Malaysians Head to the Polls for State Assembly Elections

On August 12, Malaysians in six peninsular states – Negeri Sembilan, Penang, Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah – will go to the polls to elect new state assemblies in an atmosphere of heightened political tension.

The elections come just nine months after last November’s general election, or GE15 for short, which ended with Anwar Ibrahim’s appointment to office after more than two decades in opposition. As such, the August polls are shaping as an early and crucial test for Anwar’s unwieldy unity government – of both its popularity with the Malaysian public, and its internal cohesion.

GE15 followed a period of unusual flux and fragmentation in Malaysia’s politics, which saw four prime ministers rotate through the office in just three years. The inconclusive election failed to dispel the uncertainty. It was only after several days of frenzied negotiations that Anwar managed to cobble together a multifarious unity government that includes four coalitions consisting of 19 political parties, in addition to two independent MPs. 

At the core of this government was a marriage of convenience between Anwar’s multi-ethnic Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition and Anwar’s old foe, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the main component of the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition that ruled Malaysia from 1957 to 2008. The unexpected partnership between BN and PH led to the creation of Perikatan Nasional (PN), an all-Malay opposition coalition consisting of Bersatu, a nationalist party led by former Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, and PAS, the country’s largest Islamic party.

On paper, the results of the August elections seem fairly predictable. Three of the participating states – Penang, Selangor, and Negeri Sembilan – are held by PH, with the remaining three held by PN. Based on the results of GE15, it is expected that none of the six states will change hands. Even if this is the case, the performance of the two competing coalitions could offer signals of the directions of Malaysian politics is heading – particularly of the medium-term viability of Anwar’s rickety coalition.

One set of signals to pay attention to is the growing salience of race, religion, and royalty – the so-called “3Rs” – since GE15. While the primary plotline of the election centered on Anwar’s elevation to the country’s top office and the possibilities for reform that it opened up, the election also saw a countervailing trend: the emergence of PAS as a national political force. The party, which expounds a narrowly Malay and Islamic vision of Malaysian identity, won more seats than any other single party: 43, as compared to 31 for Anwar’s People's Justice Party. GE15 also saw PAS’ “green wave” spread beyond the northern peninsular states – particularly Kelantan and Terengganu – where it has historically been strong. (PAS is thus widely expected to maintain, if not increase, its majority in these two states.)

This new political alignment has created the political and rhetorical backdrop against which this month’s state elections will take place. Unbound by UMNO’s historical need to avoid alienating its ethnic Indian and ethnic Chinese coalition partners within BN, the PN opposition has lost no time in mobilizing ethnic Malay identity politics in order to weaken Anwar’s hold on power. While Anwar has promised to rule for all Malaysians, PN has attempted to depict him as a “bad” Muslim who is aiming to erode the country’s system of ethnic Malay privileges, which have been in place since the 1970s. 

All of this has created a febrile atmosphere awash in political appeals to the 3Rs. Recognizing the toxic nature of this discourse, Anwar’s administration has promised to clamp down on those leveraging it for political gain. But in the current environment, these attempts have rather predictably served to confirm the claims of his critics: that Anwar is bent on undermining Muslim and Malay identity.

One notable instance surfaced on July 18, when Malaysian authorities charged opposition leader Muhammad Sanusi Md Nor, a leading member of PAS, with sedition for allegedly insulting the country's sultans. Sanusi's remarks, according to other media reports, questioned decisions taken by the royalty regarding the formation of government at the federal and state level. 

“We have a scared government now who uses the authorities to prohibit us from giving talks. I feel this is a sign that they are afraid,” he told reporters after posting bail at the Selayang Sessions Court. “All public agencies will be used now to stop the rise of this public wave. As such, I hope PN wins all the six state elections.”

The elections therefore offer a test as to whether the mobilization of 3R tropes results in further gains for the PN coalition. The biggest question is whether they manage to pry the states of Negeri Sembilan and Selangor away from PH. In Negeri Sembilan in particular, the PH margin is relatively narrow; the coalition holds just a slim majority of 20 out of 36 seats in the state assembly. As Sophie Lemière, a leading observer of Malaysian politics, wrote recently in The Diplomat, “The loss of these two states would be a terrible defeat and throw the government into great uncertainty.”

How Anwar’s government fares under the pressure of its opponents’ 3R rhetoric could also impact the delicate coalition politics within the unity government. As Ong Kian Ming argued in Fulcrum on July 20, UMNO, plotting its revival after a historically poor performance at GE15, will get a sense of whether it should work with PH in future elections. “It will also affect the overall confidence of UMNO leaders and grassroots members in the UMNO president and deputy prime minister, Zahid Hamidi,” Ong wrote. 

For PH, the polls will settle the important question of whether it can increase its share of Malay support by working with a Zahid-led UMNO, or whether partnering with the scandal-hit party will be an electoral liability.

While the results of the six elections will not have an immediate impact on the fortunes of Anwar’s federal government, they could provide an indication of whether PH survives in power beyond the next general election. In any event, the period of flux and realignment in Malaysian politics, so marked since 2020, seemingly still has some way to run.