Uzair Younus

Pakistan is at a crossroads. Elections are looming in early 2024, but the most popular politician in the country – Imran Khan – is in jail and few expect any true democratic choice at the polls. Meanwhile, the country’s economy is cratering, with poverty on the rise even as terrorist attacks become more frequent and more deadly.

The Diplomat interviewed Uzair Younus, the director of the Pakistan Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and the vice president at The Asia Group, about Pakistan’s political atmosphere amid this looming economic and security crisis. The outlook is not promising.

“To find a way out of this polycrisis, Pakistan’s elites must call an end to the ongoing game of thrones that is forcing them to secure power in Islamabad and Lahore, whatever the costs,” Younus said.

Back in August, a caretaker government took the helm in Pakistan with Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar, a Balochistan Awami Party senator, at its head. How has Kakar managed the government so far?

The caretaker government’s job is to ensure that free, fair, and timely elections are held in Pakistan. Elections have been delayed due to what I refer to as creative interpretations of the constitution – the Election Commission has said it cannot hold timely elections due to the constituency delimitation process – and efforts are being made to ensure that the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) does not have a level playing field. The PTI’s leader, Imran Khan, remains in jail, and while he is the most popular politician in the country, his party has continued to allege that its workers are facing harassment, intimidation, and arbitrary arrests. As a result, one has to say that Kakar’s caretaker government is actively failing in its constitutional duty.

The caretaker government technically faced a constitutional obligation to hold elections within 90 days. But, as you mentioned, the Election Commission has announced a delay until January 2024 to draw new constituencies. How is the delay being seen in Pakistan, and how is it factoring into the political jostling ahead of elections?

Most in Pakistan recognize that free and fair elections are unlikely to be held in 2024. Many experts still believe that elections may actually be delayed further – their concerns have some validity given that the Election Commission has not announced dates at this point in time. There is a broad consensus that there will not be a level playing field in the upcoming elections and that the military establishment will play the role of kingmaker. As a result, confidence in Pakistan’s flawed and floundering democracy is at an all-time low. Should the economic crisis worsen, there is a real likelihood that this growing anger may lead to growing protests.

Another key trend to keep in mind is the impact of the growing political vacuum in Pakistani Punjab. Prior to the 2018 elections, the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) emerged as a spoiler in the province, helping split the PML-N’s vote base. Over the last few months, the TLP has significantly grown its footprint in the province, capitalizing on the unpopularity of the PML-N and the lack of freedom enjoyed by the PTI. A recent poll conducted by Gallup Pakistan showed that Saad Rizvi, who leads the TLP, is the second-most popular leader in Pakistan. The TLP has been weaponizing the blasphemy issue and targeting Ahmadis across Pakistan in recent weeks as well, which has allowed the group to make further inroads in both Punjab and the city of Karachi.

Pakistan’s military is infamous for shaping election results behind the scenes. What role is the military playing so far in this election cycle? Where is its support likely to go?

The military is perhaps more dominant than it has ever been since democracy was restored in 2008. In the upcoming elections, the military establishment will play the role of kingmaker and the next prime minister will be selected based on the army chief’s preference. A low voter turnout on election day will further reinforce the military’s ability to shape a pliant government.

In addition, the military is also likely to prefer bringing to power a weak coalition that is dependent on the cooperation of pliant politicians, often referred to as “electables” in Pakistan. These politicians, who typically hail from Balochistan, south Punjab, and parts of Karachi, may play a key role in providing a majority to a government after elections are held – such an outcome would allow the military to ensure that the next prime minister does not flex their muscles in a way that challenges the military’s own interests and priorities.

Imran Khan served as prime minister from August 2018 until his April 2022 ouster in a no-confidence vote. In recent months, he faced a landslide of legal charges and is currently in jail. In the meantime, how has his party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), fared? Does the PTI have a future in Pakistani politics?

While Pakistan’s politics is extremely unpredictable, one thing is almost always certain: yesterday’s enemies can quickly become today’s allies. Back in 2017 when [then-Prime Minister] Nawaz Sharif was ousted and his party leadership was intimidated, harassed, and arrested, many claimed that this was the end of the road for the PML-N. A few years later, however, Nawaz’s brother was prime minister and now Nawaz is back in Pakistan.

After their election victory, many PTI leaders talked of a ten-year plan, where Imran Khan would rule without any opposition through 2028, and the PTI would reshape Pakistani politics. Today, the PTI is on the receiving end [of a pressure campaign], but it would be folly to say that it has no future. The party remains extremely popular, it has a core voter base locked in both Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab, and Khan remains the most popular politician in Pakistan.

In an unlikely scenario where the PTI is deliberately weakened to a point where it is no longer a viable political force, the future of democracy in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan would be at stake. This is primarily because like its political competitors, the PTI also represents millions of Pakistani citizens, the vast majority of whom are under 30 years old. Weakening a political actor like the PTI – or any other popular party – to achieve near-term goals would lead to unintended consequences that would only deepen political instability in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s economy has been on a rollercoaster for several years. Its latest IMF deal came through over the summer, but IMF recommendations have always proved controversial in implementation. What are the country’s economic prospects now, and how is the public responding to the latest ups and downs?

Pakistan has been in the midst of a prolonged and historic crisis since 2018. During this period, inflation has refused to ease, with Pakistan’s consumer price index climbing at over three times the pace in India and Bangladesh. While administrative measures and a crackdown on smuggling has led to a strengthening of the rupee, the core issue of runaway fiscal deficits remains unresolved.

As this crisis has continued, purchasing power for millions of households has been decimated, with even middle- and upper-middle income households facing growing pressures. The poverty rate has increased to almost 40 percent in the last year, with an additional 12.5 million people falling below the poverty line according to the World Bank.

As a result, there is tremendous anger on the main street and citizens mostly lay the blame of this crisis on the previous PDM government led by Shehbaz Sharif. 2024 will be a year of reckoning for Pakistan’s policymakers, and regardless of who enters office through whichever means, they will have to impose more austerity to secure a new IMF program.

At the end of the day, however, the IMF program will not resolve this crisis. For that to happen, Pakistani elites must reach a consensus on altering a status quo that has enriched the few at the expense of the many.

Pakistan has seen an alarming rise in terrorist attacks over the past two years. How has Pakistan’s political and economic turmoil impacted terrorism in the country, and how will security concerns in turn factor into the next election?

Pakistan is facing a polycrisis and it is the convergence of political, economic, social, and security crises that makes the current situation so volatile. With the United States exiting Afghanistan, Islamabad has faced increasing terror strikes conducted by the Pakistani Taliban, which has been provided a safe haven by the Afghan Taliban across the Durand Line. While the security crisis has largely remained away from the eyes of the mainstream media – both due to other crises and because of a managed media environment – the situation has continued to get worse. Political rallies have been targeted in recent weeks and I expect this trend to accelerate as the election cycle picks up momentum.

To find a way out of this polycrisis, Pakistan’s elites must call an end to the ongoing game of thrones that is forcing them to secure power in Islamabad and Lahore, whatever the costs. In addition, they must forge a consensus among themselves – across political parties and institutions – that it is time for the rich to pay a fair share of taxes and end the regressive system of extraction that currently exists.

As long as elites remain blinded by this quest for power and refuse to overturn a now unsustainable economic status quo, it would be safe to say that they will never be able to implement a robust and sustainable strategy to chart a path forward that generates inclusive, sustainable growth and creates a political economy where the constitution reigns supreme, in both letter and spirit.