60 Years After the Sino-Indian War

In the eastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh abutting China lies a Tibetan Buddhist monastery in Tawang. Galden Namgey Lhatse, as the monastery is called, is the second biggest in the world after the Potala Palace in Lhasa, the Tibetan capital. The 341-year-old shrine was built in accordance with the wishes of the 5th Dalai Lama, Nagwang Lobsang Gyatso, who ruled over Tawang from Lhasa. The sixth Dalai Lama was born in Tawang. Texts at the monastery say 14-year-old Tsangyang Gyatso was identified as a reincarnation of the fifth Dalai Lama and taken to Lhasa from Urgelling in 1697. According to records at the monastery, most of the food consumed in Tibet was grown in Tawang and the region accounted for a third of Tibetan economy.

Even though the British claimed Tawang as per the 1914 Simla accord, they never ruled Tawang. India gained independence in 1947 but took control of Tawang only in 1951, when it pushed Tibetan officials out of the area. Even though Chinese control of Tibet was still a few years away, Chinese scholars blame India’s cunning in taking advantage of Beijing’s military commitment in the Korean War at the time. Not that other parts of the disputed India-China boundary are easy to resolve, but for New Delhi, Beijing’s claim to Tawang remains one of the biggest hurdles in reaching a boundary settlement.

An agreement signed by the two countries in 2005 stated that “in reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled population in the border areas.” This would imply that Tawang would come to India, but China insists that it is an inalienable part of Tibet. Dai Bingguo, who served as Beijing’s Special Representative for border talks with India between 2003 and 2013, wrote in an article in 2017 that “the major reason the boundary question persists is that China’s reasonable requests [in the east] have not been met.”

The Chinese line has hardened, and its state media now talks of “Zangnan” – literally meaning “southern Tibet” – best defined as all of Arunachal. Beijing went further and last year renamed 15 places in Zangnan by giving them “standardized” names.

The Tawang issue highlights a critical factor in China’s turbulent relationship with India: Tibet. The Dalai Lama continues to be hosted by India as he has been since 1959, and the 2008 disturbance in Tibet demonstrated to a stunned Beijing that the control it exercises over the region is not yet absolute. Unlike most other boundary disputes that Beijing has since resolved, China’s India policy and its view of the border dispute are intricately linked to its domestic goals in Tibet. As Ananth Krishnan showed in his book “India’s China Challenge,” documents released to the public by China in 2012 (and quickly re-sealed) support the conclusion that the Sino-India border war of 1962 was driven by Chinese interests and insecurities about Tibet.

A Chinese military victory in 1962 did not resolve the border dispute or even move it forward. In 2003, when the Special Representatives mechanism was created by the two governments, Dai and his Indian counterpart, Brajesh Mishra, gave themselves “the timeframe of three years” to settle the border. Mishra told journalist Manoj Joshi that “if it could not be settled in that period, it would not be settled for another fifty years.” Nearly a third of those 50 years have already elapsed and hopes of a solution are not even on the horizon.

Another factor complicating the process is the “chicken and egg” connection between the boundary dispute and the bilateral relationship. Beijing considers the resolution of border disputes to be a result of, rather than the cause for, improvement in relations. But New Delhi sees the relationship not improving unless the border issue is settled. The centrality of the dispute to normal ties is an argument that has been playing out for more than a year between the two governments in the ongoing Ladakh crisis. And China, as the bigger power, has been able to keep India under pressure in the area, forcing it to scurry militarily and diplomatically.

The 2020 Crisis in Ladakh

The crisis in Ladakh, hundreds of miles to the west of Tawang, came to public attention in May 2020 but hit global headlines when the two nuclear powers lost at least 24 soldiers in a clash on June 15 that involved primitive weapons like truncheons, sticks, rods, and rocks. No rounds were fired at Galwan, where the fighting took place. An authoritarian regime run by the Chinese Communist Party would be expected to block all information about a border crisis, but the government headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi has gone to extraordinary lengths to deny any authorized information to the public or to Parliament.

Modi’s only substantive statement on the crisis was made four days after the deadly clash, where he claimed that in Ladakh “no one has intruded and nor is anyone intruding, nor has any post been captured by someone.” The absurdity of his claim became clear in the manner his office scrambled around the next day to issue a clarification, and his personal YouTube channel exorcized those portions from the recording.

Two months later, a Defense Ministry document that contained an admission, for the first time, that China had “transgressed” into Indian territory in eastern Ladakh disappeared from the ministry’s website, a day after it was uploaded and had been reported in Indian media.

The document, the Defense Ministry’s monthly activity report, said under the heading “Chinese aggression on LAC” – referring to the Line of Actual Control – that “the situation in Eastern Ladakh arising from unilateral aggression by China continues to be sensitive and requiring close monitoring and prompt action based on evolving situation.” It added, “Chinese aggression has been increasing along the LAC and more particularly in Galwan Valley since 5th May, 2020. The Chinese side transgressed in the areas of Kugrang Nala, Gogra and north bank of Pangong Tso lake on 17-18 May, 2020.”

