The China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Triangle

The intricate nexus between China, Pakistan, and Taliban-led Afghanistan has garnered considerable attention as these actors maneuver through a complex web of security concerns, diverging interests, and geopolitical pressures. From a security standpoint, both China and Pakistan view Afghanistan as a critical security buffer against the proliferation of threats and extremist activities into their respective territories. As a result, they have identified the Taliban, who have consolidated power and control in most parts of Afghanistan, as the best bet for safeguarding their interests.

The Taliban, however, have not been delivering well on their promise to combat terror groups, and their overtures to expand ties with other regional actors signify a desire to counterbalance Beijing’s and Islamabad’s influence. While each party seeks to advance its own agenda, the dynamics of this trilateral relationship will shape the future trajectory of Afghanistan and its broader implications for regional stability and prosperity.

Overall, China’s proactive engagement with the Taliban is occurring alongside Pakistan’s growing disillusionment with the Taliban, impacting the prospects for trilateral cooperation.

China: A Pragmatic Friend

Since the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021, Beijing has been the first mover in many aspects in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and political alignment: the first to provide humanitarian aid, the first to ink large investment deals, the first to appoint a new ambassador to Kabul, and the first to formally accept a Taliban ambassador.

China has indeed positioned itself as a valuable partner to the Taliban, one that is willing to aid the war-torn country’s development and a credible source to help the regime to attain international and political legitimacy. Diplomatically, Beijing has been acting like an interlocutor, watching out for the Taliban on international platforms, urging the easing of sanctions and asset freezes, and leveraging its veto power at the United Nations Security Council in benefit of the Taliban-led administration. 

In late January 2024, when Chinese President Xi Jinping accepted the credentials of Bilal Karimi, a former Taliban spokesperson, as Afghanistan’s envoy to China in a formal ceremony, many observers interpreted it as Beijing’s de facto formal recognition of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. This was quickly undermined by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose spokesperson claimed the ceremony was a routine affair. 

The ministry also reminded the world that China harbors the same expectations as the international community that the Taliban regime must form an inclusive administration with non-Taliban and non-Pashtun factions and fight terrorism before formal recognition can be considered.

China’s proactive engagement with the Taliban regime stems from its prophylactic strategic interest to insulate its territory from militant Islamic influences and separatist movements. To achieve this end, Beijing primarily uses economic incentives – a mix of humanitarian aid, development projects, disaster relief, trade, investments, and education scholarships – to entice the Taliban into cooperating in the fight against extremism and separatist movements. 

Mainly, Beijing hopes the Taliban can control Uyghur militants, particularly those that belong to the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), formerly known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). While the numbers and traction of the movement are widely disputed – to the extent that the United States removed ETIM from its list of terrorist organizations in 2020 – China still views the group as a major threat to its internal security. Driven by the imperative to reinforce domestic stability and cement the Communist Party’s rule in Xinjiang, the oft-quoted “three evils” – terrorism, extremism, separatism – continue to guide Chinese foreign policy directions in the region.

Despite repeated calls from Beijing and the international community, the Taliban have not modified the composition of their government. Assurances from the Taliban that they would not allow other forces to use Afghanistan’s territory to sabotage China’s interests were undercut by reports of the Taliban simply relocating Uyghur militants away from the shared border areas with China but otherwise allowing such militant activity to continue.

Still, positive stories and interviews lauding Chinese aid, investments and infrastructure development in Afghanistan are a common sight on Chinese media and news outlets. On top of its usual method of giving aid to the Taliban through its South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund, the Red Cross Society, local governments, and civil society, China has also contributed additional funding for the international World Food Program to support operations amid a funding shortage. 

Despite reports highlighting substantial Chinese investments and talk of linking Afghanistan into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Silk Road Economic Belt, tangible progress remains limited. Major economic deals like the 25-year contract with Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Co (CAPEIC) for oil extraction from the Amu Darya basin have boasted a huge dollar value of $540 million and the creation of jobs, but the promised projects and deals remain largely at exploratory stages, facing delays and challenges in implementation. 

The initial rush of opportunistic businessmen and investors from China has dwindled due to compounding security risks. The uptick in militant violence targeting Chinese interests within Afghanistan and Pakistan is prompting a realistic re-evaluation of risk exposure vis-a-vis economic prospects. The attack on a Chinese-run hotel in Kabul in December 2022 also saw the ramping up of anti-China propaganda by the Islamic State, posing a new direct threat to Beijing. 

