Parviz Mullojonov

In mid-September, the long-running border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan exploded into a new phase. The escalation of violence – which left at least 100 dead and displaced thousands – marked a sharp deterioration of relations between the respective governments, fueled by an excess of accusatory rhetoric in the aftermath. 

While the dispute has historical roots in the borderlands, where much of the international border between the two states has remained unsettled for 30 years, contemporary factors from a stalled negotiation process to increased militarization of the border area contributed to the burst of violence in September. To dive deeper into the conflict, and contemplate ways forward, The Diplomat’s Catherine Putz spoke with Parviz Mullojonov, a political scientist and historian, about the troubled Kyrgyz-Tajik border.

A significant portion of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border is undelineated and undemarcated. What have the major hurdles to settling the border been over the years?

Indeed, until the present, despite continuous efforts and regular outbursts of violence, only about 60 percent of the border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is demarcated. One of the main factors that hamper the demarcation process is the profound disagreement between the countries regarding the ownership of land plots and water sources along the border – especially around the Tajik enclave of Vorukh. In general, the disagreements could be relatively divided into three main clusters.

First, the question of ownership of several hundred hectares of land plots – predominately pastures and fruit gardens – located mainly around the Tajik enclave Vorukh. Across the centuries both local communities – nomadic Kyrgyz and settled Tajik farmers – jointly and relatively peacefully used the disputed lands based on inter-communal agreements and arrangements. However, the sedentarization and mass resettlement of the nomadic Kyrgyz population during the Soviet period changed the demographic composition and promoted competition over land and water resources. 

The effect was doubled by the so-called “demographic scissor” phenomenon, which is described when considerable population growth is accompanied by the reduction of cultivated areas. On one hand, the region experienced a demographic explosion, especially on the Tajik side of the border;  on the other, the massive and large-scale irrigation system constructed during the first decades of the Soviet Union was already outdated and required a thorough renovation both in terms of equipment and water usage technology. The irrigation methods are still based on badly regulated and intensive watering. It causes a considerable, annually increasing, rise in the levels of underground water and, consequently, salinization of soil and further degradation of land plots. 

In 1940, the average size of cultivated lands in the area constituted 0.6 hectares per capita; in 1989, it was only 0.17 hectares per capita. The phenomenon drastically enhanced competition for scarce water and land resources and, consequently, promoted social tension and conflict potential in the border areas. 

Second, there is a problem with the ownership and distribution of available water resources and the use of water supply channels. The previous Soviet arrangements on water sharing have already become ineffective under the new conditions. However, the post-Soviet authorities have failed to work out a new mechanism for distributing water and sharing the existing irrigation system. The water shortage is also enhanced due to the outdated irrigation system, which is unable to satisfy the rapidly growing population demand.  

The third cluster of disagreements is related to the status/ownership of the automobile road Isfara-Vorukh, which connects the enclave with the main territory of Tajikistan. In administrative maps of the 1920s, the area between Vorukh and the Tajik Republic was shown as a part of Tajikistan. However, in the 1930s, during the sedentarization campaign, the Soviets established a Kyrgyz-populated kolkhoz in the connecting zone, which was administratively subordinated to Bishkek. Therefore, in later Soviet administrative maps, Vorukh is shown already as an enclave separated from the rest of Tajikistan by the territory of Leilek province, Kyrgyzstan. 

Today, this cluster of disagreements is the most serious because to prove their positions the two sides refer to mutually contradictory documents and sources. Thus, in their disputes, Dushanbe and Bishkek rely on different administrative maps; the Tajik side refers to the administrative map of 1924, while Bishkek insists on following the maps of 1959 and 1979. 

Unfortunately to date, the parties have not been able to find a compromise on any of the above issues. Many experts explain this failure by pointing to internal political factors, as both governments have to consider public opinion on the ground and at the national level. To some degree, the Tajik government can be more flexible in this regard, as it fully controls the media and the flow of information in the country. The Kyrgyz authorities are in a more complicated situation being confronted by strong domestic political opposition and a part of the media; in these conditions, any concessions in territorial disputes may cause a new political crisis.

Can you describe for our readers the differences between navigating the border during the Soviet period, in the years after independence, and now?

The Soviet Union was a strictly unified and centralized country run by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The Soviet national republics were just administrative entities with limited authority; consequently, the borders between them had a rather abstract and declarative character.  The borders between Soviet republics were only approximately laid out on maps, but practically no delimitation was carried out on the ground. In general, the Soviet maps determined only the administrative and economic affiliation of the main settlements, while the ownership of the irrigation channels and specific land plots was often determined approximately – most often based on agreements between local collective farms and official bodies. During the construction of irrigation and economic infrastructure, the issue of administrative affiliation was also often disregarded – consequently, the actual status of many infrastructure facilities and economic objects remained uncertain until the collapse of the USSR.

As a rule, Moscow painfully reacted to any inter-ethnic and social conflicts, as propaganda presented the Socialist system as a conflict-free society. Therefore, local authorities tried to resolve all emerging disagreements over water and land resources on the community/kolkhoz level without involving the national and central authorities. In many cases, local communities preferred to resolve land and water disputes directly, through the network of so-called  “traditional civic institutions” such as village or city block councils, elders’ councils, informal structures, etc.

This administrative and economic uncertainty was not considered a serious problem in the conditions of a unified Socialist state. However, it triggered a series of conflicts after the collapse of the Soviet Union when the newly independent states launched the border delimitation process. In this regard, one of the most conflict-generating factors was the question of ownership of the main economic and infrastructural sites (such as water distribution stations) located in the near-border areas.

