Where Was the Middle East at China’s Big Belt and Road Forum?

Headlines proclaiming China’s expanded influence in the Middle East have proliferated this year. This was especially true following the surprise announcement in March 2023 that China had brokered a deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia, in which the two rivals pledged to restore diplomatic relations. Seizing on the momentum of that accomplishment, Beijing declared its intention to tackle an ever bigger challenge: mediating between Israel and Palestine.

Then war broke out in October 2023. Hamas staged a brutal terrorist attack on southern Israel and the Israeli military responded with a relentless counter-offensive that made little distinction between civilians and military targets. As the Gaza Strip went up in flames and Israel called for blood, China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, declared that Chinese officials were “in intensive communication with all parties to promote a ceasefire and an end to the fighting.” Indeed, Wang held a quick succession of phone calls with his counterparts from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey.

But it’s questionable whether the bloodshed in Israel and Palestine had Wang’s full attention. At the same time, he was meeting a constant stream of foreign diplomats as Beijing hosted the third Belt and Road Forum, the first such gathering since 2019.

The timing of the Belt and Road Forum, held on October 17 and 18, created a surreal parallel universe: the horrific violence unfolding in Gaza, versus the polite, tightly choreographed, and decidedly bland diplomacy underway in the Chinese capital. The two-day summit was shadowed by events half a world away.

On October 17, Al Ahli Arab Hospital in Gaza was hit – either by an Israeli missile or a Gazan militant’s rocket, a question that is hotly disputed. The strike caused a devastating loss of life, with 500 reported dead.

China – preoccupied with the BRF, which pre-empted even its regular Foreign Ministry press conferences – only issued a terse statement saying that “China is shocked by and strongly condemns the attack on the hospital in Gaza.”

On October 18, Chinese leader Xi Jinping gave a keynote address to the Belt and Road Forum attendees. The speech was full of self-congratulatory platitudes about how the Belt and Road was creating “a community of shared future.” It did not once mention pressing global issues – including the Israel-Palestine crisis. In fact, there was no mention whatsoever of the conflict during the official BRF events, not even during the tightly scripted press conference held by Wang.

The BRF’s unfortunate timing was, of course, a coincidence. China couldn’t be expected to scrap or reschedule a major diplomatic event featuring attendees from over 130 countries, including 23 heads of state. But it would have been entirely possible to include discussion of the tragic events in southern Israel and Gaza on the agenda.

That China chose not to do so likely comes down to its near-paralyzing fear of offending one of the major players in the MIddle East, with whom Beijing has so far managed to maintain cordial relations. Talking about the issue would risk taking sides, and Beijing is ill-prepared to do that. China has refused to condemn Hamas, or even mention it by name, over the October 7 attacks on Israel, just as China has refused to ascribe any blame for the October 17 hospital attack.

Meanwhile, on the same day that Xi gave his keynote speech, U.S. President Joe Biden was in Israel offering support to the Israeli people while also cautioning the government of Benjamin Netanyau to rein in its response. While there, Biden arranged a deal with Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza.

The latter was especially notable as a point of comparison. Egypt had downgraded its participation in the BRF due to the crisis, sending Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly to Beijing instead. Xi met with Madbouly, and the two discussed the Israel-Palestine dispute. But that was the exception, rather than the rule, for Xi’s bilateral meetings. Aside from Madbouly and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Xi did not mention the war in Gaza in his talks with any other world leader – not even U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres (at least, not according to the publicly released read-outs).

That lacuna underscored Xi’s near-total silence on the issue in general. China’s top leader has not spoken to his counterparts in Israel or Palestine, or heavily involved regional players like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Iran, since the conflict began. Instead, the task has been delegated down to Zhai Jun, China’s special envoy on the Middle East, who has held a flurry of phone calls with his counterparts, as well as making a trip to the region. But Xi’s lack of personal involvement provided a sharp contrast to Biden’s visit to Israel.

Of course, diplomacy is a two-way street. Any of the Middle Eastern leaders could have reached out to schedule a phone call with Xi; that they have not done so is telling of their expectations that China will truly play a role in the crisis. When push comes to shove, it’s not China that top leaders from the Middle East are calling up.

Just two leaders from the region – Egypt’s Madbouly and UAE Supreme Council member Saud Bin Saqr Al Qasimi – attended the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing. That is understandable; top leaders are reluctant to travel abroad when there’s a crisis looming at home. More curious is the fact that the Middle Eastern states didn’t bother with the other Belt and Road Forums either.

No country from the Middle East sent a head of state or government to China’s first Belt and Road Forum in 2017. Egypt’s el-Sisi attended the 2019 and 2023 events, although its attendance was downgraded from the presidential to prime minster level this year. The UAE attended both as well, sending its prime minister to the 2019 edition before also downgrading its participation amid this year’s Israel-Palestine conflict. But no other country in the Middle East has ever sent a top-level representative to China’s headline diplomatic event.

That’s puzzling. The Middle East is a key region in the Belt and Road Initiative, not least because of its geographic positioning between the Asia-Pacific and Europe. Countries in the region have also been receptive to the project: Of the 14 countries in the Middle East, all but two have signed Belt and Road agreements with China (Israel and Jordan are the lone exceptions). In fact, Qatar was one of the first countries in the world to get on board, joining in 2014, when the BRI was just a year old and counted only five members.

Iran and Saudi Arabia both followed suit in March 2017; other Middle Eastern countries joined in a wave throughout 2017 and 2018. Palestine was the latest addition to the BRI fold in the Middle East, signing a cooperation agreement in December 2022.

However, the Middle Eastern countries take a unique approach to the BRI. Much of the rest of the world sees the Chinese initiative as a cash cow, a golden ticket to funding for badly needed infrastructure projects and expanded trade and investment opportunities. Most Middle Eastern powers, by contrast, aren’t in need of handouts; countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE are themselves highly sought-after sources of development financing, especially in the Muslim world.

Instead, powers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE seek Chinese cooperation on clean energy, digital connectivity, and cutting-edge technologies to wean themselves off a dependence on fossil fuel exports. And with these countries increasingly seeking a share at the global leadership table themselves, they’re not especially interested in following China’s vision for a new global order. Bilateral cooperation on specific areas of interest suits them just fine, rather than grand multilateral extravaganzas.

As a result, despite the widespread acceptance of the BRI, the Middle East seems oddly uninterested in the Belt and Road Forum. Apparently, the feeling is mutual, given the lack of comment on the conflagration in Israel and Palestine during the big event.

Narratives of the U.S. being eclipsed in the Middle East are at sharp odds with this dynamic. The moment a crisis erupts, Washington is everywhere – for better or for worse – and China virtually disappears.