That said, smaller-scale projects and trade have been moving along. Since July 2022, China has granted 98 percent of Afghan goods a zero-tariff treatment. The “Pine Nuts Air Corridor” was probably the most successful example thus far; it saw Afghan exports of pine nuts and the reinstitution of flights between China and Afghanistan. This highlights that China is still wary and risk-averse when it comes to large-scale investments; some agreements may have been simply inked as symbolic, performative acts to enhance relations with the Taliban without risking too much money. 

Acquiring resources from Afghanistan is also on Beijing’s agenda, as reliable access to precious metals and energy can substantially boost Chinese economy. However, this is a long-term, elusive goal, which will be determined by the evolution of the Afghan security environment. Presently, the narrative grandeur of the Silk Road revival, inviting the Taliban to the Belt and Road Forum, and talks of CPEC all serve the positive image of Beijing helping its neighbor while still giving major Chinese firms the opportunity to procure exploratory rights to Afghan resource deposits without concrete development plans.

Deteriorating Pakistan-Taliban Relations

Like China, Pakistan views Afghanistan as a security buffer. However, the initial tone of optimism by the Pakistani authorities at the Taliban triumph in August 2021 has gradually changed to disappointment. Pakistan feels let down by the Taliban regime’s lack of commitment to curb cross-border terrorism despite its repeated requests. 

According to the latest Global Terrorism Index, Pakistan suffered 490 terror attacks in 2023, the highest in the world and a 34 percent increase from previous year. Nearly 1,000 Pakistani security forces and civilians were killed in 2023 alone due to militant violence. Northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and southwestern Balochistan provinces bordering Afghanistan have accounted for over 90 percent of both the attacks and the casualties.

The twist is that while Pakistan has been experiencing a surge in terrorism since the Taliban’s return to power, Afghanistan’s security situation has improved drastically. Total terror incidents dropped by 71 percent in 2023 compared to 2022. This is why Pakistan’s special envoy for Afghanistan, Asif Durrani, made the scathing remark that “peace in Afghanistan, in fact, has become a nightmare for Pakistan.” 

Despite its historical support for the Afghan Taliban, the escalation of terrorist attacks has greatly frustrated the Pakistani establishment. Islamabad often alleges that Afghan fighters linked to the Taliban have facilitated and assisted in Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)-led attacks on Pakistan and criticizes the Taliban for providing support and shelter to anti-state groups. 

Previous thinking about the Afghan Taliban and the TTP as distinct movements are dissipating with newer ideas suggesting that the TTP is an extension and proxy of the Afghan Taliban, directed to undermine Pakistan. The increased threat perception propelled Islamabad to exert pressure on the Taliban by revoking its advocacy for the regime at the international level, halting trade incentives, periodically closing border crossing points, and forcing the repatriation of Afghan refugees. 

Tensions escalated to a high point in March 2024, when Pakistan launched airstrikes targeting supposed TTP hideouts in Afghanistan in retaliation for a suicide attack on a military checkpoint in Waziristan district. The last time Pakistan conducted such airstrikes across the border was in April 2022.

In response, the Taliban have consistently denied these charges and tried to get rid of its stigma of being a “militant haven.” Despite the pressure tactics by Islamabad, the regime in Kabul has not sought an offensive retaliation and it has largely contained itself to publicizing discontent over the expulsion of refugees as “un-Islamic.” Outright confrontation and armed conflict with Pakistan are certainly undesirable in the Taliban’s calculus, as their government is bogged down with myriad problems from a struggling economy, to fighting the Islamic State, and wrestling with its own internal divisions.

Previously the Taliban had sought to rein in the TTP by facilitating ceasefire talks with Pakistani, relocating some fighters away from the border areas to remote Afghan provinces, and issuing a decree banning fighters from leading cross-border attacks from Afghanistan. However, since the TTP canceled the months-long ceasefire with Islamabad in November 2022, it has continued to launch attacks on Pakistani soil.

It remains a genuine question of how much control and influence the Taliban currently holds over the TTP. The shared ethnic and ideological affinity between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP, compounded with historical support and expectations of reciprocity, make it hard for the former to fully abandon the latter. 

Beyond the TTP, Pakistan also faces increased threats from the Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). These groups have been emboldened by the Taliban victory to continue their cause and capitalize on the ongoing instability within Pakistan. 

Notably, though the TJP only emerged in early 2023, they are believed to be affiliated with the TTP and have already claimed responsibility for carrying out the deadliest militant attack on the Pakistani military: In December 2023, at least 23 soldiers were killed when the TJP assaulted an army base in northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Another noteworthy point is how the Taliban appear to be applying the same tactic to allay Pakistani and Chinese concerns about militant groups – by relocating militants away from shared borders, aiding them to build new lives as civilians, and dismantling their group command. Interviews with Taliban officials by the International Crisis Group revealed that the regime believes militants who pose no transnational threats can transit into civilian lives. They also complain that these relocation efforts have huge financial costs, which the Pakistani government has not provided any assistance with. 

