Kinmen Again a Flashpoint in Cross-Strait Relations
The outlying islands governed by Taiwan, but far closer to the mainland, are an often overlooked factor in regional security dynamics.
When we talk about Taiwan, “the island” is often used as shorthand. Taiwan is, in fact, the name of a particular island – but the entity known as the Republic of China is more than just the island of Taiwan. The ROC also governs over 160 smaller, outlying islands, including the Penghu Islands, the Kinmen Islands, the Matsu Islands, and several features in the South China Sea.
Of these, the Kinmen and Matsu island groups are just a stone’s throw from China. Kinmen Island (from which the larger group gets its name) is just 6 kilometers from the major city of Xiamen, in China’s Fujian province, but roughly 190 km away from Taiwan Island. In fact, under Taiwan’s governance structure, both Kinmen and Matsu are technically part of Fujian province (spelled “Fuchien” by the ROC in English) – a holdover from the days when the ROC governed the mainland.
Given the geographic proximity, connections between Kinmen and mainland are greater than between Taiwan Island and China. A regular ferry runs between Kinmen and Xiamen, and Kinmen receives some of its water and electricity from the mainland. Chinese President Xi Jinping has proposed expanding such links between the two, including constructing a bridge linking Xiamen and Kinmen.
Close proximity, however, can also be a breeding ground for conflict. Recent tensions in the waters around Kinmen are creating a new potential flashpoint in the already-complex security environment of the Taiwan Strait.
On February 14, a confrontation between a Taiwanese coast guard vessel and a Chinese speedboat resulted in all four passengers aboard the latter falling into the ocean. Two drowned; two were retrieved from the water by the Taiwanese coast guard and eventually sent back to China.
China immediately condemned Taiwan for the fatal incident. A spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) in Beijing said China “strongly denounced” Taiwan, accusing it of “wicked” and “rough” conduct. The spokesperson warned that the incident was “absolutely not an isolated case,” alleging consistently “brutal treatment of mainland fishermen” since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power.
China pledged it would “never allow such this type of incident to happen again.”
China matched words with actions when the Fujian Coast Guard announced it would “strengthen its maritime law enforcement capabilities” and “launch regular patrol operations” in the waters near Xiamen and Kinmen. To that end, the TAO also emphasized that China does not recognize Taiwan’s designation of “prohibited” or “restricted” waters around Kinmen, saying such off-limit zones “absolutely do not exist.”
Taiwanese media noted that broader patrol efforts indeed went into effect soon afterward, reporting that China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels were “navigating in waters to the east, southeast, and south of the main island of Kinmen.” On February 19, a CCG vessel even boarded a Taiwanese tourist boat. The Chinese officers spent half an hour on board, demanding to see the boat’s route plan as well as operating license, before departing.
Taiwan’s government said the boarding “created panic among the people, and was not in the interest of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait,” but stressed that it wanted to resolve the issues of maritime law enforcement peacefully.
“We hope that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will adopt a rational, reciprocal, and cooperative approach to maintain the security of the waters between Kinmen and Xiamen,” Premier Chen Chien-jen said.
On February 20, Taiwan said its coast guard had driven off a CCG boat that entered prohibited waters near Kinmen, using radio warnings.
As China steps up its patrols in the region, Taiwanese experts fear the CCG will look to contest or outright block Taiwan’s ability to conduct maritime law enforcement operations near Kinmen. We could see access denial operations similar to China’s consistent attempts to block the Philippines from reaching disputed features in the South China Sea. And if Taiwan loses de facto maritime jurisdiction around Kinmen, that could be a stepping stone to China attempting to wrest control of the island group away from Taipei altogether.
While talk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan – generally meaning Taiwan Island – has reached a fever pitch lately, most analysts think that catastrophe remains thankfully far-fetched. But the possibility of China testing the waters by attempting to seize control of the outlying islands, starting with Kinmen, is much greater.
China has long viewed Kinmen as a stepping stone to taking control of Taiwan proper. Kinmen (also known as Quemoy, a term more commonly used in historical documents) was the center of the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises in 1954-55 and 1958, respectively. In both cases, it was largely U.S. intervention – including the signing of a Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC in 1954 – that prevented China from a full-on invasion attempt. After the intense shellings of these two crises, China bombarded Kinmen intermittently from 1958 all the way until 1979, although the shelling was mostly pro forma and did little actual damage.
Today, China seems more intent on winning “hearts and minds” in Kinmen than dropping artillery shells on the island group. Building on Xi’s push to expand links between Xiamen and Kinmen, in September 2023 Beijing announced plans for a “integrated development demonstration zone” in Fujian to entice more cross-strait travel and investment. Given the proximity between the two, and the existing links, Kinmen is supposed to be the major beneficiary of the policy, which promises to treat Kinmen residents (numbering under 130,000) the same as locals from Fujian.
Coming at a time when Beijing has severed ties with Taiwan’s central government, led by the DPP, the pledge to increase links with Kinmen is viewed as an attempt to drive a wedge between Taipei and the outlying islands. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council dismissed Beijing’s development plan as “one-sided wishful thinking to try and seduce our members of the public and enterprises to the mainland and integrate into their system, laws, and norms and accept the leadership of the Communist Party.”
Now that economic “carrot” is, in line with China’s typical playbook, being accompanied by a “stick”: beefed up patrols that attempt to prove China has maritime jurisdiction over the waters surrounding Kinmen. China is already squeezing Taiwan’s ability to respond to maritime and aerial incursions within the Taiwan Strait, but don’t sleep on developments in the Xiamen Bay.