Jennifer Lind on Abe Shinzo and Japanese Nationalism

The assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo on July 8 sparked a wave of commentaries on his legacy. Many analysts linked his political rise to a supposed surge in Japanese nationalism, pointing to increasing defense budgets and retrenched denialism regarding abuses committed by Imperial Japan before and during World War II. Throughout his time in office, Abe came to symbolize Japanese nationalism in the minds of many, but geopolitical shifts, especially in Japan’s near neighborhood, have more to do with the changing perceptions of Japan’s role in the world than any single politician.

In the following interview, Jennifer Lind, an associate professor of government at Dartmouth College, a faculty associate at the Reischauer Institute for Japanese Studies at Harvard University, and a research associate at Chatham House in London, exposes the nuances dividing “nationalism” and “patriotism” in Japan and fits Abe into the evolving continuum of Japanese politics. Lind, the author of “Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics,” pushes back against simplistic narratives about Japanese politics, arguing instead that it is rather remarkable that a country so near an increasingly assertive China and a nuclear North Korea has not had more of a debate about increasing its military and defense capabilities.

What typifies right-wing nationalism in Japan? Is it distinct from nationalism in other countries?

The term “nationalism” means very different things to different people. Social identity scholars distinguish “patriotism” from “nationalism.” Patriotism is a sense of connectedness to one’s country – a love of country and its institutions, values, and way of life. This is not associated with denigration of others. By contrast, nationalism connotes not only a sense of connection to one’s nation, but also a sense of national superiority over others. When you say “right-wing nationalism” in your question, I think that’s what you’re referring to. While patriotism isn’t associated with violence, historically nationalism has underpinned war and imperialism.

In every country, Japan included, liberals and conservatives have very different ideas about national identity. (I think this is an important point, as coverage of Japan often suggests it’s quite different than other countries, when really it exhibits similar patterns.)

In every country, conservatives tend to see the world as a dangerous place. They want a strong, unified country, and believe that leaders should cultivate patriotism in order to achieve that. On the far right, though, this shades toward nationalism: toward a lack of respect or contempt for other countries. In this extreme view, violence undertaken during an effort to “civilize” other people is justified or even laudatory. After World War II Japanese diplomats talking with Koreans showed such views; the Japanese diplomats were genuinely bewildered why Koreans wanted apologies given that, as the Japanese said, Japan had done so much to improve Korea. Of course, these kinds of views were hardly rare then – think how closely this hews to American and European narratives about colonization.

What about liberal national identity? Liberals tend to not see the world as so threatening: They see progress in the rise of global governance and spread of human rights. So liberals worry less about creating national unity. People on the far left even reject the idea of the nation – they believe people should be “citizens of the world” and have connections to all human beings, without special connections based on borders.

Moderate liberals, who do value national identity, think of patriotism very differently than do conservatives. Liberals want to make the country better and believe that doing so requires constant scrutiny of its problems and past wrongs. To liberals, exercising their voice and rights to improve the country is patriotic. As James Baldwin wrote, “I love America more than any other country in the world and, exactly for this reason, I insist on the right to criticize her perpetually.” Think of the 1619 project; and in Germany think of efforts to atone for the Holocaust and World War II. And in Japan it’s liberal educators, journalists, activists, and leaders (famously Murayama Tomiichi) who favor reckoning with Japan’s past.

In sum, I’m arguing that Japan – like all countries – exhibits a range of liberal and conservative views about national identity.

How would you describe Abe’s personal strand of nationalism or patriotism?

Abe was a conservative who argued for creating a strong sense of national connectedness and patriotism. Take his book, “A Beautiful Japan.” Abe didn’t denigrate other countries, and certainly wasn’t militarist. But he advocated national pride and as such supported a narrative about the positive aspects of Japan’s identity.

We did see Abe sometimes shade toward nationalism. Indeed, within the LDP, and conservative parties in general, there will be a constant struggle between people who favor more moderate patriotism and versus those favoring a more extreme nationalism. We see this not only in the LDP but within Abe himself.

An example is Japan’s famous 1993 Kono Statement, which acknowledged a past wrong – namely, government involvement in horrific wartime violence against hundreds of thousands of girls and women (the “comfort women”). The Kono Statement was a pretty moderate policy when you think about it; liberals wanted much more interrogation of the history and much more atonement, and conservatives on the far right opposed the statement. When as prime minister Abe suggested he might go after it, this was him at a fork in the road: Would he choose to be Abe the patriot, or Abe the nationalist? (The more moderate patriot is willing to acknowledge past wrongs; the nationalist wants to whitewash or explain them away – or not think about them at all.) Abe chose the more moderate path. At another important moment – his speech on the 70th anniversary of the war in 2015 – he did the same.

Media reports often describe Japanese nationalism as on the rise, and argue that Abe was a big part of that. Did rising right-wing nationalism put Abe in power, or did Abe’s ascent in politics boost right-wing nationalism?

The claim that “Japanese nationalism is on the rise” is a longstanding, and inaccurate, trope. The media have been writing this hot take since the 1980s. It hits the headlines every time Japan’s defense budget goes up by some miniscule amount – when actually the real story is, “Isn’t it remarkable how this potentially formidable great power spends barely anything on defense?”

In my research with co-author Chikako Ueki, we measured and compared Japanese national identity over time and across space (for the latter we compared Japanese national identity to national identity in seven other countries). We found that Japan has a strong sense of patriotism that is stable over time – and no evidence of nationalism (or rising nationalism).

