Kishida reiterated his government’s commitment to increase Japan’s defense spending. However, Japan, like any government around the world, has had its economy hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic, which still restricts the movement of people and goods across borders. As long as Japan continues to essentially close its borders to international travelers, Kishida will face a daunting task in revitalizing the Japanese economy.

As the entire country is still waiting to see what Kishida’s promised “new form of capitalism” will look like, increasing government spending on anything other than economic revitalization and the social safety net will remain contentious. Particularly with some calling Japan a “hyper-aging” country, the pressure against increasing the defense budget will persist. Even with a growing awareness among the public of the unstable security environment that confronts Japan, the battle to increase Japan’s defense spending will be an uphill one without a resilient political champion – and at this point, no one has emerged to take that role.

Moreover, as Japan moves forward with revising its NSS, NDPG, and MTDP, those who are involved in the process will have to address issues that are critical for Japan’s own national security, and yet public misunderstandings and misconceptions of these topics persist. Take the issue of whether Japan should have an offensive strike capability, for example. The term teki kichi kogeki noryoku (“the capability to attack enemy bases”) has been recently introduced into the public discourse as Japan faces increasing missile threats from North Korea. What often goes missing in this debate is that even the Japanese Constitution never prohibited Japan from possessing such a capability. In fact, Japan already does have an offensive strike capability – it is just that this capability cannot be used until Japan falls under attack. That technicality aside, the crux of the debate is really over whether Japan would be willing to utilize an offensive strike capability to defend the nation before it finds itself under attack, and, more importantly, whether Japanese political leaders are willing to order such an action, knowing that their decision may not be very popular.

A similar thing can be said about the renewed discussion on the role Japan should play in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Just within the last year, an increasing number of Japanese political leaders, many of whom are high-profile – topped off by former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo – have grown less hesitant to discuss a possible contingency in the Taiwan Strait as a national security crisis for Japan. Such an open acknowledgement is a step in the right direction. After all, the geographical proximity of Taiwan will make it impossible for Japan to stay out of any kind of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. But questions remain as to whether Japan’s leaders are genuinely willing to take their case to the public and work to gain public support for what needs to be done to get Japan ready for such a situation. This would include increasing defense spending so that the Japan Self-Defense Forces can be properly equipped, trained, and ready.

The January 6 “2+2” joint statement was one of the most ambitious and aspirational documents that the Japan-U.S. alliance has put out. But the statement also left Japan a great deal of homework to do before achieving the vision laid out in the document.