Weiting Chen

In March 2014, the Kuomintang or KMT – then in control of both Taiwan’s presidency and the legislature – attempted to force through a controversial trade pact with China, the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA). The move drew outrage from civil society over concerns that the deal was opaque and would grant China too much influence over Taiwan’s economy.

On March 18, days before the KMT planned to put the bill to a final vote, student groups occupied the Legislative Yuan to show their anger over the CSSTA. It soon became clear that the students were not alone – public opinion wanted to put the brakes on then-President Ma Ying-jeou’s attempts to draw Taiwan closer to China. Hundreds of thousands turned out to show their support for the students in a rally on March 30. The occupation and related rallies now had a name: The Sunflower Movement.

It became a turning point in Taiwan’s politics. Not only was the CSSTA scrapped, but the KMT suffered major losses in the next election in 2016. It has not been able to win the presidency since, most recently losing in the 2024 polls. Meanwhile, the Sunflower Movement became a breeding ground for political talent for pan-Green parties.

Weiting Chen was one of the student leaders of the Sunflower Movement. In this interview, Chen, now a geopolitical analyst, discusses the factors that helped the Sunflower protesters succeed, and how the movement continues to reverberate in Taiwan’s politics today.

What were the major concerns that drove the occupation of the Legislative Yuan in 2014? Was it concern over China’s influence, Taiwan’s sovereignty, the “black box” nature of the bill, or all of the above?

All of the above. Before the occupation movement began in March 2014, civic groups and various industry-related organizations had already started protesting against the content of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) when it was signed in June 2013. These protests included sectors like telecommunications, publishing, advertising, media, and healthcare, all raising concerns that the trade deal could threaten Taiwan's national security or impact Taiwanese workers adversely. Therefore, those fundamentally opposed to the trade agreement formed the core of the movement.

After the occupation movement started in March 2014, more people began to pay attention to this issue. These individuals were not necessarily opposed to the trade agreement in its entirety but quickly became aware of the government's lack of transparency (the “black box” issue) in negotiating and reviewing the agreement. They believed the government had failed to conduct proper impact assessments, hence supporting the need for stronger supervisory mechanisms to scrutinize the CSSTA.

However, whether it was groups opposed to the CSSTA itself or those against the “black box” process, a common bottom line was the desire to prevent an increase in Chinese influence in Taiwan through the CSSTA, which could undermine Taiwan's sovereignty.

How did the Sunflower Movement fit into the longer tradition of student-led protests in Taiwan, including the Wild Lily Movement (1990) and the Wild Strawberries Movement (2008)? What lessons did the Sunflower protesters take from previous protests?

The core objectives of the Wild Lily Movement, the Wild Strawberries Movement, and the Sunflower Movement align in their shared aspiration to strengthen democracy in Taiwan. The Sunflower Movement, in fact, was not solely a “student-led movement” but a collaborative effort across generations, joining forces with those involved in the Wild Lily and Wild Strawberries Movements. Many leaders from the Wild Lily Movement represented various NGOs during the Sunflower Movement, actively participating in its strategic decisions.

Unlike the previous two movements, which were confined to occupying the plaza of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, the years leading up to the Sunflower Movement saw Taiwanese social movements escalate to the point of preparing to occupy government departments. Therefore, by the time of the Sunflower Movement, activist groups were ready to occupy government sectors as a means to exert pressure on the government when necessary.

Furthermore, during the Wild Strawberries Movement, a decentralized decision-making approach was adopted, allowing all participants on the ground to be involved in the decision-making process. However, this led to inefficiencies in decision-making. Consequently, the Sunflower Movement saw a return to a more centralized approach, where decisions were primarily made by the initiating groups.

This shift aimed at more efficient decision-making, despite criticisms regarding the movement's lack of openness in its decision-making processes.

The Sunflower Movement had a particularly strong impact on Taiwanese youth at the time, cementing political awareness and interest in a wide number of young people. Are we still seeing the impact of the movement on Taiwan’s political class today?