In short, Japan’s nationalism is not “on the rise” so that can’t be what put Abe Shinzo in power. I’d also note that the LDP has dominated Japanese politics since the 1950s, so the ascent of a LDP conservative is not an event that we need to struggle to explain.

But terminology aside, let me get to what I think is the spirit of your question. It’s not “rising nationalism,” but we do indeed see interesting changes in Japanese national identity over the years. Japan has gone from a country that was (like most countries) unwilling to reckon with its past violence, to a country in which, starting in the 1990s, many people advocated historical reconciliation with wartime victims. As a result, Japan actually apologized a great deal. But since then many Japanese moderates and conservatives think that (particularly in South Korea’s case), Japan’s conciliatory behavior has basically been ignored, and that Seoul keeps hammering Tokyo for more apologies. So this has animated “apology fatigue,” undermining the left and empowering the right.

People look at all this and say “nationalism is on the rise!”; I disagree with that statement, but I think with it, people are trying to capture this interesting evolution.

Japan’s imperial era in the early 20th century was typified by strong Japanese nationalism and belief in Japan’s superiority. Is this something that we could see re-emerge as Japan takes on a larger security role?

As I noted, national identity in Japan has been very stable – but yes, it’s always possible that a country’s national identity will shift over time. Japan’s has done so dramatically over its history. Frankly I would have expected that given China’s rise, we’d see in Japan an increasingly animated defense debate that included greater contestation over national identity. But we’ve seen very little of either. Of course, lots of people would respond to this by saying, “Oh, but Japan has changed a lot; threat perception of China has grown; antipathy toward China has grown; because of China’s rise Japan is becoming more diplomatically and even militarily active.” And sure, to some extent this is true.

But with China we’re talking about a rising superpower – potentially the most powerful great power in the history of the world, given its size. And it lives in Japan’s backyard. And it hates Japan. Its government has stoked anti-Japanese nationalism; it’s building the world’s largest navy, looking increasingly interested in using force against Taiwan, and claiming pieces of territory that Japan says it owns. This is a Threat, with a capital T.

What I’m trying to convey here is that it’s astounding that Japan has reacted so little to the rise of China’s wealth, power, and military assertiveness. Throw in North Korea acquiring the ability to strike the United States with a nuclear weapon (which reduces the credibility of U.S. involvement in a war between Japan and North Korea), and Japan’s security environment looks pretty dire. If in all this we saw Japan triple its defense spending, and LDP leaders make a big push toward creating a national identity akin to what 1950s conservatives called “defense-mindedness,” lots of people would say, “Yes, that makes sense.”

What explains the continuity we see, despite the grave changes in Japan’s security environment? Scholars who emphasize Japan’s anti-militarist norms would point to the restraining effects of public opinion and the legacy of World War II, and that is certainly part of the story. Others would point to the U.S.-Japan alliance: that Japan still expects the United States to take the lead in balancing against China.

In sum, I’m surprised that Japan has not already had more of a defense debate, perhaps accompanied by a move toward a national identity more supportive of the use of (defensive) military force. I think that was what Abe was seeking to do, and he did move the needle. However I don’t believe he was trying to cultivate nationalism – nor do I think the Japanese under another leader will move toward the more toxic nationalism.

Japan is not alone in seeing a rise in vocal nationalism. When it comes to clashes between Japan and its neighbors (China and South Korea in particular), how is increasing nationalism among the publics on both sides contributing?

As argued above, I disagree that Japan is experiencing a “rise in vocal nationalism.” And I haven’t seen good recent studies on changing nationalism in South Korea or China. What’s the evidence that nationalism is rising in those countries relative to the past? Again, this is a very slippery thing to define and measure (let alone measure over time, which you need to do if you’re making a claim about “rising” or “falling”).

Both China and South Korea have potent reservoirs of memory and resentment about the abuse that they suffered from Japan, and about grievances since then. Leaders reach into this reservoir when it suits their policy agenda. To be clear, I don’t mean to suggest that the people have no agency, or that their feelings aren’t sincerely held; I also believe that Japan’s behavior of course matters too. But leaders do play a significant role in foregrounding or backgrounding memories of the war.

Thus sometimes in China and South Korea, leaders fan anti-Japanese sentiment. We’ve certainly seen this in China, with “patriotic history education” emphasizing Japanese brutality during the war and occupation. But at other times, conditions shift and Chinese or South Korean leaders see an interest in promoting better relations with Japan. In addition to the reservoir of anti-Japanese sentiment, they also have a reservoir of more friendly, unifying symbols, events, and themes. This is particularly true for South Korea: shared democracy and liberal values, a shared love of each other’s popular culture and technology, positive focal points such as past moments of reconciliation, a shared ally, etc. And even in China, as Yinan He shows in her research, sometimes Beijing has been more conciliatory when it served its interests.

Unfortunately, as China seeks greater influence in the region – particularly if it seeks to drive out the United States – this increasingly puts it at odds with Japan. And in this process China’s leaders will draw on that reservoir of anti-Japanese history and feeling, and will fan the negative sentiments held by many Chinese people.

There’s more hope for Japan and South Korea. Seoul has so far hedged during China’s rise, but this appears to be changing; perhaps Seoul will move toward a policy of balancing against China. If it does, South Korean leaders will need to craft a positive narrative of partnership with Japan. And it’s up to Japan’s leaders to meet them in the middle with a narrative that both sides can feel good about.