Darcie Draudt-Véjares

South Korea held its legislative elections on April 10. It was the last chance for President Yoon Suk-yeol to secure a legislative majority that could make progress on his agenda. The opposition Democratic Party (DP) had won in a landslide in the 2020 polls; Yoon and his People Power Power (PPP) were hoping to avoid a repeat of that defeat.

Those hopes were roundly dashed, as the DP actually expanded on its majority instead.

Many saw the results as a direct referendum on Yoon, although the president wasn’t on the ballot (and won’t be again, as South Korean presidents cannot run for re-election). The result effectively leaves Yoon a lame duck – except in the realm of foreign policy, where South Korea’s presidential system gives the executive branch near total control.

In this interview, Darcie Draudt-Véjares, a fellow for Korean studies in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, discusses the election results and the impact on the Yoon administration’s policy choices moving forward. Ultimately, she says, “Voter choices were largely driven by everyday economic issues… and the more interventionist policies to address these tend to align with the progressive platform.”

The Democratic Party won in a landslide, besting its record majority from the last election. What issues were driving voting choices this year? Was the legislative election a referendum on President Yoon?

Certainly, President Yoon has dismal approval ratings. Because of the association of party performance with public views of the president, the election does in some way reflect assessment of his tenure to date. But Yoon’s performance and policy positions alone cannot explain the public’s favoring the DP.

Voter choices were largely driven by everyday economic issues such as youth unemployment, housing shortages, and the high cost of real estate, education, and healthcare – and the more interventionist policies to address these tend to align with the progressive platform.

On these issues of inequality, Yoon’s public gaffes, such as the internationally ridiculed “spring onion” incident, made many citizens feel that Yoon was out of touch with the common economic struggles of faced by the Korean majority.

What does the DP’s retention of its legislative majority mean for the rest of Yoon’s presidency? Will he be able to pursue any of his agenda items?

As mentioned above, the DP majority shows the public favors more economic and welfare reforms typically associated with progressive policy priorities. However, it is also true that the Korean political system largely favors the executive, and the legislature has several practical and legal limits on overturning policies and initiatives introduced by the executive or under the purview of the ministries. Despite changing National Assembly procedures in 2012 to give the legislature greater authority to review executive policies, the empirical record shows that the executive and relevant ministries drive agenda-setting and implementation, particularly in the realm of foreign policy and defense domains.

On that note, will the setback for the PPP force Yoon to rethink some of his policies – especially the controversial partnership with Japan? What would the implications be for the Japan-South Korea-U.S. trilateral?

Given the momentum he’s gained particularly with the United States and Japan vis-à-vis trilateral cooperation and outreach to Europe, NATO, and the G-7, Yoon will still be able to pursue the general contours of his Global Pivotal State strategy. That said, diplomatic overtures toward Japan can swiftly cause public backlash. As the trilateral seeks greater military coordination – such as trilateral aerial escort flights last year – opposition at home could stymie further efforts to enhance joint military exercises among the three.

Some DP politicians have been critical of Yoon’s harder line on China policy. Will Yoon be able to get legislative buy-in for some of his China-focused foreign policy priorities, including joining U.S.-led efforts at “de-risking”?

Given the limits of legislative influence on foreign policy, Yoon will still be able to pursue defense and diplomatic initiatives as planned. But, there are important areas where the National Assembly does play a central role, particularly in the domain of treaties, which need legislative approval. Any new trade deals associated with the U.S.-led effort to de-risk supply chains will need legislative buy-in, and the specter of a harder China policy may mar any debate.

Based on the big win for the DP, do you think Lee Jae-myung is now a lock to be the party’s presidential candidate in 2027? What would a Lee presidency mean for Korean foreign policy going forward?

Plainly put, it is way too early to predict the progressive candidate for the 2027 presidential election. While many now presume Lee Jae-myung as already the presumptive nominee, he’s not free from public scandal, and both the DP and PPP are undergoing internal politics and will certainly undergo reshuffling in the next three years.

What can be said is that internal and external factors may reshape the standard progressive North Korea-first policy. Domestically, polarization and public aggravation with standard political leadership regardless of party will make any president at risk for policy-related flashpoints. Internationally, North Korea’s constitutional revision, Sino-U.S. rivalry, and concern over American politics regarding global alliances also narrow the parameters for ideological differences on foreign policy.