What Did the 20th National Party Congress Tell Us About China’s Taiwan Plans?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has proven, with deadly clarity, that wars of national attrition are possible in the 21st century. That, in turn, has reawaken interest in China’s long-standing vow to achieve political control over Taiwan – by force, if necessary.

Various dates have been floated by outside observers as China’s target date for the final annexation of Taiwan: 2049, the People’s Republic of China’s centennial anniversary; 2035, the date top leader Xi Jinping has pegged for China to “basically” achieve its goal of becoming a leading world power; 2027, a key target for China’s military modernization efforts; and 2024, when Taiwan’s next presidential election is due. In late October, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Gilday even spoke of “a 2022 window or potentially a 2023 window” for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, saying “I can’t rule that out.”

Echoing Gilday, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned that Chinese leaders have made “a fundamental decision that the status quo was no longer acceptable and that Beijing was determined to pursue reunification on a much faster timeline.”

Neither Gilday nor Blinken provided any evidence for their assertions, however.

Gilday is correct that we can’t categorically “rule out” a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as soon as this year – if Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has taught us anything, it’s that authoritarian leaders can make personalized decisions that outsiders struggle to comprehend. That said, there’s no particular reason to believe China is going to invade Taiwan in the next few months (recall that in the case of Ukraine, there were months of clear indications that a military operation was imminent). 

Barring the ability to read Xi’s mind, our best indication of the Chinese party-state’s thinking on Taiwan comes from official policy pronouncements. And nothing is more official than the work reports issued at the beginning of each National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). So what did Xi say about Taiwan this year at the 20th Party Congress, how was it different from his work report in 2017, and what does this all mean for Taiwan?

First, the basics: Xi devoted about the same amount of time to speaking about Taiwan in 2022 as he did in 2017. The 2022 work report’s main section on Taiwan ran to 575 Chinese characters this year versus 527 in 2017. It’s worth noting as well that both work reports were over 32,000 Chinese characters in length, so just a tiny fraction of each addressed cross-strait issues. Clearly, the CCP has other concerns.

Still, there were clear differences in the two work reports that, taken together, paint a worrying picture. In 2017, the work report’s topline review of the CCP’s accomplishments over the previous five years noted that China had “vigorously safeguarded peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” That assertion was not repeated this year. Either the CCP does not believe it achieved that goal or it simply doesn’t value “peace and stability” vis-a-vis Taiwan as much as it did five years ago.

Instead, the 2022 work report spent more time talking about the CCP’s successes in countering “separatist activities aimed at ‘Taiwan independence’” and “external interference in Taiwan affairs,” a clear sign China is more worried about these trends than it was previously. In fact, the 2017 work report didn’t mention “external interference” or “external forces” at all in the context of Taiwan.

Likewise, the 2017 work report listed having “promoted the peaceful development of cross-strait relations” and “strengthened cross-strait economic and cultural exchanges and cooperation” as among its achievements. Their absence this year is similarly telling.

Instead, the 2022 work report contains a new accolade for the CCP: “We have strengthened our strategic initiative for China’s complete reunification.” There was no such reference to making actual steps toward “reunification” in the 2017 work report.

In the later section of the work report – the part dedicated to laying future plans, rather than praising past accomplishments – Xi in 2022 was far less interested in “peaceful reunification.” While in 2017 “peaceful reunification” was the ultimate goal, now “national reunification” is the aim, with “peaceful” reduced to optional status. Although the 2022 work report noted that “peaceful reunification” is “the best way to realize reunification,” it also reiterated that the CCP “will never promise to renounce the use of force.” 

Unification is the goal, by whatever means necessary. That has always been true, but it’s telling that Xi took care to spell it out explicitly in 2022, not in 2017.

As if that wasn’t enough, the 2022 work report ditched the 2017 work report’s assurance that “we respect the current social system and way of life in Taiwan.”

