Japan’s Enhanced Security Engagement With the Pacific Islands

In July 2024, the 10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) will be held in Tokyo. The PALM summits have been bringing together Japan and the Pacific Island countries (PICs) on a triennial basis since 1997. On this occasion, Japan might propose a security cooperation agreement to the countries of the region. Indeed, the expansion of security and defense cooperation stands as the most spectacular change in Japan’s contribution to the region in recent years.

The Pacific territories hold significant wealth in fishery resources and raw materials, including critical minerals. Their sea lanes are crucial for Tokyo’s energy supplies, and their strategic geographical location is vital amid China-U.S. rivalry. Additionally, these territories play a key role in realizing Japan’s vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. These factors underscore Japan's strong interests in the region and explain the rise in strategic engagement.

As a major provider of Official Development Assistance (ODA), Tokyo has developed innovative tools to help strengthen the maritime surveillance capabilities of the PICs, and more broadly, their resilience to climatic and geopolitical risks. From its low-profile beginning, focusing on non-traditional challenges and led by civilian actors, security cooperation has grown to be more visible, with the increased participation of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and in cooperation with like-minded partners such as United States and Australia. As a result, Tokyo has positioned itself as a security provider in the Pacific Islands, developing a multifaceted and integrated approach.

From Low-Profile Security Cooperation…

Tokyo began providing aid to the Pacific islands in the 1970s, when the establishment of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) was under discussion and Tokyo wanted to ensure access for its fishing vessels. Today Japan is the region’s third-largest donor, behind Australia and New Zealand.

In 1997, nine years before China, and at a time when the United States and other major donors were disengaging from the area, Tokyo set up a triennial high-level forum to meet its Pacific partners. The PALM summit initiated a multilateral political dialogue, initially bringing together 16 countries in the region, and accompanied the expansion of Japanese aid.

Japan’s security cooperation has therefore primarily involved development aid and has focused on strengthening the maritime surveillance and policing capacities of Micronesian states, which are historically and geographically closer to Japan. It has been mostly implemented by civilian actors: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), which trains their Micronesian counterparts; and also a private actor, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF), which set up in 2009 an “International Committee for the Establishment of a Maritime Safety System in Micronesia.” This mechanism has offered seminars on the law of the sea and, since 2011, has provided small patrol boats to the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Marshall Islands, and Palau.

By operating in this manner, Tokyo could meet the expectations of Pacific states seeking assistance in monitoring their EEZs and combating illegal fishing. At the same time, Japan could act with discretion to secure approval from both Canberra and Washington, who were previously the sole providers of patrol boats for the PICs.

Security cooperation has gradually evolved to include Japan’s Ministry of Defense, which launched its own capacity-building program in 2012. Initially, these activities were quite low profile and fell within the scope of defense diplomacy and soft power. For example, since 2015, the Ground Self-Defense Force has been training the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Defense Forces’ military band.

In 2018, Pacific Island countries were incorporated into Japan's vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and the PALM summits took on a greater strategic dimension. Since then, and in addition to sustainable development, which has always been a top priority for Pacific Islanders, the PALM summits’ final declaration has made references to the security situation in East Asia, the preservation of the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and the need to enforce United Nations’ sanctions against North Korea.

The same year, the PICs were mentioned for the first time in Japan’s annual Defense of Japan report and longer-term National Defense Program Guidelines, which noted: “With island nations of the Pacific Ocean, Japan will promote port and airport visits by SDF as well as exchanges and cooperation that utilize capabilities and characteristics of each service of SDF.”

In keeping with that goal, the 2021 edition of the SDF’s annual Indo-Pacific deployment (IPD) saw the maritime destroyer JS Murasame make stopovers in Papua New Guinea, Palau (where it delivered 75 judo outfits), and Vanuatu (where it conducted a passing exercise).

...to Full-Fledged Security and Defense Engagement Amid China’s Advances

The first Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD), held in September 2021, sent a clear signal of Tokyo’s determination to step up its game in this area. It brought together, in virtual format due to the pandemic, defense officials and representatives from 13 Pacific Island countries, as well as Australia, New Zealand, France, the United States, and Canada, to promote port calls and exercises with the SDF in maritime security and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (HADR). It was the first-ever multilateral defense ministerial hosted by Japan and took more than five years to come to fruition.

The growing Chinese presence in the Pacific Islands region and its deleterious side effects provided an important backdrop to this initiative. Expensive loans were granted by Beijing within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), sometimes resulting in heavy debts for countries that could compromise sovereignty. Among the PICs, Chinese loans account for 55 percent of Tonga’s total external debt and almost half of Vanuatu’s debt.

The extent of China’s ambitions in the region was highlighted with two trips by President Xi Jinping in 2014 and 2018. The region’s political importance is linked to Taiwan, a core security interest for Beijing. Only 12 nations in the world still recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state, with three located in the South Pacific (the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Tuvalu). Beijing has persistently pressured Taipei’s allies, leading the Solomon Islands and Kiribati to switch recognition to China in 2019; Nauru followed suit in February 2024.

