China’s Disinformation and US Elections: What to Watch for in Congressional Contests

Russia may be the primary culprit regularly attempting to influence foreign elections, but since 2018 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also stepped into the ring, often with a different set of goals, priorities, leverage points, and tactics. In fact, over the past five years, the CCP has notably increased the use of online information operations, fake accounts, and disinformation (the deliberate spreading of false and misleading content) to target the United States.

With just over one month to go until major U.S. elections, how likely is a People’s Republic of China (PRC)-linked campaign to occur and what forms might it take?

An attempt to influence the presidential race in favor of one candidate or the other seems unlikely for various reasons – including the relatively strong bipartisan consensus on China in Washington and the evident policy continuity between the last two administrations.

Still, based on research and investigations surrounding the 2020 and 2022 midterm U.S. elections, ongoing activity by PRC-linked fake accounts and social media influencers, and recent incidents in Taiwan, Canada, Australia, and Europe – it is almost certain that there will be some attempt made to meddle in the U.S. information environment and influence voters between now and November 5, and possibly in the election aftermath.

What might this look like? First, Beijing-linked accounts have already started to amplify existing political polarization, sow distrust in U.S. democracy, and attempt to influence policy debate on China-related issues.

Second, when it comes to electoral politics, a review of recent academic research, news reports, and tech firm investigations reveals multiple cases of PRC-linked actors trying to mar the reputation of legislative candidates or even entire parliaments in the Asia-Pacific, Europe, and North America. Thus, it is not out of the question that an emergent campaign could smear the reputation of non-presidential targets, including congressional candidates critical of Beijing.

Learning Lessons From Elsewhere

In Taiwan’s general elections in January, for example, alongside a well-documented operation by the Chinese regime to sway the presidential race, reports have also emerged of troll attacks and disinformation targeting parliamentary candidates from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) disfavored by Beijing. In one case, DPP legislator Lin Ching-yi had her social media posts swamped with vulgar accusations and sexual overtones. False information also spread claiming that she had plagiarized her thesis.

It is hard to determine the impact of these attacks on voters, but ultimately Lin lost her seat in parliament. Indeed, the DPP lost its majority, though displeasure over the economy and social issues, as well as a third party gaining many seats – rather than PRC disinformation – is considered by experts to have contributed to that outcome.

In Europe, seven French MPs were the target of a phishing attack linked to China. Another French candidate in June’s European Parliament elections was warned that PRC-linked accounts were spreading claims he was a “Trojan Horse” for the United States and even a CIA agent.

In Canada, two sets of China-linked influence operations are worth noting. One targeted four MPs – three of Asian descent – using various tactics to harm their reputation and cut off access to constituents. These included coordinated attacks and false information spread about the candidate on WeChat, a social media platform owned by Chinese tech giant Tencent and used widely in the diaspora. They also involved offline pressure on Chinese community organizations not to invite disfavored candidates to events or urging ordinary voters not to volunteer with their campaigns.

In August-September 2023, another campaign in Canada combined social media posts on multiple platforms and AI-enhanced videos that made it appear as if a prominent Chinese dissident was accusing Canadian politicians across the political spectrum of ethical and criminal violations, all the while making anti-Muslim comments. Although the attempt was exposed and debunked, it demonstrated the potential for PRC-linked operations to try to achieve dual goals at once: harm the reputations of both Canadian lawmakers and critics from among the Chinese diaspora.

In Australia in early 2023, amid actual scandals emerging from misdeeds in parliamentary offices, China-linked accounts were found to be generating new, false information and circulating it to further undermine trust in the institution.

Implications for Upcoming U.S. Congressional Races

Several dimensions of these campaigns are notable when considering the implications for the U.S. political landscape and upcoming congressional or local races.

First, with the exception of Taiwan, all of these operations were party-agnostic. In other words, they were not trying to turn voters away from or toward a particular political party or segment of the domestic political spectrum.

Second, there was a common factor shared by these disinformation campaign: The targets were individual lawmakers known for being vocal critics of the Chinese government and its rights abuses. Some of those targeted by hacking or disinformation targeted were lawmakers who have been sanctioned by Beijing for their outspokenness or are members of entities like the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC). IPAC is a coalition of over 250 lawmakers from 40 countries who take joint action to support victims of Beijing’s repression or counter malign CCP influence targeting foreign countries.

From this perspective, there are a number of U.S. lawmakers – both Democrats and Republicans – who might be deemed ripe targets. IPAC itself includes eight U.S. senators and representatives in a bipartisan delegation. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), which holds hearings and publishes an annual report on PRC rule of law violations, counts among its members nine representatives and nine senators from both parties.

Twelve of those 18 members are running for re-election in November, as are five of the eight members of the U.S. IPAC delegation. A small number of U.S. lawmakers – including Representative Jim McGovern (a Democrat from Massachusetts) and Senator Ted Cruz (a Republican from Texas) – have faced sanctions from Beijing in retaliation for their own or the U.S. government’s outspokenness on rights violations in China, including Hong Kong. Both are running for re-election this year.

Representative Chris Smith, a Republican from New Jersey, co-chair of the CECC, and the sponsor of various pieces of legislation on human rights and religious freedom in China is also running and could be a tempting target for Beijing, but has also typically won a large proportion of votes in his district. Democrat Sherrod Brown, an articulate and outspoken critic of the CCP’s authoritarian rule in China and its implications for the United States, as well as a long-standing member and former co-chair of the CECC, could be more vulnerable given how tight a race he is facing in Ohio.

Let’s hope that the CCP and its proxies do not try to influence U.S. public opinion about these lawmakers or tilt these electoral contests. However, if recent events in elections around the world are any indication, their campaigns, relevant U.S. agencies, and major social media platforms should still keep their eyes peeled for PRC-linked disinformation in the run-up to November.