Pelosi’s Taiwan Visit and China’s Diplomatic Blame Game

When U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi landed in Taiwan late on the night of August 2, it touched off a firestorm in China-U.S. relations. Beijing claims self-governed Taiwan as its own territory and vociferously decried the visit from Pelosi, the second in line to the U.S. presidency.

On August 4, China began a series of unprecedented military drills around Taiwan, including launching missiles over the island, while the United States accused Beijing of irresponsibility escalating tensions over a supposedly routine exchange. Both sides tried to gather diplomatic allies to support their positions, especially as the furor kicked off just days before a major round of meetings linked to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying claimed in a press conference on August 5 that “already more than 160 countries have made their voice of justice heard. They reiterated their commitment to the One China policy and expressed support for China’s efforts to firmly uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Later, she added that “over 160 countries” (presumably the same ones referenced above) had “condemned [Pelosi’s] visit as a serious, reckless and irresponsible provocation.”

As is usually the case when Chinese officials throw around large numbers like this, there was no comprehensive list provided. For comparison, however, China’s 2022 white paper on “the Taiwan question” says that “181 countries including the United States have established diplomatic relations with the PRC on the basis of the One China principle.” In essence, then, China is claiming that all but 20 or so of its diplomatic partners sprung to its support in the wake of Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. (Curiously, on August 8, another Foreign Ministry spokesperson put the number of countries supporting China’s position at “more than 100.” Later in the same press conference, he upped the figure to “more than 170 countries,” further underscoring the uncertainty involved in the count.)

By throwing around such large – and essentially unverifiable numbers – China clearly wants to claim that global public opinion is on its side. Based on the figure of “over 160” countries, Hua calculated that “80 percent to 90 percent of the world’s total [population] are standing with the Chinese people.”

But Taiwan’s diplomatic status is an extremely complicated issue, as Beijing well knows. It’s not even accurate to state, as the white paper did, that “181 countries including the United States” established diplomatic relations with China “on the basis of the One China principle.”

Instead, the United States has very purposefully avoided committing to the “One China principle,” which involves acknowledging that Taiwan is an “inalienable part of China’s territory.” Instead, Washington follows its own “One China policy,” which is expressed in the 1979 joint communique that established China-U.S. diplomatic relations in two parts: “The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China” and “The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.”

“Acknowledging” another party’s position is very different, in diplomatic parlance, from actually sharing that position. As Michael Green and Bonnie Glaser noted in an explainer for CSIS in 2017, China later tried to unilaterally change the Chinese characters used in the joint communique from “acknowledge” to “recognize,” which would imply that the U.S. accepts China’s position on Taiwan. The U.S. pushed back, saying the English text – including the “determinative” word “acknowledge” – was the binding version.

If this sounds confusing, that’s because it is. But the main point is that each individual government has come to its own understanding of the Taiwan issue, with its own policy boundaries for interactions with Taipei. Some states do indeed embrace the “One China principle” and explicitly describe Taiwan as part of the rightful territory of the PRC. But many others, the U.S. included, do not go that far. In the current context, China is deliberately eliding these nuances to bolster its international support.

And this matters a great deal in terms of counting supporters. In the wake of Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, Washington repeatedly confirmed that “nothing has changed about our ‘one China’ policy…  We do not support Taiwan independence.” So if we were to count every country that has reaffirmed its commitment to the “One China policy” as firmly backing Beijing’s military drills around Taiwan and condemning Pelosi’s trip, then the United States itself would be included on the list – which would clearly be a serious misreading of the U.S. position. Yet in many cases, that appears to be exactly what Beijing is doing: spinning a pro forma reiteration of a particular government’s “One China policy” into backing for the Chinese military drills in early and mid-August.

Another problem with China’s approach is that, based on examples cited by its Foreign Ministry spokespeople, it is conflating a variety of sources to claim support from different countries. In her list, for example, Hua quoted official statements from different countries’ foreign ministries or presidential offices – which would indeed generally be read as a “country” voicing a particular stance. But in the next breath she quoted statements by individual politicians (the vice president of Mexico’s senate, for example, or the chairman of the Kenya-China Parliamentary Friendship Group), who do not necessarily represent national governments.

In one case, Hua cited comments from the Malaysian prime minister’s special envoy to China – even though the Malaysian foreign minister had explicitly distanced the government from those remarks, saying, “That is not the statement that was discussed” in the foreign ministry.

More egregiously, Hua talked up support from political parties that are out of government entirely. Hua quoted a statement from “Mongolia’s third largest party,” ignoring the fact that the Civil Will-Green Party does not hold a single seat in Mongolia’s legislature. Hua similarly cited a statement from Brazil’s Workers’ Party, part of the opposition, which received just 10 percent of the vote in Brazil’s latest legislative elections.

Presidents and parliamentarians, foreign ministries and opposition political parties (in some cases tiny ones) – these are vastly different actors that do not have equal claim to be an authoritative voice for their countries. Beijing knows this, but is choosing to disregard it in listing supporters.

Specific examples help drive home the immense variation in the positions of countries China claims as its supporters. One of the strongest examples of support, unsurprisingly, has come from Russia, and particularly Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Lavrov directly denounced the United States for pursuing “the policy of lawlessness… seeking to establish their dominance.” He added that Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan “ignored the principles they [U.S. leaders] had publicly declared and had assured everyone of their steadfast commitment to them.” He offered full support for Chinese actions taken in response

(As an aside, perhaps the strongest statement of all came from North Korea, but China failed to list Pyongyang as a voice of support – perhaps calculating that backing from North Korea does more harm than good in the court of public opinion.)

A step down from Russia’s statement is the one from Laos. It recognizes Taiwan as “an inalienable part of China and opposes any intention aiming at creating a situation for ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan,’” but doesn’t criticize the United States. Laos also pointedly reiterated “its support for the policy of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the national reunification by peaceful means” (emphasis added) and did not explicitly say it supports China’s military drills near Taiwan.

Singapore’s statements were more tepid about declaring support for China. In talks with China’s Wang Yi, Singaporean Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan affirmed that “Singapore has a clear and consistent One China policy and is opposed to Taiwan independence and any unilateral moves to change the status quo.” But he also “emphasized the need to avoid miscalculation and accidents, which could lead to an escalatory spiral and destabilize the region.” It’s hard to read that as anything other than a request for China to tone down its saber rattling and military drills.

These three examples help show the variety of positions espoused by countries in the region. Not every government that expressed support for China denounced U.S. actions. And not every country that reaffirmed its “One China policy” actually voiced support for China’s military drills. Yet Russia, Laos, and Singapore were all included in comments from Hua and Wang as examples of countries that support China’s position, with their notable differences glossed over.

In my recent examination of foreign ministry statements from 33 Asia-Pacific countries, I found 14, including China itself, that fully supported or leaned toward Beijing’s position. Twelve adopted neutral stances or made no comment at all, while seven leaned toward or explicitly supported the U.S. position.

Of course, it doesn’t necessarily follow that those hedging their support of China fully back the United States, either. The level of ambiguity and diplomatic posturing at play is neatly summed up in the fact that both the United States and China claimed support from ASEAN’s “Statement on The Cross-Strait Development.” China pointed to its reaffirmation of the “One China policy” and the U.S. to ASEAN’s call for “maximum restraint.”