The revelation, in March 2022, of a confidential security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands, which could possibly allow the stationing of Chinese naval vessels, came as a shock to Australia and the wider Western world. In June 2022, Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited seven Pacific countries and presented a five-year cooperation plan, including the domains of security, policy, and defense, which was ultimately rejected by the countries of the Pacific Islands Forum. These moves raised alarms and prompted reactions from the United States, Australia, and other like-minded countries.

The expansion of Japan’s defense cooperation reflects the 2022 surge of activities related to defense diplomacy with the Pacific that reacted to China’s visible advance to the region. During the 2022 edition of the IPD, the largest vessel in the Japanese fleet, the aircraft carrier Izumo, called on Australia, Fiji, New Caledonia, Palau, PNG, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu. The strategic signal was clear: Japan is reinvesting in the area, including at the military level, echoing China’s moves.

Beyond the China factor, the integration of the climate factor into Japan’s security and defense strategy was a major development with direct implications for its cooperation with the Pacific states. The first “Climate Change Response Strategy” published in 2022 by the Japanese Ministry of Defense identified the climate vulnerability of Pacific Island countries as an aggravating factor in internal and interstate tensions, and a vector of destabilization that could lead to an expansion of China’s influence in the area. One of its priorities is therefore to build capacity and share expertise with these countries in order to improve their resilience.

Japan could build upon its previous contribution in 2018 to fund the Pacific Climate Change Center (PCCC), a regional research center located in Samoa focusing on the impacts of climate change. Japan also positioned itself as a HADR operation contributor: In February 2022, Japan was the third fastest country to dispatch its armed forces to bring humanitarian assistance to Tonga after a violent underwater volcano caused a tsunami that immensely damaged the country. Japan is also helping to build the capacity of PNG for the maintenance of heavy engineering equipment, which plays an important role in disaster relief operations.

An Integrated, Inter-Agency Approach

At the ninth PALM summit in 2021, Tokyo set up an “Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Promotion of Cooperation with PICs” to strengthen inter-agency coordination and the coherence of Japanese actions. In particular, “the preservation of a free, open, sustainable and law-based maritime order” was identified as a priority objective. The maritime cooperation model Japan has applied to Southeast Asia since the 2000s is being extended to the Pacific; new players and tools are being mobilized, and practices are being integrated.

In 2023, one of the Japanese Coast Guard’s Mobile Cooperation Teams (MCTs) was assigned to Pacific Island nations. By maintaining daily contact with aid recipient countries, the MCTs strengthen their understanding of local issues, and help train and equip these countries’ maritime police, thereby building trusting relationships.

In June 2023, the MCTs took part in the first cooperation action for the benefit of Kiribati’s maritime law enforcement agencies, and engaged in security-focused trainings in the Marshall Islands and FSM in early 2024.

The MCTs were originally set up in 2017 to train and equip Southeast Asian coast guards to cope with Chinese expansion. Japan is thus clearly linking the risks posed by China’s maritime expansion in the South China Sea to the Pacific Islands theater and seeking to strengthen cooperation between ASEAN and PICs, as highlighted by Defense Minister Kihara Minoru at the second JPIDD in March 2024. He recalled that in August 2023, Japan involved PICs for the first time in its “Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program” aboard the JS Izumo, near Australian waters.

Another innovative tool is Official Security Assistance (OSA) introduced by the 2022 National Security Strategy. Piloted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this program is designed to strengthen the resilience of the armed forces of friendly countries, while supporting Japan’s defense industry, since it often involves the sale of military equipment on credit. The initial priority recipient nations were the Philippines, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Fiji.

In the case of Fiji, Japan’s OSA works in tandem with Australia’s capacity-building program: The Fiji navy received Japanese patrol boats and small rescue boats (worth $2.7 million) for use in training exercises conducted by the Australian army.

The initial OSA budget of $14 million will increase to $34 million by the end of 2024, and the program will be extended to other countries, including PNG.

Japan’s integrated approach requires closer coordination between the various institutional players: the SDF and JCG are working together with increasing frequency, as in the Marshall Islands in May 2024 by equipping and training the local coast guards. Similarly, implementation of OSA requires close coordination between the National Security Secretariat, which sets strategic priorities; the Ministry of Defense, which oversees the production and sale of military equipment; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which actually operates the aid program and articulates it with ODA.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications is also involved in cybersecurity capacity building activities, a domain in which Japan has played a pioneering role in Southeast Asia with the establishment in 2018 of the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Center in Thailand. In February 2024, Japan led its first cybersecurity exercise with five Pacific Island nations (Palau, the FSM, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, and Kiribati, with Fiji and Tonga as observers) and in cooperation with the United States and Australia, with whom it is also working on the region’s digital connectivity. This effort goes hand in hand with Tokyo’s participation to fund and set up undersea cables in the region.