For those who were in their 20s and 30s at the time of the Sunflower Movement, now in their 30s and 40s, the impact on their political identity appears to be lasting. Since 2014, the Kuomintang (KMT) has struggled to gain meaningful support among this demographic. These voters also show greater concern for the government's approach to handling policies related to China.

However, for the younger voters, around 20 years old now, who were in high school during the Sunflower Movement, the event may not have left a deep impression. Most of their adult life has been under the governance of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and despite the increasing threats from China, the Taiwanese government has not engaged in actions that could potentially harm Taiwan's sovereignty as might have been the case during the KMT's rule from 2008 to 2016. Therefore, this group may have a lower sense of urgency regarding Taiwan's sovereignty issues and instead focus more on domestic policies. For them, the Sunflower Movement might not be a particularly influential political event.

The new parties formed in the aftermath of the Sunflower Movement have lost their initial momentum, with the New Power Party failing to win seats in the 2024 election for the first time since it began competing in legislative elections. What went wrong for these “third forces”?

After the Sunflower Movement, the political parties that emerged primarily drew supporters due to their emphasis on strengthening Taiwan’s sovereignty and their more assertive approach to progressive issues compared to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), including labor rights, LGBTQ+ rights, and environmental policies. However, two main factors have structurally limited these smaller parties:

First, post-2014, the DPP shifted toward a more progressive stance, narrowing the gap between itself and the Third Force parties. With Tsai Ing-wen’s government since 2016, the administration has integrated leaders from past social movements into official roles, driving reforms to meet the demands of civil society.

The New Power Party (NPP) has been crucial in overseeing the DPP on various progressive issues, gaining the support of younger voters in the process. Notable achievements include working with progressive DPP legislators to pass the same-sex marriage bill in 2017 despite resistance from some conservative DPP members, and collaborating with labor unions to protest against amendments to labor laws proposed by the DPP in 2017, which garnered significant backing. The NPP also kept a watchful eye on the DPP’s development policies from an environmental protection perspective. However, aside from a few national social movements, voters have seen little difference between the NPP and the DPP on progressive issues.

Second, increased pressure from China has made sovereignty issues a priority for both DPP and NPP voters, leading to a united front in support of the DPP to prevent pro-China parties from coming to power. There is a considerable overlap in the supporter base of the NPP and the DPP, with most NPP supporters casting their presidential votes for the DPP. These voters not only prioritize strengthening Taiwan's sovereignty but also expect the NPP to monitor domestic issues in the legislature.

Nonetheless, since 2016, the escalating pressure from China has amplified the sense of urgency among these supporters, prompting them to downplay internal differences and rally behind the DPP to maximize its parliamentary presence. The NPP's criticism of the DPP’s domestic policies has been criticized as “divisive” and potentially beneficial to pro-China parties, thereby limiting the NPP’s influence.

In light of these structural factors, the NPP has been embroiled in an ongoing internal debate about whether to forge a closer collaboration with the DPP or to maintain a distance and possibly ally with parties that place less emphasis on sovereignty issues, such as the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). This dilemma has resulted in numerous members leaving the party, significantly diminishing its strength.

Given the mass movement in opposition to the CSSTA, were you surprised to see calls for the deal’s resurrection during the 2024 presidential campaign?

Yes. However, the opposition in Taiwanese society to the CSSTA was still quite strong. After the TPP allegedly advocated for reopening negotiations on the CSSTA, [TPP presidential candidate] Ko Wen-je saw a significant drop in his approval ratings. Consequently, Ko quickly shifted his stance, no longer vehemently advocating for the reopening of the CSSTA discussions. The KMT, despite its strong support for the CSSTA, also failed to resonate with younger voters.

A decade has passed, and given China's current economic state and the increased military threats to Taiwan, signing the CSSTA would only lead to greater peril. I remain confident that if the risks associated with the agreement were thoroughly discussed, the majority of Taiwanese voters would still oppose this agreement.