The latest outbreak of hostilities along the border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan resulted in at least 100 people killed, thousands displaced, and considerable damage to civilian infrastructure. What factors contributed to this dramatic escalation over previous clashes on the border?

I would stress three main factors promoting conflict escalation in the last few years:

First, there is a complete stalemate in the inter-state negotiation process as Dushanbe and Bishkek continue to occupy diametrically opposite positions regarding the main disputed questions. Despite numerous statements, the parties failed to make progress in the delimitation of disputed sections of the borders, especially in the area around the Vorukh enclave. This stalemate promotes social tension in the area as well as a sense of mutual distrust, both on national and inter-community levels. 

Second, there is a phenomenon of the rapid militarization of the near-border areas; in the past few years, both sides have invested heavily in the deployment of new troops and heavy equipment to the conflict zone, construction of new outposts and checkpoints, and strengthening police and military control in trans-border areas. The militarization of the border has significantly increased the risk and intensity of armed clashes in the conflict zone. Thus, previously the trans-border conflicts arose mainly between groups of civilians, while militaries tried to separate the sides or were involved in clashes later. However, in the latest outbursts of violence, the armed clashes started directly between troops without any involvement of the civilian population to start. 

In addition, the two sides initiated the practice of distributing arms among civilians, which also considerably increased the risk of renewed and expanded conflict. The militarization of the borders greatly influenced the social and economic life of the residents of the border regions on both sides. Before the conflict escalation, trans-border trade was one of the main pillars of the local economy contributing to economic well-being and living standards. Due to the militarization, the residents of the borderlands have paradoxically lacked a sense of security, which has a negative impact on the psychological state of local communities.

Third, the negative effect is doubled by the deepening economic and social crisis caused by the pandemic and the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The crisis increases the social and economic vulnerability of local communities, which promotes the process of their political and social radicalization. 

How was the conflict interpreted and communicated to the wider Tajik public via government statements and media?

The Tajik government initially preferred to refrain from making official statements about the recent conflict on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border. Also, reportedly, the official media received the same set of instructions. This position was officially explained by the government's unwillingness to escalate military sentiments in society and provoke further conflict escalation. Therefore, Tajik officials made their first official statements in response to accusations of aggression from Bishkek. In turn, the Tajik government accused the Kyrgyz side of military aggression and provocation of a new outburst of violence on the borders.

Therefore, the overwhelming majority of data, information, and news about the conflict development, situation on the ground, violence cases, opportunities and failures of peaceful settlement, and so forth, was disseminated mainly via Tajik social media. Besides, several groups of Tajik IT experts specialized in fact-checking activities to prevent the dissemination of unreliable and provocative data on the internet and social media. In general, the conflict caused the rapid intensification of social media and self-organized groups on the ground intended to fill the gap in the informational sphere, to support the refugees and IDPs [internally displaced persons].  

In general, in Tajikistan, the government, political opposition, and civil society share relatively similar positions concerning the border conflict with Kyrgyzstan. The majority of Tajik observers believe that the first shooting on the borderline started with the opposite side, accusing the current Kyrgyz leadership of provoking conflict to divert public attention from its internal problems.

After the violence witnessed in September, there was an escalation in rhetoric between the two governments, and online between Kyrgyz and Tajiks. What do you make of this increasingly antagonistic atmosphere?

I consider this phenomenon as an extremely negative and alarming signal, which implies that the conflict is gradually shifting up, to another inter-state and inter-ethnic level.  Before that, for many decades, it was still just an inter-community low-intensity conflict caused by the competition of local communities for water and land resources. It did not affect the relationship between both countries and nations, which remained friendly until very recently.

In several last years, the situation changed, and the language of hatred and animosity started to penetrate and fill up the media and informational space in both countries, gradually shaping the image of the other as an enemy in public perception. Such a phenomenon is also described by the term  “dehumanization of the adversary,” which is considered in the conflict resolution field as one of the main signs of a sustainable and violent conflict.

What needs to be done to avoid future conflicts along the border?

It will be very difficult to resolve this conflict. Among other things, one should take into account the domestic political agendas in both states, when, due to pressure from below, the communities, too large concessions will directly affect the popularity of governments. De-escalation must take place as soon as possible; otherwise, we can expect its complete transition to the inter-state level, affecting inter-ethnic relations, internationalization (that is, the involvement of third countries), a new phase of the arms race, and so on. In general, if there would be no further progress in the peace talks, we would witness more regular and extended outbursts of violence in the border area.

The international experience suggests several consequent steps to reduce the tension and de-escalate the conflict, such as:

First, demilitarization of the conflict zone – in the given case, the near-border areas in the Vorukh-Batken zone. It would reduce the possibility of renewal of armed clashes and create opportunities and conditions for more productive peace talks. This process has already started – Bishkek and Dushanbe recently agreed to liquidate four military posts in the conflict zone.

Second, the renewal of a new set of official peace talks (Track I) – probably, with the mediation of international organizations and donor countries. The mediators could provide a platform for effective peace talks and dialogue between the conflicting sides; besides, they can help with the agenda and content of the peace talks, monitoring the implementation of signed agreements, etc.

Third, the international experience also shows that the best results in the peace process could be achieved via a combined Track I and Track II. approaches – which implies the combination of upper-level peace talks with civic and expert dialogues, mixed working groups’ activities, etc. The peculiarity of the Kyrgyz-Tajik peace process is its exclusiveness. The Tajik-Kyrgyz peace talks include a narrow group of people limited to representatives of official bodies. I suppose that this is a time to increase the number of dialogue platforms and participants to make the peace process more productive, accountable, and sustainable.