Kyrgyzstan’s Revolutionary President Japarov, 2 Years On

Sadyr Japarov’s two post-revolutionary years in power have been eventful, both in domestic and geopolitical developments. Slow post-pandemic recovery, a dramatic escalation of the border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, soaring inflation, the doubling of fuel and food prices, and the war on Ukraine all present enormous challenges for a politician with no previous international and state governance experience.

Indeed, many local commentators predicted that Japarov and his team would not last long in power. Yet, two years after storming into office the “revolutionary” government is still in place. Not only did Japarov’s government manage to survive severe water and electricity shortages, but it continues generating dynamism in domestic and regional affairs to the liking of his support base.

Through observations of Japarov’s two-year rule we can chart the elements of his success, but there is also growing public discontent related to repression, corruption, mismanagement, and Jaaprov’s unique style of governance.

Still a Tandem?

The recurrent question that many foreign observers of Kyrgyzstani politics ask is about the tandem – that is, the duo of Sadyr Japarov and Kamchybek Tashiev. Tashiev is not only the head of the State Committee for National Security but also the deputy head of the Cabinet of Ministers.

Many local analysts predicted a disintegration of the Japarov-Tashiev duo due to Tashiev’s strong ambitions. After all, such political unions in the past enjoyed a rather short life due to the lack of common ideological ground: Kulov-Bakiyev, Tashiev-Babanov, Jeenbekov-Isakov, and so on. But despite existing frictions, the Japarov-Tashiev tandem continues to function.

However, observing Tashiev’s growing interventions into the social and economic sectors and the deployment of his repressive apparatus upon all spheres of life, a critical question arises: Who really rules the country? Is it the president, Japarov, as the constitution says, or Tashiev and his all-powerful repressive security services?

Many insiders share the opinion that Japarov has a rather passive personality and allows himself to be led by others in many spheres of governance. As such, the centrality of the security services within state governance has become more evident in recent years. The State Committee for National Security has launched criminal cases not only against dissidents but also against members of the bureaucracy, creating a paralyzing dynamic among even lower and mid-level management and halting much needed reforms.

There are rumors that Tashiev might soon dethrone Japarov to take power himself. But such a scenario looks foolish from the perspective of simple regime survival strategies. In a country like Kyrgyzstan, one cannot rule based only on fear, and Tashiev needs Japarov’s charisma and ability to steer populist mobilization. So far, the two have devised a distribution of labor not in opposition to each other’s own rent-seeking activities.

Populist Policies and Trust-based Governance

One must give Japarov’s government some credit for domestic achievements that shine brightly in comparison to the uneventful presidency of his predecessor, President Sooronbai Jeenbekov. Japarov’s administration ushered in an unprecedented increase in salaries for teachers, civil servants in the countryside, medical personnel, and other vulnerable social groups. Furthermore, the construction of railroads, public buildings, and investments in other large infrastructure such as hydropower stations are constantly boasted about on state TV channels. The purchase of 2 billion som in modern military equipment amid rising regional threats and the nationalization of the Kumtor gold mine work perfectly toward reanimating popular sentiments of sovereignty that Japarov so much galvanized during his presidential campaign in early 2021.

In foreign policy, too, Japarov’s rule has been marked by high-level events hosted by Kyrgyzstan such as the consultative meeting of the five Central Asian presidents and the Eurasian Economic Union summit in summer 2022. Earlier, in January 2022, Kyrgyz troops participated in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) intervention in Kazakhstan, demonstrating authoritarian cooperation among the regimes and earning Japarov some regional credit. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Samarkand last month and the new impetus promised there to the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway as well as other regional investment plans are among significant items in Japarov’s foreign policy basket.

High-level visits, the acceptance of Japarov by regional and Western partners, and a positive economic recovery give the impression of a dynamic government. Domestically, this signals to society that Japarov is indeed eager to fulfill his revolutionary and electoral promises. On the regional level, his activism puts him in the center of a much-needed re-activation of dialogue and cooperation after the long pandemic-related break.

In addition, his team is very good at connecting with popular sentiments of pride, patriotism, and traditional values. Japarov’s populist language helps him rule based on a simplification of complex issues, depoliticization of public criticism, and supplementing facts with his “truths.” Society is told to simply follow Japarov’s lead, trust his words, and patiently wait for positive changes to come. We see this exemplified below in a print newspaper, published in late June and spread across the country in two languages. The headline reads: “500 days of service to the people.”