This naturally causes a growing gap between the direct conclusive actions desired by Beijing and Islamabad and the Taliban regime’s rehabilitation-oriented attitude toward counterterrorism. It will be difficult to bridge this division and build a common approach on counterterrorism given the familial ties and historical support between the Taliban and many of these groups. 

Dim Prospects for Trilateral Cooperation

China has been relatively silent on recent Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions, although Beijing has become a victim of the deteriorating relations between Kabul and Islamabad. Many militant attacks have targeted Chinese nationals and projects in areas near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Beijing is equally frustrated with the Taliban and Pakistan for their respective failures to contain terrorist groups and curb attacks on Chinese nationals. While the silence could be perceived as Beijing’s usual policy of non-interference, it leads one to question the efficacy of China as an effective mediator between the two parties. 

Since 2017, Beijing has played the role of facilitator between Afghanistan and Pakistan mainly through the mechanism of the trilateral foreign ministerial dialogue. The dialogue, which saw the participation of the Taliban administration for the first time in May 2023, initially fostered a positive climate for trilateral cooperation. 

Sadly, the momentum has since dissipated due to the deteriorating relations between Pakistan and the Taliban. The viability and future of the trilateral dialogue is now in limbo. So far, the dialogue stands as the only minilateral platform for Beijing to exert influence and lead direct communication between Pakistan and the Taliban. As such, China may be interested in keeping the format afloat.

But in the short term, the prospects for trilateral cooperation appear bleak due to the prevailing security threats. Following the news of China and Pakistan agreeing to extend elements of the $60 billion CPEC into Afghanistan in May 2023, discussions around CPEC in Kabul have yet to materialize into substantial infrastructure investments or realized loans. The presence of the TTP and other militant groups in the border areas of Afghanistan-Pakistan presents the largest security impediment to the expansion of CPEC. 

Meaningful trilateral cooperation between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan hinges largely on the Taliban’s willingness to crack down on militancy and foster better bilateral relations with Pakistan. A decisive, strong Taliban administration with a firm grip on Afghanistan and committed to counterterrorism is what both China and Pakistan want.

Despite the heightened security risks, China remains committed to its nuanced diplomacy. Beijing will sustain dialogue with the Taliban and Pakistan to maintain a stake in the evolving affairs. More investments and economic opportunities will be provided once tangible security guarantees from the Taliban are secured. Until then, the extension of CPEC into Afghanistan remains an elusive aspiration for all three parties.

Other Players in the Mix

Other regional players like India, Turkey, Russia, and Iran are also recognizing the importance of engaging the Taliban and making their moves into Afghanistan by reopening their diplomatic missions in Kabul. Eager to make friends, cognizant of its overdependence on China and Pakistan, and sharing the common goal of fighting the Islamic State, the Taliban are actively engaging these foreign parties and exploring alternate economic opportunities.

This was most clearly seen on January 29, 2024, when the Taliban hosted its first international meeting titled the “Regional Cooperation Initiative,” with 11 countries sending representatives to discuss regional security and economic cooperation. 

Furthermore, the Taliban’s recent building of relations with India and Iran poses challenges to China and Pakistan. In February 2024, the Taliban interim government announced its intention to invest $35 million into projects in Iran’s Chabahar port and the Chabahar Free Economic Zone. This investment, coming against the backdrop of dismal domestic economic conditions, is rather surprising but does show the Taliban’s desire to diversify partners. 

Two weeks later, New Delhi similarly proposed expanding political and economic cooperation and enhancing trade between the two countries using Chabahar port. If given access to the port, Afghanistan’s reliance on Pakistan and China as trade partners would be significantly reduced. 

Presumably to score goodwill with India and points from the larger international community, the Taliban have also recently espoused their commitment to protect the rights of minority Afghan Hindus and Sikhs and kickstarted the restoration of property rights for affected members of these communities who were deprived of their homes in previous decades.

Conditions in Afghanistan are dire, with soaring unemployment and an estimated 23.7 million people requiring humanitarian assistance in 2024. Sanctions continue to undermine private investment and business opportunities. In the face of a spiraling economy and fears of being ousted again, the Taliban administration will probably prioritize relations with countries that can offer the best economic incentives to revive the Afghan economy and progress on formal diplomatic recognition of its regime as the legitimate government.