As no questions or discussion has been allowed in the Indian Parliament or during the on-camera meetings of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense, this retracted report remains the only admission of Chinese ingresses into Ladakh in the summer of 2020. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, who has spoken on the subject, has tried to skirt the facts by using the euphemism of “friction points” for these areas of Chinese ingress.

Kenneth Juster, who was the U.S. ambassador to India when the crisis began, told an Indian news channel that “[t]he restraint in mentioning China in any U.S.-India communication or any Quad communication comes from India, which is very concerned about not poking China in the eye.”

Despite these impositions, some information has made it to the public domain. Besides the three areas mentioned in the deleted Defense Ministry report, media reports tell us that in the summer of 2020, the crisis in Ladakh included Depsang in the north and Demchok in the south. After the Chinese military deployment and the Indian mirror deployment, more than 50,000 additional soldiers of each army were deployed in Ladakh. At the “friction points,” these soldiers were arrayed against each other, only yards apart. Only at Galwan, after the clash, did the two sides agree to step back by a few miles and create a no-patrolling zone. Structured talks between the senior military commanders of both sides about other areas promised a lot, but there was no progress.

In late August 2020, the Indian Army decided to launch a tactical quid pro quo operation, moving into areas in Kailash Range on its side that had not been occupied since the 1962 war. These peaks to the south of Pangong Tso allowed the Indian Army to dominate Chinese territory and military garrisons by both observation and fire. As both sides exchanged fire, the risks of a military escalation seemed high at one point. The Chinese responded by moving their forces from other areas, which led to soldiers and tanks of both armies facing each other. Images released later showed Indian and Chinese tanks barely 50 yards apart, a very risky situation, prone to accidental and unintended escalation.

The persistent risk of escalation through the harsh Himalayan winters gave energy and intent to the talks between senior military commanders. After nine rounds of talks, India and China had completed disengagement on the north and south banks of Pangong Tso in February 2021. As in the case of Galwan, “no patrolling” zones were again created in these areas. More talks were to be held within 48 hours, and the Indian side expected an early disengagement at PP15 and PP17A in Gogra. That was not the case.

The Chinese agreed to disengagement at PP17A only in August 2021 but, for some reason, have not officially announced it to date. Thousand of phone calls on military hotlines, scores of meetings between local commanders and diplomats, and 16 rounds of talks between senior military commanders finally led to disengagement at PP15 in August 2022.

The problems with Chinese ingresses at Depsang and Demchok remain unresolved even now, with the Chinese demonstrating a reluctance to even discuss these areas.

A Lingering Standoff

Besides Depsang and Demchok, even other areas that have witnessed disengagement have not returned to “normal.” Disengagement is akin to taking the patient out of immediate danger but is far-removed from being discharged from the hospital. The ideal solution for India, which was New Delhi’s goal at the beginning of the crisis, was the restoration of the status quo ante as of April 2020. It involved a three-step process of disengagement (distancing soldiers who were facing off against each other by a few miles), de-escalation (moving these soldiers back to semi-permanent or permanent bases in the area in a non-operational mode), and deinduction (removing all additional soldiers from the theater).

Modi’s government is no longer insisting on a restoration of status quo ante of April 2020. That option has been flatly rejected by Beijing, which continues to blame India for the situation. After the disengagement at PP15, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, when asked if the latest round of disengagement could lead to a restoration of the April 2020 status quo, said, “I’d like to state that the status quo of April 2020 you mentioned was created by India’s illegal crossing of the LAC. China will by no means accept that… We don’t accept the so-called status quo created by India’s illegal crossing of the LAC.”

The status quo has been altered dramatically since April 2020 by both sides, but particularly by China with its massive construction of military and dual-use infrastructure in the area. It has deployed new radars, surveillance systems, fiber optic cables, and military platforms, besides constructing bridges, roads, airstrips, helipads, logistics sites, and other infrastructure. China also has the advantage of a flatter terrain in Aksai Chin, compared to the tougher valleys and peaks on the Indian side in Ladakh.

India has brought in additional troops and military equipment to Ladakh too, which it does not wish to move out from the theater. The whole LAC in eastern Ladakh was looked after before the crisis by only one mountain division but now has an additional Rashtriya Rifles force headquarters, equivalent to a divisional headquarters, for the southern portion.

For these reasons, the status quo ante is no longer on the agenda. Even if the two sides arrive at some agreement in Ladakh, there is no going back to the pre-2020 LAC reality.

While a perfect status quo ante has been given up as unrealistic and unattainable, former northern army commander Lt. Gen. D. S. Hooda says that “if we define status quo ante as [meaning] that the PLA must pull back its soldiers from areas where they had come in, in 2020, across our perception of the LAC, that is the more sort of practical understanding of what status quo ante is.” He contends that “we have to stand firm on this. We must insist on this.”