In addition to giving a harsher picture of what unification might look like, the 2022 work report used stronger language to discuss “resolving the Taiwan question,” which is now described as “a historic mission and an unshakable commitment.” By comparison, the 2017 work report simply said that “resolving the Taiwan question” was “the shared aspiration of all the Chinese people” (language that also appeared in the 2022 work report, as well). The 2022 work report, while not devoting more space to Taiwan, gave the importance of “reunification” a rhetorical upgrade.

Taken as a whole, there is a worrying sense of inevitability coloring the 2022 work report that was not there five years ago. The 2017 version proclaimed, “We will never allow anyone, any organization, or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from China!” Essentially, the CCP was pledging not to allow Taiwan independence. Five years later, Xi thundered, “The wheels of history are rolling on toward China's reunification and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Complete reunification of our country must be realized, and it can, without doubt, be realized!” This is a positive promise that Taiwan’s “unification” with the mainland is coming.

In examining these changes, it’s tempting to simply see a more assertive and aggressive China. But we also have to take into account the changes on the other side of the Taiwan Strait and across the Pacific Ocean in the United States.

2017 and 2022 brought very different contexts to cross-strait relations. Most of Xi’s first term – 2012-2017, the period covered in the 2017 work report – coincided with a Kuomintang (KMT) president in Taiwan: Ma Ying-jeou, who made outreach to China a key pillar of his administration from 2008 to 2016. Warming cross-strait ties culminated in a historic meeting between Xi and Ma in Singapore in November 2015.

That rosy period came to an abrupt end in January 2016, when Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won Taiwan’s presidential election. Beijing is unwilling to deal with Tsai or the DPP, a homegrown Taiwanese political party that the CCP has always considered to be “separatists” pursuing “Taiwan independence.” The CCP much prefers to work with the KMT, a political party born in China and with strong roots there even today. Accordingly, in 2016 Beijing froze out the new DPP administration, despite repeated assertions on Tsai’s part that she is committed to the status quo in cross-strait relations.

That resulted in a vicious cycle: With cross-strait exchanges shut down unilaterally by Beijing, and with China taking every opportunity to keep Taiwan’s new government out of international exchanges, Tsai’s administration had to go on the offensive, seeking to bolster its international space. That, in turn, only reinforced perceptions in Beijing that the DPP was seeking full independence.

Meanwhile, worsened ties between the United States and China – and Beijing’s ramped-up pressure campaign against Taipei – incentivized Washington to push the envelope on its unofficial relationship with Taiwan. Since 2017, the U.S. has passed the Taiwan Travel Act (which encourages high-level U.S. officials to travel to Taiwan), increased arms sales (including the once-taboo sale of new fighter jets to Taiwan), and passed the TAIPEI Act (which threatens countries seeking to sever ties with Taiwan with punitive action from the U.S.). These and similar developments are the context behind the repeated emphasis on “foreign interference” in cross-strait affairs in the 2022 work report.

One explanation for the toughened language in 2022 is the face-value one: Xi Jinping, an ardent nationalist, is hell-bent on securing his place in Chinese history by achieving “complete national reunification.” But another explanation is that Xi, faced with a worsening situation across the Taiwan Strait – and in the United States – felt pressure to talk tough on the issue to distract from the policy failures that have let the situation degrade this far.

We can view China’s unprecedented military drills around Taiwan in August 2022, following U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, in a similar vein. Was it an invasion preparation exercise, carried out at the first possible pretext? Or was it Beijing’s attempt to save face amid domestic anger that it had “allowed” the visit to take place?

Only Xi Jinping really knows the answer. But what we do know is that Xi’s worrying rhetoric is already having a real impact by further alienating Taiwanese from China, decreasing the prospects for the “peaceful reunification” Beijing once dreamed of. Such rhetoric is also convincing U.S. officials and military officers that an invasion may be imminent, and thus sparking more intensive efforts at deterrence on Washington’s part. And so the vicious cycle continues.