Finally, the Japanese police, along with the SDF, is expanding and diversifying its capacity-building activities in the area, including for local police forces. The National Police Agency is participating to the JPIDD, along with the SDF and the Japan Coast Guard. In January 2024, the Solomon Islands Police Force received training to improve the management of unexploded ordnance from the Pacific War, which still causes casualties. In terms of police cooperation, the Japanese koban system is considered as being a useful model for maintaining law and order in the PICs.

An Integrated Approach, Coordinated With Partners

Coordination with like-minded partners, especially Australia, the region’s leading provider of development and security assistance, is another dimension of Japan’s integrated approach to the Pacific Islands.

The ultimate aim seems to be integrating the efforts of the various partners through minilateral initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Partnership (IPMDA) set up by the Quad, bringing together Japan, India, the United States, and Australia in 2022. The four Quad foreign ministers also signed the guidelines for a “Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the Indo-Pacific” in September 2022. The HADR partnership was implemented for the first time in the wake of the catastrophic landslide in Papua New Guinea in late May 2024.

Japan is a founding member of the Partners in the Blue Pacific, a U.S. initiative also involving Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, and the U.K. to take joint action in the PICs. One of the partnership’s first regional initiatives was the Pacific Cyber Capacity Building and Coordination Conference held in Fiji in October 2023.

Tokyo is also strengthening its cooperation with French forces in the Pacific. Since 2014, the SDF have been a regular participant in the multinational HADR exercises Croix du Sud and Marara led by France in New Caledonia and French Polynesia, respectively. These French territories have been included in the PALM summit since 2021. Japanese participation in the first seminar of the Pacific Coast Guard Network organized by France, the opening of a Japanese consular office in Nouméa, New Caledonia, in January 2023, and the negotiation of a Reciprocal Access Agreement for armed forces, announced in May 2024, are elements that point to stronger ties in the area.

The Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue, which held its second edition in March 2024 in Tokyo, reaffirms Japan’s integrated approach to security cooperation. Japan has shown willingness to coordinate the JPIDD with the PALM summit and the South Pacific Defense Ministers’ Meeting (SPDMM). The SPDMM stands as the sole multilateral forum bringing together defense ministers from the extended South Pacific – Australia, Chile, Fiji, France, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga – to discuss and better coordinate on climate change and its impacts, maritime security, and the training of armed forces for HADR. Japan, along with the United States and United Kingdom, has been an observer country since 2022, and is now applying to become a full-fledged member.

Finally, it should be noted that Japan’s security cooperation is also channeled through multilateral organizations. In May 2023, for example, Tokyo and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) signed a funding agreement worth $6 million to counter maritime crime (illegal fishing as well as drug trafficking) in nine PICs, through the upgrade of maritime law enforcement infrastructure as well as the strengthening of maritime law enforcement and criminal justice institutions. Under the agreement, four inshore patrol crafts will be delivered to the maritime police of Kiribati, Nauru, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu, and X-band radar stations will be installed on land to improve maritime surveillance capability.

Conclusion

Despite the growing strength of Japanese security and defense cooperation in the region, which is now truly multidimensional, several limitations and challenges endure.

Tokyo’s ability to influence the Pacific Islands and in particular to counterbalance China remains to be seen. The people of Oceania are concerned by major geopolitical projects and are careful not to create enemies. Only five out of the 12 Pacific nations (Fiji, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and Papua New Guinea) have openly endorsed the Free and Open Indo-Pacific slogan, which originated with Japan. In contrast to ASEAN, the PICs have demonstrated no intention of developing their own Indo-Pacific strategic framework or integrating the concept into their individual national policies.

The PICs, in all of their official documents, describe climate change as the existential threat to their security and wish to stay away from the geopolitical competition between the United States and China. So while the geostrategic competition with China provides the backdrop of Japan’s growing security cooperation, Tokyo is careful not to frame its activities in this way. Mindful of the sensibilities of PICs that are reluctant to take sides, Tokyo underlines the centrality of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), building up the sovereignty and resilience of the Pacific countries, and defending the rule of law. When working with the PICs, Japan usually refers to a free, open, and stable “sea” rather than “Indo-Pacific” – a more loaded term that has been rejected by China.

It should be also noted that some enduring irritants in the relations may affect Japan’s expanded security cooperation with the Pacific Island countries. In particular, the issue of nuclear waste, especially after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster triggered by the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, remains sensitive. The PICs have consistently voiced their concerns about Japan’s discharge into the ocean of wastewater from the damaged Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, calling for greater transparency and communication from the Japanese authorities. This question will be on the agenda for the upcoming PALM 10 summit.

Finally, the resources that Tokyo can dedicate to the region are limited. Japan’s security efforts must and will focus on the archipelagic state’s immediate environment, where tensions are on the rise. Tokyo must therefore work with its partners as much as possible, and develop long-term bonds of trust with the PICs. The forthcoming arrival at the Japanese National Defense Academy of officer cadets from Fiji, Tonga, and Papua New Guinea should help to achieve this.