This suggestion has two implications. It means that, with both armies having already supported additional troops in the theater for two winters, the deployment of 100,000 soldiers in eastern Ladakh is going to be the new norm. Some retired military officers refer to it as the “LoC-ization of the LAC,” the LoC being the Line of Control with Pakistan in Kashmir. It is not an accurate equivalence because the LoC, unlike the LAC, is both delineated and demarcated. Moreover, depending on the state of bilateral ties between India and Pakistan, along with the security situation in Indian-administered Kashmir, the LoC witnesses heavy firing from both sides. That would be unimaginable as the new status quo on the LAC between India and China.

This leaves the thorny question of the “no patrolling” areas that have been created by the process of disengagement at various places in Ladakh. How does India establish and demonstrate its control over these areas, if the soldiers are not going to be able to patrol them? Claims in statements or on maps that this is Indian territory will be of little help unless that claim is established physically by the soldiers patrolling into such areas. There is no clarity about the duration for which these “no patrolling” zones have been agreed upon, and the protocols to be followed to prevent clashes if patrolling resumes. In an effort that has so far been focused on averting a crisis, resumption of patrols has failed to make it to the negotiating table.

India’s Response: Necessary but Insufficient?

India has responded to the Chinese challenge in Ladakh by undertaking an internal rebalancing of its military and an external rebalancing with its partners and friends in the Indo-Pacific. The internal rebalancing was forced upon it by the suddenness and enormity of the Chinese ingresses and has meant that some of the military plans for Pakistan would need to be worked out again. But it does not mean that New Delhi now has sufficient resources to avoid being surprised all along the LAC. Poor infrastructure and limited deployment of troops leaves eastern Arunachal Pradesh, including Tawang, under tenuous Indian control in case of a Chinese move.

The armed forces have been crying out for more resources to make up the shortfalls and to undertake modernization. This wake-up call from China in Ladakh should have led to a greater financial commitment for the military from the government. But that has not been the case, with both the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force in desperate need of more platforms. Because of Modi’s insistence on domestic manufacturing of defense systems by banning imports, there is a danger of leaving the armed forces vulnerable to obsolescence and shortages. The army has been burdened with a new recruitment scheme and asked to slash its strength by around 15 percent. It would not be an easy task in the best of times, but the ongoing Ladakh border crisis makes it even more challenging.

Because of the geopolitical turmoil, the second prong of external rebalancing has become knotty. While New Delhi has been an enthusiastic participant in Quad summits and ministerial meetings, the grouping has stopped far short of articulating security-centric goals. Even the plans to produce COVID-19 vaccines for Southeast Asian countries faltered due to U.S. and European patent-holders’ reluctance to grant production licenses to Indian pharmaceutical companies. Modi’s aversion to trade pacts, in order to protect Indian companies, has led to New Delhi refusing to sign onto the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and now pulling out of the trade leg of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). Within the neighborhood, Sri Lanka succumbed to Chinese pressure and allowed its research vessel, Yuan Wang 5, to dock at Colombo port, despite Indian warnings.

Whether it be in Ladakh or in South Asia, the status quo seems loaded against India because of the widening power gap between India and China in recent years. The Chinese economy is five and half times India’s and its military spending is nearly four times that of India. It is a superior power in most technological fields and carries far more geopolitical and geoeconomic heft than New Delhi. Cognizant of this asymmetry, India is apprehensive about provoking Beijing but unwilling to accept a subservient role to China in the continent.

This contradiction leads to unreasonable claims, such as the one repeatedly made by Jaishankar that ties with China cannot be normal unless the border situation is normal. But all through the Ladakh border crisis, China has been India’s near-biggest trading partner and is on course to cross the $100 billion mark for the second consecutive year in 2022 – bilateral trade reached $79.77 billion in first seven months of 2022, up 18 percent year-on-year. Nearly a quarter of the development loans from the Beijing-headquartered Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) have been advanced to India: more than $2 billion in 2021 and another $1.6 billion so far this year.

Aggravating the situation is the ultranationalist nature of the Hindutva regime in India. So strong is the indoctrination that in a recent survey, 72.4 percent of the respondents in India said that India “definitely” or “probably” would defeat China in a war. Modi’s right-hand man, Home Minister Amit Shah, stood up in Parliament in August 2019 and vowed to give his life to wrest back Aksai Chin from China. Modi heads a Hindu nationalist government in India that believes in the goal of attaining an Akhand Bharat, or an unbroken India, and that includes Tibet. Modi himself invoked the geographical term in a speech in New Delhi on September 7.

Any sustainable resolution of India’s problems with China would need a stance of “give and take” – without banking on keeping 1.4 billion Indians totally in the dark – and the current Indian narrative rules out any sensible and reasonable compromise with Beijing. Enmeshed in geopolitical churning, the challenges are historical, political, and economic – and in places like Tawang, religious. The two Asian giants may still find a remedy, but that will only be a short pause in what threatens to be a risky and volatile strategic situation on their contested border.